FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

JANUARY 1958

Alternatives for Security	*Edward Teller*	201
An Inward Look	*Robert Oppenheimer*	209
Earth Satellites and Foreign Policy	*Lloyd V. Berkner*	221
The Middle East: Conflict in Priorities	*John S. Badeau*	232
The Revolution in Soviet Strategic Thinking	*Herbert S. Dinerstein*	241
Gandhi Ten Years After	*Frank Moraes*	253
Laws and Men in Soviet Society	*John N. Hazard*	267
NATO: Deterrent or Shield?	*Malcolm W. Hoag*	278
The Political Impact of New Population Trends	*Kingsley Davis*	293
Last Chance in North Africa	*Lorna Hahn*	302
The Intelligentsia in Changing China	*Y. Chu Wang*	315
Where India, China and Russia Meet	*Kusum Nair*	330
Communism in Iceland	*Mary S. Olmsted*	340
Recent Books on International Relations	*Henry L. Roberts*	348
Source Material	*Ruth Savord*	365

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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ALTERNATIVES FOR SECURITY

By Edward Teller

IN the years since the end of World War II the United States has acted with the wisdom that comes from sad experience. Had we been as active in the 1930s in foreign affairs as we are now, World War II would not have occurred. Had we paid as much attention to our military preparedness between the two world wars as we pay at the present time, we would not have been caught unprepared by the last great conflict. Both our foreign and our military policies have become much more mature. The unfortunate fact is that even these improved efforts, which came too late, are now also proving too little for our present needs.

Twelve years ago the Soviet Union had a powerful land army. Nevertheless our own over-all military potential was incomparably greater. What is even more important, our technology was in full bloom while that of Russia had been severely damaged by the Nazi assault. Perhaps most important of all, the United States was obviously and decisively ahead of Russia in the field of science. Science is the breeding ground of new technical advances and we had every reason to expect that we would stay ahead of Russia in technology for many years to come.

A mere 12 years later, spectacular Soviet successes prove to the world that scientific and technical leadership is slipping from our hands. This is happening in a field which has obvious and menacing military applications. At the same time it is happening in a field which comes closest to the realization of a human ambition which is one of the oldest and most inspiring: the ambition to reach the stars.

This Russian challenge needs not one response but many. Some are urgent. Some will necessarily take a longer time. All of them will require sacrifices. Meanwhile, we face immediate problems of security for ourselves and our allies. I should like to discuss here two principal ways in which we may seek to improve our

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chances of safety in a world which appears to become less safe with each passing year.

One way seems the more logical and more appealing at first sight. It is to find peace for the whole world through disarmament. The thought of war has never seemed more dreadful than it is at present, and the desire for peace has never been more passionate and universal. Disarmament has become the hope and the symbol for an ultimate peaceful solution of all our problems.

There is another way toward greater safety but, by comparison, it seems to be a makeshift. It is to strengthen further our ties with the other nations of the free world, and in coöperation with them to develop a capacity to deal with a variety of threats to our security, including the capacity to wage a limited war. Indeed, coöperation with our allies cannot be considered in a concrete manner without discussing the technology of a limited war. In the minds of most of our allies the question of limited war is as important as that of total war. After all, the total war may even pass over their heads and they might hope to weather the storm in comparative safety.

II

Since a political solution of the global problem is nowhere in sight, it has been proposed to make the world more peaceful by eliminating the means rather than the causes of war. To be strongly armed in times of peace is not in the American tradition. Disarmament, at first partial, and later perhaps more complete, would appear therefore both logical and desirable.

The desire for disarmament is perhaps even stronger among our allies than it is in the United States. One can easily understand that war-torn countries living under the shadow of bigger and more powerfully armed nations would enthusiastically welcome any development which will reduce everybody's military efforts.

My main argument here will be based on technical rather than on historical facts. But I cannot refrain from mentioning the most obvious historical analogies which come to mind. It is widely believed, and it may well be true, that the First World War was caused by an arms race. Yet it seems to me even more obvious that the Second World War was brought about by a race in disarmament. The Allied countries, though strong and interested in the maintenance of peace, neglected their defense. When

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Nazi Germany started to rearm, public thinking and public action were too slow and the Allies were caught unprepared. Historical analogies, however, are not reliable. We should not consider the past as proof that disarmament (or limitation of armaments) is a bad idea. But we should also refrain from arguing: history proves that disarmament will prevent war. Most certainly a mere agreement to disarm is not sufficient.

Many ingenious schemes have been proposed in order to insure effective disarmament. It seems to me that there are at present two major reasons why such schemes are doomed to failure. One is the existence of the Iron Curtain. The other is the nature of modern scientific discoveries.

Modern war-making potential depends to an increasing extent on highly specialized weapons. Some of the most essential of these weapons can be hidden with relative ease. Nuclear explosives and long-range rockets are two outstanding examples. Thus, surveillance becomes more and more difficult. In addition, scientific and technical developments have produced and will produce unexpected types of weapons. How shall one check whether such weapons exist when the person who does the checking does not even know what he is looking for? We have most correctly emphasized that no disarmament scheme is acceptable unless the application of it can be verified. Few things are impossible; but it may actually be impossible to verify disarmament in the Soviet Union. The game is strongly weighted against us and the very rules are changing too fast.

Two years ago we attempted to insure the world against surprise attack by the "open sky" principle. Today we have to consider this concept in the light of the Russian satellite and the Russian intercontinental missile capability. The satellite has in a way implemented the idea of the open sky; through this development world-wide observation has become an obvious possibility. On the other hand, the launching of a massive attack by intercontinental ballistic missiles requires very little visible preparation. Therefore, observation from the open skies will not accomplish the purpose of advance warning.

III

Another proposal is to start disarmament by agreeing to stop the tests of nuclear bombs. It has been claimed that a nuclear test can be noticed around the world and that a ban on tests

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would therefore appear to be self-policing. Many additional arguments have been advanced for such a ban: the tests are considered a hazard to the health of all people and of generations yet unborn; and the tests are believed to lead to the development of even more horrible weapons. The expression "weapon test" has acquired repulsive connotations, implying the construction of a murderous instrument. Not satisfied with the probability of devastation, we perform a test to make quite sure of the degree of destruction we can cause.

Actually, a nuclear test is easily noticed only if it is performed in the most obvious manner. There can be no doubt that if a nation wants to carry out tests in secrecy, observation will become difficult and uncertain. In the contest between the bootlegger and the police, the bootlegger has a great advantage. Of course, it will cost some money and effort to hide nuclear explosions. But the Soviet Union has never been stingy where a military advantage has been at stake. On the other hand, our tradition and the structure of our society make it certain that we would not violate an international obligation to which we had agreed.

The danger of past tests to public health is certainly much smaller than other biological effects to which we are and have been exposed. The cosmic rays which bombard the earth are of greater influence and their intensity increases markedly with altitude. If you move from the seashore to Colorado, you expose yourself to considerably more additional activity than the accumulated effect of all past weapon tests. The effects of medical X-rays are greater still. It is repeatedly claimed that world-wide fall-out is certainly harmful, yet even this simple straightforward statement has not been proven conclusively.

All this, however, is far less important than the question: How will continued testing affect a future war? Further tests will put us into a position to fight our opponent's war-machine while sparing the innocent bystanders. One development of the greatest importance is the progressive reduction of radioactive fall-out. Clean weapons of this kind will reduce unnecessary casualties in a future war. At the same time we are developing nuclear weapons which can be used to shoot down high-flying attacking planes without endangering the life of anyone below. The complete safety of a person standing directly beneath such an aerial duel was demonstrated in a lifelike experiment in Nevada. Also, nuclear explosives could have many peaceful purposes if they were

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sufficiently clean. A ban on tests would stop our development before we could make our explosives more flexible, more humane, and before we could put them to a constructive use.

Nuclear tests are conducted to try out new scientific principles. It would be more proper to talk not about weapon tests but rather about experiments with nuclear explosives. These experiments are closely connected with the laws which determine the internal functioning of stars. One is tempted to call the tests experiments in astrophysical engineering.

A ban on nuclear tests has been widely advocated as a simple, practical and beneficial first step toward disarmament. In fact, such a ban could not be enforced, would make a future war more brutal and would be beneficial only to that party which could and would violate the ban by secret testing.

It is not possible to assert that all attempts at disarmament will fail. Each proposal should be considered on its merits. But the example of a ban on nuclear tests illustrates the difficulties we face when trying to agree with a clever and ruthless opponent on the limitation of technical devices which are changing their nature from year to year as new inventions are added to the old.

IV

In the thermonuclear-rocket age all-out war is in nobody's interest. If war cannot be avoided at least it should be limited. But how can this be done? If we agree to limit the kinds of weapons that are to be used, the side which finds itself losing will be under overwhelming temptation to disregard the limitation. Our announced policy is that in case of war we shall use the most effective weapons available to us. This is plain common sense.

Limitation of warfare is possible in a different manner. We cannot limit the *means* of war. We can limit the *aims* of war and also the territory in which fighting takes place. That this can be done is borne out by examples in history. Furthermore, the loser in such warfare is not tempted to widen the conflict, because in doing so he would expose himself to a greater loss at the precise time when he is in a weak position.

If we do not limit the means of a future war we obviously accept the use of nuclear weapons. This raises the spectre of cities in ruins, non-combatants killed by the millions, and radioactive contamination spreading outside the battle zone, across the borders of neutral countries. The future is uncertain and one

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cannot assert that these horrible possibilities will not occur. I believe, however, that they need not occur. There are good reasons to believe that a limited nuclear war can be fought in a humane way—if any aspect of war can be called humane.

In a limited conflict world opinion will be a factor of considerable weight. For this reason as well as for reasons of good military planning it will be best to concentrate on the enemy's fighting power. To spare non-combatants will be in the interest of both sides. If we develop clean nuclear weapons we can eliminate the danger of a poisonous cloud deposited by unpredictable winds. If at the same time the Russians use weapons with a heavy fallout they will lose supporters. They may choose to be callous—but in that case they will have to pay a price.

In World War II cities were subjected to heavy bombardment. There was a military reason for this. The cities were important as producers of weapons and as centers of supply lines. A limited war of the future will be fought with small and highly mobile units of great firepower. Such warfare is made possible by flexible atomic weapons, by easily delivered rockets, by the ubiquitous and readily available air-transports and by the excellence of modern equipment for communications. By these means and by these means alone can we be of real and prompt assistance to other free countries. If we continue to plan for the slowly moving conventional warfare, we cannot arrive in time to stop piecemeal aggression on the periphery of the Communist empire.

In a highly mobile nuclear war, bombardment of cities will be pointless, unless hostilities are prolonged. Having ceased to be hubs of transportation of men and matériel, cities will become of much smaller importance in over-all strategy. There will be little military reason to destroy them.

Nuclear weapons will certainly cause a considerable amount of unintended damage. But the enormous lumbering armies of the conventional wars did not spare the civilian population either. It is not clear that the devastating firepower of a mobile war of the future will leave more ruins in its wake than did the clumsy fighting machines of the past. The main rôle of nuclear weapons will be to prevent the use of massed military power. Therefore, the will of the local population is going to become a more important factor in a future limited war. Guerrilla activities in many places during recent years, as well as the destruction of tanks by poorly armed and ill-trained youngsters, have shown what de-

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termined people can do in a fight on their home grounds. A highly mobile force armed with modern weapons might conquer the world if not opposed by a similar force. But in a war where modern weapons are available on each side the decision may well depend on the local population. Therefore, the mobile army of the future should be considered as the guardian of freedom.

By mutual help, the free countries can greatly increase their chances of national survival and of independence. They can do so, however, only if they coöperate and coördinate all their technical means. The most modern arms must be made a part of the joint planning. This raises the question of secrecy, for close coöperation cannot be planned without sharing most—maybe all—technical secrets. Yet the more widely a secret is shared, the sooner it may become known to the enemy. We must therefore consider how much we are likely to lose by sharing our secrets.

In 1945 we would have lost very much indeed if all our secrets had become known to the Russians. At that time we had a great technical advantage; in the field of atomic weapons we enjoyed a monopoly. Undoubtedly some secret information was lost to spies who worked for the Communists, but a whole complex technology cannot be given away by a few reports. The reasons to guard our information remained strong.

At the present time we do not seem to be ahead of the Russians in military technology or in science. Differences remain which are to our advantage in some fields and are to the advantage of the Russians in others. Science and its military applications have made giant strides behind the Iron Curtain in the last 12 years. This fast development shows that Russian education must be excellent. Soviet progress proves that our competitors are moving ahead with a most impressive momentum. It is practically certain that they will surpass us in the next few years.

Let us look into this situation more concretely. We have plenty of evidence that Russian children between the ages of 10 and 20 receive a better technical education than do our own youngsters. These children will be the most active scientists a decade hence. As the lead-time in scientific education is long, we probably cannot prevent the loss of our scientific leadership. The best we can hope for is to recapture later what we are losing now.

If we are no longer foremost in science and in military technology, our secrets will obviously be of less value. Most of our secrets will be known to the Russians from their own work. It

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does not follow that we must abandon all secrecy, but it is clear that we can more easily afford to share our secrets with our allies. It would seem to me that henceforth it is less important to keep our secrets and more important to produce additional knowledge and additional technical tools. Our security lies in speed; our allies could be most helpful in our efforts to attain it.

American science has surpassed the European because of our mass education. We have sown our seed more widely and more fruit was borne. Soviet Russia is surpassing us now because to mass education she has added the highest incentives for technical and scientific accomplishments. This competition will not be easy for us to win.

To help our allies to educate more scientists and engineers is one obvious move in the battle for future leadership. To integrate the efforts of the free nations in military technology is another. The miracles of modern science are not created by one brain and one pair of hands. We need broad financial support, teamwork and the spirit of friendly competition. We need the spirit of World War II which merged into a common and urgent enterprise the work of American, British and Canadian scientists. The present emergency is even greater. The response must be greater if freedom is to survive.

I would like to summarize my ideas in a simple statement. Let us start our planning with the word "Do." It is a mistake to begin with "Don't." Prohibition is futile. Action can be fruitful. I do not believe that disarmament will prevent war. I do believe that active, close and full coöperation between free nations can lay the foundations of a peaceful future.

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AN INWARD LOOK

By Robert Oppenheimer

THE conflict with Communist power from time to time throws a harsh light on our own society. As this conflict continues, and its obduracy, scope and deadliness become increasingly manifest, we begin to see traits in American society of which we were barely aware, and which in this context appear as grievous disabilities. Perhaps the first thus to come to attention is our inability to give an account of our national purposes, intentions and hopes that is at once honest and inspiring. It is a long time since anyone has spoken, on behalf of this country, of our future or the world's future in a way that suggested complete integrity, some freshness of spirit and a touch of the plausible.

Two other national traits have more recently aroused grave concern. Because the conflict with Communist power is taking place concurrently with an extreme acceleration of a technological revolution, and in particular because these last years have marked the maturing of the military phases of the atomic age, public attention has been drawn to the relative effectiveness of the Soviet system and ours in the training and recruiting of scientists and technical people. This comparison has shown that, in a field where once we were better than the Russians, we may soon be less good. The Soviet system, by combining formidable and rare incentives for success in science and technology with a massive search for talent and with rigorous and high standards in early education, appears about to attract to scientific work a larger fraction of its population than we shall be doing.

When we learned this, it was natural to turn our attention to its causes. Some of these lie in the relatively low esteem in which learning is held in this country and, above all, in our indifference to the profession of teaching, especially teaching in the schools, a low esteem that is both manifested and caused by the fact that we pay our teachers poorly and our scientists not too well. The grimness of life in Soviet countries makes it easy to translate prestige into luxury and privilege. We do not want it so here. Yet on closer examination we have seen that in our own schools

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educational standards are far lower for languages, mathematics and the sciences than in their Soviet counterparts. We have learned that many of our teachers are not really versed in the subjects which it is their duty to teach and, in many cases, their lack of knowledge is matched by their lack of affection or interest. In brief, we have come upon a problem of the greatest gravity for the life of our people by matching ourselves against a remote and unloved antagonist.

Something of the same kind appears to be happening in a quite different area. This has to do with the ability of our Government —in fact, with the ability of our institutions and our people through our Government—to determine national policy in those areas that have to do with foreign affairs and strategy, military and political. To quote Mr. W. W. Rostow in an address to the Naval War College late in 1956:

> I do not believe we as a nation have yet created a military policy and a civil foreign policy designed to fulfill [our purposes] and to exploit the potentials for social and political change favorable to our interest within the Communist Bloc. . . . Historically, the United States has thrown its energies into the solution of military and foreign policy problems only when it faced concrete, self-evident dangers.

Or again, Mr. Henry Kissinger wrote in the April 1957 issue of *Foreign Affairs*:

> By establishing a pattern of response *in advance* of crisis situations, strategic doctrine permits a Power to act purposefully in the face of challenges. In its absence a Power will constantly be surprised by events. An adequate strategic doctrine is therefore the basic requirement of American security.

It is now a widely held view that, despite the organization of the executive branch of the Government to cope precisely with long-range problems, foreign policy and military strategy; despite the rôle assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council and the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State; despite the availability to these organizations of the technical and intellectual talent of the whole of this country and, to a more limited extent, of the whole free world—despite all this, the United States has not developed an understanding of its purposes, its interests, its alternatives and plans for the future in any way adequate to the gravity of the problems that the country faces. There is a widespread impression that we live from astonishment to surprise, and from surprise to astonishment, never adequately forewarned or forearmed, and more often than

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not choosing between evils, when forethought and foreaction might have provided happier alternatives. Why should this state of affairs exist in a country rich with wealth and leisure, dedicated to education, with a larger part of its citizenry involved in education than in any other land at any other time, with more colleges, universities, institutes and centers than anyone cares to count, and at a time when unparalleled powers in the hands of a dedicated and hostile state threaten us more grievously than ever since the early days of the Republic?

There are, of course, other national traits of which we can scarcely be proud, on which neither the atomic age nor the conflict with Communism has put much emphasis. We may think, for instance, of our great wantonness with our country's resources; we may think of the scarcity of instances in which a concern for public beauty and harmony has made of the physical environment in which we live that comfort to the spirit which the loveliness of our land and our great wealth could well make possible.

Indeed, all of the traits in which we judge ourselves harshly could have been drawn by historians comparing us with past cultures, or observers of the current scene comparing us with those contemporary. We should then, perhaps, have noted that no people has ever solved the educational problem which we have put to ourselves, and that no government, in a world in which few governments succeed for very long, has ever succeeded in a problem of the scope and toughness of that which faces ours. Indeed we could recognize the traits of weakness in our society in terms of a norm or an ideal, and hear of them from the philosopher or prophet. I believe, in fact, that these ways are the more constructive, because I believe, as will be more evident in what follows, that the traits that bother us are signs of a rather deep, refractory and quite unprecedented cultural crisis, and that in the end they will yield, not to symptomatic therapy, but to changes in our life, changes in what we believe, what we do and what we value.

For the problems of our country and our age have hardly in historical times arisen in anything like their present form; certainly they have never been resolved. If our adversary appears to have solved them better than we, it may be healthy for us to note that; it can hardly be healthy for us to adopt his means. He knows what he wants, because he has a simple theory of the

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meaning of human life and of his place in it. With the strength of that confidence, he has a government prepared to take, at vast human cost, all necessary steps to reach his ends. That there is only a small, fragmentary, largely obsolete taint of truth to his theory, that it excludes the greater part of truth, and the deeper, should give us some confidence that he will not succeed. That his failure may be marked by a vast if not universal human involvement, and an unparalleled devastation and horror, should temper our pleasure in this prospect and return us to the solution of our problems on our own terms, in our own way, in our own good time.

For the traits of weakness in our society we can see grounds that are at once multiple, intelligible and ironic. I think that the three weaknesses—in our education, in our faltering view of the future, and in our difficulties in the formulation of policy—have some common grounds; but they are not the same, and to follow them all is not the purpose of this paper. Certainly egalitarianism and our traditionally cherished tolerance of diversity, diversity precisely on the most fundamental issues of man's nature and destiny, his salvation and faith, certainly these qualities, long held as virtues, have much to do with our troubles in education where they define, as it were, the insoluble problem; they have much to do with the difficulties of prophecy and policy, which traditionally rest on consensus precisely with regard to those matters where we are dedicated to difference. The good fortune of the country, speaking in large terms and over the centuries, and its consequent optimism and confidence, have something to do with our troubles. Perhaps we would not change these things, but we must give weight to them, when we compare ourselves with Athens, or Elizabethan England, or Victorian, or seventeenth century France.

Our weaknesses, of course, have a touch of irony. It is our very confidence in education, our determination that it should be available to all, our belief that through it man will find dignity and freedom, that have played so large a part in reducing our educational system to the half-empty mockery that it now is. When, for the first time in years of formal peace, we have devoted effort, study, thought and treasure to the quest for military security, we have brought about the most fearful insecurity that has been known to man in what we know of his history.

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II

It is commonly said that our national culture favors practice over theory, action over thought, invention over contemplation. There is some truth to this thesis. It should not be exaggerated. For one thing, the balance between operation and reflection must always, everywhere, numerically favor the doers as compared to the reflectors; even in Athens there were quite a few Sophists for one Socrates; and I find it hard to imagine any society in which the world's work does not occupy more people more of the time than does an understanding of the world. For another, the balance between these aspects of life has been accented by circumstance, in that the doers in our country have had great good fortune to mark and celebrate their deeds: the country's wealth, its spaciousness, its wide measure of freedom, and, on the whole, its prevailing optimism. It would take quite considerable accomplishments of theory and understanding to match the brilliance, often almost the impudence, of our material creations.

Our past has always been marked by a few original and deeply reflective minds whose work, though it was part of the intellectual tradition of Europe and the world, has nevertheless a peculiarly national stamp, as in the four names of Peirce, Gibbs, James, Veblen. Today, in almost all fields of natural science, and in some others as well, our country is preëminent in theory as it is in experiment, invention and practice. This has meant a great change in the educational scene, as far as higher education is concerned, in the graduate schools, in post-doctoral work, in the institutes and universities. Part of this, it is true, has come about because of misfortunes abroad: the two wars in Europe, and the Nazis, the initial effects of Communist power in Russia, which for a time at least made conditions of serious study very difficult. It has been brought about in part by the coming to this country of scholars in refuge from their régimes, from tyranny and trouble abroad. Nevertheless it is true that today a young man wishing the best training in theoretical physics or mathematics, theoretical chemistry or biology, will be likely to come to this country, as three decades ago he would have gone to the schools of Europe. It was important, after the end of the Second World War, when there was much public interest in the successes in applied science which the war years had brought about in this country, to combat any exaggerated sense of American superiority by pointing to the

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great contributions for which we were in debt to Europeans and others from other lands; but to repeat today that which was only partially true then, namely that Americans excel in practical undertakings but are weak in theory, is to distort the truth. It should be added, of course, that the number of men engaged in theoretical science is always small and, even with us today, it is very small. Their work and their existence can have little direct bearing on the temper and style of the country.

Having said all this, it does seem to me that in comparison with other civilizations—that of classic India surely, that on the continent of Europe, and probably even that of England, where theory is brilliantly made but largely ignored in practice—ours is a land in which practice is emphasized far more than theory, and action far more than contemplation. In the difficult balance of teaching, we tend to teach too much in terms of utility and too little in terms of beauty. And if and when we "do it ourselves," it is unlikely to be learning and thought.

To see the bearing of this trait, we should recognize another feature of the American landscape: in important, deep and complex ways, this is a land of diversity; and it tolerates, respects and fosters diversity in the form of a true pluralism. There is much theory made in the United States: cosmological theory, theory of genetic processes, theory about the nature of immunity, theory about the nature of matter, theory about learning, about prices, about communication; but there is no unifying theory of what human life is about; there is no consensus either as to the nature of reality or of the part we are to play in it; there is no theory of the good life and not much theory of the rôle of government in promoting it. The diverse talents, skills, beliefs and experience of our people contribute effectively to the solution of a concrete problem, to answering the well-defined question, to the building of a machine, or a structure, or a weapon system; and in such concrete and limited exercises, the diversity and strangeness of the participants is harmonized by the community of the concrete undertaking. The team of experts, sometimes including experts from social science, was an immensely successful invention for wartime research, and continues to be in many forms of technical enterprise. It continues to be inappropriate, and tends to languish, in the general undertakings of academic life.

American pluralism can no doubt in part be understood in terms of our history, and those features in which we differ from

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most of the communities of Europe and of much of Asia. We may think of the relatively primitive communities in the Indian villages of the Southwest, which some of us may still remember from the earlier years of this century. The quality of their life was relatively static and highly patterned; all of its elements were coherent, and were rendered unified and meaningful by religious rites and religious doctrine. Change was slow, and communication adequate to the limited experience of the villagers. Such communities represent almost an ideal of unity, of common understanding, and of a monistic view of the world. There has been little of the village in American life. The frontier, the openness of the country, and later the immense rapidity of change and the tumult of motion and traffic, have given us a very different national experience. Probably for two centuries New England had the stability of village life; and I believe that we see today, in the coherence, firmness and mutual understanding of its survivors, one of the most stable and unified elements in our country. Probably, although I know less of this, one could find a similar story in the South, though the fortunes of the last hundred years have dealt harshly with it.

Even if we turn our thoughts to Europe, the site of so much of the commotion, disillusion and variety which characterize our own land, we see important differences; there is a long past of limited mobility, culminating in the thirteenth century in the unified view of all matters important to man, in a universe determined by God, with God omnipresent, with the unvarying natures of all finite things, and the ever-present end and purpose of man's life. When this world began to break, it broke slowly, first in the minds of the philosophers and scientists. It was not until the seventeenth century that the turn from contemplation to action can be seen with any completeness; long after it occurred, its consequences were still troubling to John Donne: " 'Tis all in peeces, all cohaerence gone, All just supply, and all Relation." Man's awareness of his power came slowly to Europe; it came to people bound by a common tongue, a common habit and common traditions in taste, manners, arts and ways.

Compared to all this, Americans are nomads. There is, of course, much in common in what brought people to this country; but in overwhelming measure, what was common was either negative or personal and practical: the desire to escape repression, or the hope of making a new fortune. In the formative years of our

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history, emptiness, the need and reward for improvisation, variety, and the open frontier endowed the differences between men with weight and sanction. Our political philosophy undertook to reconcile the practical benefits of union with the maximum tolerance of diversity. To all of this has come within the last century, and complementing the closing of the physical frontier, a new source of change, more radical and in the end more universal than those before. This lies, on the one hand, in the unprecedented growth of knowledge, whose time scale, estimated apprehensively as a half century two hundred years ago, could better now be put at a decade; and with this, based partly upon it, partly upon accumulated wealth, and partly on the tradition of freedom and mobility itself, a technological explosion and an economy unlike any the world has seen.

Early in this century, William James wrote:

> The point I now urge you to observe particularly is the part played by the older truths. . . . Their influence is absolutely controlling. Loyalty to them is the first principle—in most cases it is the only principle; for by far the most usual way of handling phenomena so novel that they would make for a serious rearrangement of our preconception is to ignore them altogether, or to abuse those who bear witness for them.

In our time the balance between the old truths and the new has been unhinged, and it is not unnatural that most men limit, in the severest possible way, the number and the kind of new truths with which they will have to deal. This is what makes the intellectual scene a scene of specialists, and this is what makes our people, for all the superficial evidences of similarity, more varied in their experience, more foreign to each other in the tongues which they use to talk of what is close to them, than in any time or place which comes to mind; this is what limits consensus to statements so vague that they may mean almost anything, or to situations so stark and threatening and so immediate that no theoretical structure, no world view, need intervene.

Perhaps the most nearly coherent of all our large theoretical structures is that of natural science. It is hardly relevant to many of the questions of policy and strategy with which our Government must be confronted; to some it is. This coherence is, however, of a very special sort: it consists by and large in an absence of contradiction between any part and any other, and in a pervasive, often only potential mutual relevance. It does not consist in a structural coherence by which the whole can be derived from

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some simple summary, some key, some happy mnemonic device. There are thus no fundamentals of science. Its largest truths are not definable in terms of common experience; nor do they imply the rest. Our knowledge of nature is in no true sense common knowledge; it is the treasure of the many flourishing specialized communities, often cut off from one another in their rapid growth. Never has our common knowledge been so frail a part of what is known. Natural science is not known, and probably cannot be known, by anyone; small parts of it are; and in the world of learning there is mediation in the great dark of ignorance between the areas of light.

In assessing the practical import of scientific developments, the Government may be faced by a reflection of this situation. Even in so relatively limited a field as the peacetime hazards of atomic radiation, it cannot turn to an expert for the answer. It turns to the National Academy of Sciences, which assembles a series of committees, both numerous and populous, whose collective knowledge and collective recognition of ignorance is, for the time being, our best answer.

In other aspects of intellectual life, more relevant to policy and to strategy, we find a situation not wholly dissimilar, though less formalized and less clearly recognized. In our own internal affairs, knowledge on the part of the Government of what the situations in fact are with which it must deal is complemented by a traditional safeguard in our political institutions. If, in fact, the executive and legislative branches of the Government have erred in their assessment of the problems of Northwestern lumbermen, or of maritime labor, or of Marine recruits, there is opportunity for those who are specialists in these ways, because they live in them, to be heard; and there is an underlying tolerance, sometimes violated, sometimes ignored, which yet gives to the voice of those most deeply concerned, and most intimately and immediately knowledgeable, the grave weight of the doctrine of the concurrent majority. In foreign affairs, in matters affecting other lands and people, no such protection and no such redress exist. Here the Government must rely most heavily on what is essentially scholarship: what the historian, the linguist, the artist and all others who, with the slowly learned historian's art of judging, evaluating and understanding, can give as an intimate glimpse of what goes on in foreign and often very strange lands.

Faced with all this, faced with the complexity, the variety and

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the rapid change which characterize both the intellectual scene and the world itself, there is a terrible temptation to seek for the key that is not there, the simple summary from which all else might follow. We have tended to do that in the wars of this century, with, it would seem most probable, consequences of great trouble when we have come to the end of the war. It was probably bad even in the First World War, when our Government had a relatively elaborate and learned theory which was widely accepted by our people, but which was not quite true. It was probably bad in the Second World War, where the theory seemed to be very primitive and to consist of the view that evil, however widely spread in the world, was so uniquely concentrated in the governments of the hostile Powers that we could forget it elsewhere.

A government may, for more or less valid reasons, reach a conclusion as to what its action should be, as ours does when we declare war, or when we adopt such relatively well-defined policies as the Truman Doctrine. Such decisions, reflecting the best estimate of the evidence available when they are made, are acts of will; clearly, further evidence which supports the decisions reinforces the will, makes the prosecution of the war or the execution of the doctrine more likely to be effective. Evidence that the decisions may have been in error or may no longer be timely has a contrary effect. The human commitment to its own decisions, the human reluctance to learn and to change should not be reinforced by any doctrine which deprecates the truth, and therefore the value, of what is inconsistent with past evidence and past judgment. The danger lies, not so much in that the new and conflicting evidence may be weighed and given too little weight; it is that it will not even be seen, that our organs of intelligence and perception will be coded, much as our sense organs are, by our commitment, so that we will not even be aware of inconsistency and novelty.

I believe that we are now deeply injured by the simplifications of this time. The cold war is real, it is bitter, and it is deadly. But it is not the only issue in the world, and for countless other peoples and their governments it is not the issue they see in the brightest, harshest light. Such global views tend to inhibit the reception of essential knowledge because in the light of our dominant doctrine this knowledge appears irrelevant or somehow does not fit. That we are indeed in this danger seems to me clear from

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the extent to which the unfolding of history finds us always surprised.

There are two features of the situation that I have attempted to sketch that need a special comment. It seems to me that both the variety and the rate of change in our lives are likely to increase, that our knowledge will keep on growing, perhaps at a faster and faster rate, and that change itself will tend to be accelerated. In describing this world, there will probably be no synopses to spare us the effort of detailed learning. I do not think it likely that we are in a brief interval of change and apparent disorder which will soon be ended. The cognitive problem seems to me unprecedented in scope, one not put in this vast form to any earlier society, and one for which only the most general rules of behavior can be found in the past.

It also seems to me that we must look forward to a world in which this American problem is more nearly everyone's problem. The beginnings of this are perhaps as important in the present moods of Europe as are the history of the two Great Wars, Communism, the Nazis, and Europe's loss of political, military and economic power. The problems seem clearly implied in the determination of peoples in Africa and Asia, and in Central and South America, by means not yet devised and not at all understood, to achieve education, learning, technology and a new wealth. They form a part of the unrest, newly apparent in the intellectuals of the Soviet world, perhaps especially among their scientists, and increase the sombreness of any prospect of change from tyranny to freedom.

There are thus the most compelling external reasons why we, in this country, should be better able to take thought, and to make available in the pressing problems of policy and strategy the intellectual resources now so sorely lacking. They are needed in the struggle with Communism; they are needed if we are to have some understanding and some slight influence, in all the rest of the world, in the great changes that lie ahead for it. Awareness of this need will do us good; and I do not underestimate the value of its general recognition by the people of this country nor official recognition by their Government. It can only help to make money available to education and to teaching; it can only help to make the learned as well as the facile welcome in the proceedings of government policy-making. But though these measures are bitterly necessary, and though they are long

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overdue, the real thing will not, I fear, come from them alone.

There may be valid grounds for a difference of opinion as to whether an official recognition of a need, or even a generally understood recognition of a need among our people, will evoke the response to that need. What we here need is a vastly greater intellectual vigor and discipline; a more habitual and widespread openmindedness; and a kind of indefatigability, which is not inconsistent with fatigue but is inconsistent with surrender. It is not that our land is poor in curiosity, in true learning, in the habit of smelling out one's own self-delusion, in the dedication and search for order and law among novelty, variety and contingency. There is respect for learning and for expertness, and a proper recognition of the rôle of ignorance, and of our limits, both as men and as man; but of none of these is there enough, either among us, or in the value with which they are held by us, if indeed government by the people is not to perish.

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EARTH SATELLITES AND FOREIGN POLICY

By Lloyd V. Berkner

FROM the vantage point of 2100 A.D., the year 1957 will most certainly stand in history as the year of man's progression from a two-dimensional to a three-dimensional geography. It may well stand, also, as the point in time at which intellectual achievement forged ahead of weapons and national wealth as instruments of national policy.

The earth satellite is a magnificent expression of man's intellectual growth—of his ability to manipulate to his own purposes the very laws that govern his universe. In the message of President Bronk of the U.S. Academy of Sciences to Nesmeyanov, President of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., the widespread view of American scientists of the real meaning of the event was aptly expressed:

> On behalf of the National Academy of Sciences of the U.S.A., I wish to congratulate you and your Academy of Sciences, U.S.S.R., for the great achievement of placing an earth satellite in orbit. This is a brilliant contribution to the furtherance of science for which scientists everywhere will be grateful.

We should not make the mistake of seeing in the satellite merely the symbol of a foreign Power's military progress. It does, of course, represent important advances in military capability. But quite irrespective of the usual interaction of scientific and military strength, the satellite symbolizes an intellectual attainment that may dominate the period immediately ahead as the most powerful single instrument of national policy. We should examine this view closely, or we may unwittingly miss the opportunity to realize its great potentialities.

Since the instrumented satellite represents very advanced science and technology, I should like to review some of its special scientific properties. We must remember that we on the earth are sandwiched between an insulating atmosphere above and the earth beneath. The protective atmosphere above admits but a single octave of light and a few octaves of radio waves from the heavenly bodies. These restricted radiations, together with a few meteors and cosmic rays that penetrate this blanket of atmosphere, have given us an almost monochromatic view of the universe—of the space through which the Earth is coursing

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on its orbit. Yet this almost colorless view has provided the clues from which the laws of motion were formulated—laws that govern much of present-day engineering. It has stimulated our realization of the laws of relativity that have led us to nuclear energy.

The artificial satellite now permits us to see the universe for the first time in its full range of "color." I use the word "color" in the special sense that the satellite broadens the range of our vision of the occupants of space from a narrow spectrum of vision to the whole spectrum of nature—from the shortest to the longest wave lengths, from the lowest to the highest particle energies. This new, chromatic view lets us see the sun and the stars in quite a new way, with the view from the satellite translated to our senses on the earth through intermediate radio channels that are easily controlled and interpreted.

Future satellites will be ideal platforms from which telescopes of every variety can be employed by a diversity of new methods to examine and explore the sun and the universe and the space around us. The artificial satellites move through the tenuous cloud of particles that extend from the sun's corona through the earth's orbit. It moves through space in which the cosmic rays are as yet uncontaminated by collisions in the atmosphere, in space swept by intense streams of particles from the sun and the meteoric dust of space. These can now be examined at first hand.

Man's satellite looks back at the earth and scans it twice each day. For the first time man can see terrestrial phenomena on a planetary scale. He will learn how many storms disturb the weather at any time and how and where they form, move and disintegrate. The driving energy of the great atmospheric heat engine that produces our weather from the heat of the sun will be measured within the year. The great reservoirs of heat and cold whose flow is sometimes inhibited and then subsequently overflows with catastrophic results can be watched in detail. Certainly, a revolution in our knowledge and control of the weather is impending. As the satellite scans the earth, particle streams can be measured as they impinge on the atmosphere, and the flashing of aurorae will be observed in their full range of color from outside the atmosphere of planet earth. The distortions of the geomagnetic field can be measured, and their origins traced and identified. Geography and geodesy can be learned with precision. Certainly, then, the instrumented earth satellite is not a

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"stunt"—it is a superlative scientific tool that, in skillful hands, will vastly enlarge man's vision of his environment. By escaping into space, man has dropped the "gray" monochromatic vision of the insect—he can now see the full glory of the whole range of color that the universe provides. His knowledge and comprehension and eventually his control of his environment will grow accordingly.

The satellite is the first step towards man's dream of interplanetary travel—a dream that is now almost within his grasp. Quite aside from the adventure, quite aside from unevaluated ideas of occupying other planets, the scientific knowledge to be acquired in such exploration is prodigious. That there are some forms of plant life and perhaps even animal life on Mars, for example, seems quite certain. The differences in evolutionary patterns under presumably independent circumstances could easily provide basic keys to the origin of life itself. This is but a single example of a wide range of extraordinary scientific vistas that will be opened to the interplanetary voyager. The satellite is but one step removed from the space platforms from which future interplanetary travel may well be launched. Scientists of the Soviet Union have announced their intention of taking such a step.

The satellite, then, should be properly viewed as a major advance in man's opportunity for growth. Command of its techniques is symbolic of the highest skills in a wide range of scientific disciplines. The vital point is not so much that the Soviet satellite preceded that of the United States, heretofore credited as the leader of world technology; it is that the United States, for the first time, finds a challenging competitor in the most advanced scientific fields. The achievement of the Soviet satellite has demonstrated to Americans what they refused to believe before, that they are in a race for intellectual leadership when they hadn't realized that there was a race, or even that another nation had the capability to challenge their technology. In the complacency of our assumed technological lead, we have confused our high standards of living and material prosperity with intellectual stature. It is an extravagant and dangerous mistake.

The race for intellectual preëminence has as its objective the creation of a new instrument of national policy to supplement the traditional instruments of military power and of national wealth. Intellectual stature contributes to both the latter, but

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it should not be confused with them, for it is potentially a new and powerful instrument of national policy in itself.

Now that we are forced to think of the earth as a planet in the scientific sense, there are even more impelling reasons to view it thus in a political sense as well. Let us look back for a moment at the instruments of national policy in the pre-*sputnik* era. Predominant physical strength has always been a deciding factor in combat between individuals, tribes and nations. With the advance of civilization, however, man found that productive capacity was also an essential instrument of national policy, and therefore a second prerequisite to world leadership. Of course, national wealth became more and more essential to a strong military machine as the conduct of war became more totally demanding on the resources of a nation; but as an instrument of policy national wealth was much more than this. It could control and direct the flow of the world's goods and the growth of the world's sources of power. In time of peace, the franc or the mark or the pound sterling or the dollar was inevitably a major instrument of policy when coördinated with the requisite military strength. As late as the first quarter of the twentieth century, this was enough.

But again looking back from the vantage point of the year 2100, what do we find the situation to have been at mid-twentieth century? We find that a subtle change has taken place. First of all, military power has tended to become absolute and relatively easy to acquire. Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. have acquired the power to destroy a people and all its wealth by a single blow. The same power is easily acquirable by any nation of substantial strength. The blast, fire and radioactive fall-out of a single overnight attack by a thousand modern weapons suitably directed can decimate the population of any nation, level its factories and render its land at least temporarily uninhabitable.

The principal contenders, the Soviet bloc and the West, can ill afford to tap this power, since its use by either side means instant retaliation by the other and leaves little doubt as to the ultimate destruction of both. One side dares not allow the other an appreciable military advantage lest he put it to use and escape unscathed. So while *military advantage* becomes a vital objective of both contenders, military power as an instrument of policy is, at least for the time being, noticeably weakened. In the face of near total destruction, neither side can have the confidence of

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victory essential to useful employment of the more total aspects of military strength as effective tools of policy.

This is not to say that military force cannot or will not be used, but that its employment is sufficiently dangerous to the user in its present total form to imply that it can be used only with the greatest circumspection and for compelling motives. Therefore, this instrument of policy is not so readily adaptable as it once was for use in solving most world problems. The fact that it can be used only in extreme situations has encouraged the Soviet bloc to resort to creeping and less provocative means of encroaching on the ideals and interests of the West. While jealously guarding its military stature in this critical situation, an intelligent national leadership therefore is forced to look for additional and more applicable instruments of national policy.

At mid-twentieth century we find that a second major change is occurring in the traditional instruments of policy. Education is beginning to penetrate even the most backward areas of the world. Restive peoples of underdeveloped areas, yearning for material improvements and outlets for political expression, have given their support almost blindly to movements and leaders that promise quick attainment of these ends. The desire for freedom from external political control, besides being a fundamental human urge, seems also to be becoming more practicable. The phenomenal growth of science is shifting the relative values of natural resources. The one-time imperialist nations are beginning to develop new resources to substitute for some of those that they have had to look for overseas; on the other hand, colonial areas can dream of self-sufficiency based on the new resources that science promises to provide from previously worthless materials. Coal will no longer be so vital a national resource when uranium affords much greater sources of energy. The two metals, copper and iron, that for so long dominated civilization, are less important in a multi-metal world. Entirely new structural materials are available cheaply in the form of plastics and other polymers. Simpler means of sanitation, antibiotics, pest control and exotic medication raise world-wide health standards. In short, the aspirations of underdeveloped peoples now seem to them to be attainable.

Now the problem has become the need for capital in the underdeveloped countries—countries with new-won freedom but radically unbalanced economic resources. Two sources of capital or

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its equivalent seem open to them: from the West, with its traditional system of free enterprise, or from the Communist-dominated Soviet bloc. The methods of Communism are suspect because they substitute a new form of even more drastic slavery for the old imperialism. Foreign investment by the West is also suspect, not only because it is reminiscent of imperialism, but also because historically it has been used as an instrument of policy. Moreover, for complex reasons largely inherent in the very conditions of economic backwardness, such foreign aid and capital as has been poured into the underdeveloped areas has not accomplished as much as was hoped for, either by the givers or the receivers.

In view of the reduced effectiveness of both military power and national wealth as instruments of policy, a kind of power vacuum has appeared. Clearly, the side that can effectively develop a new instrument will enjoy a powerful advantage. The Soviet Union seems to have found one in scientific achievement as a basis for claiming intellectual leadership.

The potentialities of intellectual leadership which we enjoyed after World War II were never fully recognized or exploited. The most conspicuous example of this failure was in connection with the extraordinary development of nuclear energy out of the most abstract processes of human thought coupled with superb experimental skill. The discovery captured the imagination of men everywhere, coming as it did at a time when the world's sources of fossil fuels were dwindling. But we did not understand the political significance of this intellectual attainment and failed to capitalize fully on the opportunity. The discovery of nuclear energy could have brought a flood of leaders and students from abroad to the feet of our teachers, and thus could have provided unbounded opportunities to demonstrate the advantages of Western methods. But we clothed our new developments in a shroud of secrecy, imposed by our preoccupation with military security. Although the secrecy has gradually been lifted, the opportunity for us to exercise real leadership in this field has meantime been seriously limited.

The Soviet Union, however, saw an opportunity for leadership based on recognized intellectual stature. It had already expanded its science teaching and its research institutes, an action that the West misinterpreted as relating solely to military power. But it meant more than this, as the satellite was to demonstrate. Dostoievsky's lame German cooper endlessly constructing his

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"same old moon . . . on Gorokhovaia Street" has at last been justified. And now his moon circles the earth for all to see.

Leaders of the Soviet bloc are now capitalizing on intellectual leadership as a means of acquiring an essential element of what Milovan Djilas calls "the inherent need of those in power to be recognizable prototypes of brilliance and might."[1] Their ready political and propagandistic exploitation of the great achievement of Soviet scientists upon launching the first earth satellites illustrates clearly their recognition of the advantages that scientific leadership can confer.

The advantage to be acquired from emphasis on science and technology has led to subordination of Communist doctrine to science when the two conflict. The battle between the theory of relativity and Communism was short-lived—science won. Lysenko triumphed briefly in the struggle over predetermination in genetics, but he was then repudiated and Soviet genetics is recovering. These are indications that where science and Communism conflict, the present Soviet leadership is willing to subordinate political doctrine to science—an extraordinary spectacle in a totalitarian state.

Soviet scientists now equal in numbers those in the United States. During the short period of concentrated expansion of their scientific effort, the Soviets have not attained qualitative leadership in most fields of science and technology; but they can easily do so in the next few years unless the West reassesses the scope and scale of its own effort. A wealth of opportunities equal in challenge to the *sputnik* is waiting to be realized. To find and exploit the limits of man's control of weather is but a single example.

There are intellectual fields in addition to science where the Russians have a brilliant tradition; and the Soviets have begun to show a desire to capitalize on the advantages that this tradition can provide. The Bolshoi Theater testifies, as the once-brilliant Moscow Art Theater did before, to the Russian talent in the theatrical arts. In music, not even the heavy hand of political doctrine could permanently suppress the genius of Prokofiev and Shostakovich. And certainly a people that produced Pushkin, Turgenev, Tolstoy, Dostoievsky, Chekhov and Gorky have inherited great intellectual potentials which, though dormant, might again be released. In sum there are strong artistic and lit-

[1] "The New Class." New York: Praeger, 1957.

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erary traditions in Russia which could provide a fertile ground for political leaders prepared to use a wide range of cultural achievements in the service of their policy and propaganda.

In view of this, we need to inquire whether Western governments and the free societies they represent are geared to deal with the new situation. Consistent national policies for the development of science and technology must be instituted, and imaginative new efforts must be made to provide wider and better education in all the disciplines and for the encouragement of literature and the arts. And we must learn to use achievements in these fields to show the world the merit of the political system in which they have matured. Certainly we have not entirely neglected this field. For example, of the more than 40,000 foreign students receiving higher education in the United States last year, nearly 2,000 were directly aided by such programs as Smith-Mundt and Fulbright, and many more were aided by private sources. The foreign development and medical programs of the Rockefeller, Ford and other foundations have been significant. President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program has helped emphasize American intellectual stature both by training young scientists and providing research materials.

But in face of the organized Soviet effort to capture the imagination of the world through demonstrations of scientific achievement, these efforts, fine as they are, do not suffice. Science and technology, like literature and the arts, are too much a part of the fabric of international intercourse to be ignored by diplomacy. One suspects that diplomatic instruments can grow obsolete in the same way that military machines do.

The interaction between science and foreign policy was discussed extensively in Washington as early as 1950, when a special survey by the Department of State in collaboration with the National Academy of Sciences produced the report entitled "Science and Foreign Relations." It advocated the establishment of an office of Science Advisor to the Secretary of State and the appointment of scientific attachés to certain posts abroad.

From 1951 to 1953 the plan was partially implemented; then it was suddenly dropped as an economy measure; attachés and appropriations were withdrawn; a science advisor was not reappointed. The Department of State refused to acknowledge that the plan had been abandoned but insisted that "it was held in abeyance." The office of science advisor was reduced to a single

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economist who had had much to do with organizing the original plan, and who, as Acting Science Advisor, has done a herculean job in holding the few remaining pieces of the project together.

The plan was so promising that its abandonment caused much surprise and led to a discussion in scientific journals. The influential *Chemical and Engineering News* said on January 9, 1956:

> . . . the attachés report glowingly of their work and of the program's reception abroad. The Ambassadors and other mission officers have been cordial and helpful. Some Ambassadors relied directly on the science attachés for detailed advice and guidance on scientific matters affecting foreign relations. Good working relations were established between science attachés and other officers of the embassies with whom they frequently had to work on matters of common interest. U.S. science attaché work found wide acceptance among scientists and others in foreign countries. The scientists who have served abroad believe they have something unique to offer toward foreign relations.

The duality of the problem of science and foreign relations was clearly put by Professor W. Albert Noyes, Jr., in his acceptance of the Willard Gibbs Medal of the American Chemical Society on May 24, 1957: "We must distinguish clearly," he said, "between the utilization of expert scientific knowledge to aid in broad foreign policy decisions, and the development of foreign policy on matters which affect mainly science and scientists."

With respect to the former, it is hardly necessary to mention that a little timely scientific advice to the Department of State on the *sputnik* would have been worth the cost of the whole program of science attachés and a fully-staffed scientific division within the Department. There was world-wide interest in the preliminary announcements regarding the launching of a Soviet satellite. Yet our policy-makers seem to have had no appreciation of the international reaction that would follow the accomplishment of that scientific feat.

The impact of foreign policy decisions on science is well-illustrated in the matter of international scientific meetings. It has always been the rule in international, non-governmental scientific organizations that any bona fide scientific group from any country would be recognized. This tradition has been accepted by American scientists because it keeps politics out of science. The People's Republic of China is represented by its academy of sciences in an increasing number of international scientific organizations. Since no truly international organization can accept an invitation to meet in any country that excludes some of its mem-

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bers, our ban on the entry of Communist scientists into the United States prevents any meetings of such organizations from being held in this country.

In the meantime, however, Moscow is inviting all scientific organizations willing to come. Consequently, many important international scientific meetings, such as assemblies of the International Astronomical Union, the Special Committee for the International Geophysical Year, and so on, will be held in Moscow in 1958. The effect of our attitude is to increase the importance of Moscow as a scientific capital and on occasion to isolate American scientists unless they will travel to Moscow. This type of dictation by the Department of State serves neither the purposes of American foreign policy nor American science.

Science and technology enter into almost every policy judgment that must be made in the day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs. In planning the expenditure of our foreign aid funds we have allotted only minor support to Asian universities, yet the results of that support provide some of the brightest spots in the whole program. Further modest grants or specialized assistance might catalyze major successes, but recommendations for these by American scholars have often gone unheeded. The Russians have sent hundreds of first-rate scientists and teachers abroad and it is necessary for us to match them in this respect. Again, a few thousand dollars invested in needed laboratory equipment would directly influence the training and perhaps the orientation of future leaders. We should not forget that the ranks of foreign political leaders include many scientists and engineers. As Professor William H. Forbes reminds us:

> Scientists in all countries are increasing in numbers and in cultural and political importance. The subjects with which they deal have long had great economic impact and have now a rapidly increasing significance in matters of government and of international relations. Scientists are already considerably more internationally minded than most other groups and are therefore easier to make contact with, especially if the contact is made by scientists. This presents opportunities for international coöperation which should be utilized.[2]

Our overemphasis on military as contrasted to intellectual activity abroad is demonstrated by the fact that in 1957 there were more than 500 military attachés assigned to our foreign missions —and not one scientific attaché. This is not to suggest that in the present international situation we do not need to maintain our

[2] "The Rôle of Science Attachés," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, October 1957.

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military strength at its fullest capability; without this shield there would be no opportunity for other forms of action. But equally we must not neglect essential measures in other realms of human activity that may be decisive in the final determination of events.

The great danger of the present world military position lies in the fact that it is not, as some assert, a stalemate; it is a state of unstable equilibrium. This is why a change of power like that represented by the advent of the I.C.B.M. and demonstrated by the satellite has been viewed with so much alarm. In our concern for our military position we have tended to miss the significance of the satellite as a Soviet bid to gain power by capturing man's imagination.

The instability of the armaments situation can only grow worse if present technological trends continue and no political controls are devised. As large numbers of fast-flying missiles come into the possession of both sides, ready for use, critical command will tend to devolve to lower and lower echelons. To some extent this is already occurring. If we are going to be able to retaliate effectively it will become less and less practicable to assemble the Congress, or to call together the Cabinet or even for the President to be consulted when missiles with the ultimate destructive power are seen flying toward us. Effective retaliation must be *instant* indeed. Who at that moment will hold the fate of the world in his hands? In the face of such degeneration of command, agreement on effective forms for the control of absolute weapons is the alternative to ultimate destruction.

Meanwhile, with military strength less effective as an instrument of policy, let us seek other measures to protect and to extend the realm of freedom. We have the chance to earn the right to leadership through demonstrating intellectual preëminence. We enjoy the advantages of a free society where diversity of interest and individual initiative are incalculable assets. But we must be aware that there is a race and that we are in it. A race for intellectual preëminence is not in itself undesirable, for it is regenerative in character; like the intellectual challenges faced in the past it can, in the long pull, bring only benefit to man.

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THE MIDDLE EAST: CONFLICT IN PRIORITIES

By John S. Badeau

IN making judgments on the Middle East, or considering its problems or its reactions or its leaders, we must bear in mind that the "Middle East" is not a clearly defined geographical term; it exists chiefly in the minds of diplomats and its content on any particular occasion is determined by the particular problem under consideration. About a year ago *The New York Times* published four maps of the Middle East as defined by Secretary Dulles, the British Foreign Office, and two leading dictionaries. Each one of them encompassed a different area; in none did the borders coincide. For when you approach the Middle East in political, geographic or sociological terms you quickly discover that the area dissolves into its separate units, each marked by strong individuality.

It is also well to remember that there is no major issue on which the Middle East takes a single and unified view. In the Syrian crisis, Iran and Turkey have stood on one side, while the Arab world has stood on the other. The Israeli issue stirs scarcely a ripple of interest in Iran or Afghanistan. Certainly the incursions of the Soviet Union do not elicit a unified response. Even within the Arab world itself, there are a variety of reactions; part adheres to the Baghdad Pact, part does not. Yet situations such as the Syrian crisis can suddenly bring forth something like pan-Arabism, and people who were squabbling a few months before rally behind the façade of Arab unity.

Another hazard in dealing with the Middle East is that the constant and unrelenting rush of the headlines tends to focus our attention on the immediate flow of political events. The recent Syrian crisis is a good example of this. We have had it treated and explained almost exclusively in terms of Russian ambitions. There is of course no doubt that Russia is using Syria to force her way into the Middle East and to exert certain diplomatic pressures on the Western world. And yet to understand the Syrian crisis adequately we would have to go back to the creation of Israel; behind that to the giving up of the sanjak of Alexandretta in 1939 by the French Mandatory Power to the Turks; behind that to the short-lived Arab Kingdom in Damas-

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cus after World War I, with Faisal at its head; and back of that to the decades of repression of Arab nationalism at the hands of Imperial Turkey. If there were no Russia threatening the Middle East, if Israel had not been created, if the United States had not refused Egypt the loan for the High Dam, the area would still be in turmoil. And therefore until we look at the more basic issues—"what lies *under* what lies under," as the psychologist said—we are not prepared to deal with the area.

The significant point here is that what appear to be basic issues from the standpoint of the United States may be far from basic from the standpoint of the Middle East. There is therefore a sharp clash in the priorities with which the two sides approach the current situation. Further, even when these priorities *are* identical the content of them often differs. For example, in recent months there has been a good deal of interest in the application of international law to the free use of the Suez Canal and freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba. But international law represents largely the practice of the Western world in its diplomatic relationships; yet we approach the Middle East with the assumption that this body of Western experience has a universal validity. The fact is that the Muslim world in mediæval times developed its own "international law" and had its own principles of diplomacy. It divided the world into the Abode of Islam (Dar el-Islam) and the Abode of War (Dar el-Harb), and upon this division set up its view of international relations. When we talk to the Muslim world about "international law," then, we use terms which do not always have the same history and meaning for them as for us.

Let us now examine the basic issues, or priorities, first as the West sees them, and then as I believe the East sees them, in order to find out at what points there are differences and at what points there are similarities.

II

Certainly the most embracing and fundamental objective of the United States is to keep Soviet Russia out of the area. Whether this means Russian military occupation, as in Azerbaijan after the end of the Second World War; or some form of alliance between the Soviet Union and one of the states of the area, as at the moment in Syria; or Soviet penetration like that in Egypt—in all such instances we are equally resolute in our

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determination to prevent Russian incursions in the Middle East. Indeed, it was this basic issue that first changed America's historic interest in the Middle East to a positive responsibility. The change took place with the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, in which we undertook to arm a Middle Eastern country and to strengthen its defenses against an outside Power.

We have clothed our objective in terms of defending people from Communism. The Eisenhower Doctrine, which I believe to have been meant as a direct warning to Russia that we were prepared to oppose military action by military action, is actually phrased in terms of keeping the Middle East free from a *Communist* threat and from no other. We recognize, of course, the subterfuge in this, because the problem of Russia in the Middle East is far older than Communism and far older than our interest in the area. For we have inherited the task which Britain carried in the nineteenth century, when she fought three wars—one in Russia and two in Afghanistan—to check the Russian advance. One reason why our policy in the Middle East often has little local appeal is that the Middle East knows enough history to recognize that we are seeking not merely to prevent the spread of Communism, but to hold the Middle East as a preserve of the free world against the encroachment of *Russian* power.

Our second major objective—or priority—in the area derives from the first. We are convinced that in so crucial an area neutrality is impossible and that therefore the Middle East must be aligned with the free world. Our reason for insisting that the Middle East cannot be neutral is that neutrality implies either isolation from world affairs or equality of treatment between opposing Powers. Isolation is impossible in the Middle East; therefore if the Middle East is to adopt positive neutralism, it must extend equal treatment to the Soviet Union and ourselves. But equality of treatment clashes with our first objective, for it brings Russia into the area. This has been the problem in Syria. The relationship between Russia and Syria is not basically different from our relationship and privileges in Saudi Arabia or Iran, where we have supplied arms, obtained airfields and provided economic support. But we are not prepared to admit that the principle upon which we act in these two countries can be applied by Syria because this runs contrary to our first and irrevocable commitment to keep Russia out of the area.

Our third priority, I believe, is the State of Israel. Until the

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ill-fated military action of last year, Israel represented a higher priority for the United States than for our European allies. Since the Suez expedition, however, France and Great Britain feel a larger identity of interest with Israel and are perhaps prepared to give it a higher priority. To us, Israel represents our oldest direct interest in the area. Before the Truman Doctrine—indeed, before the emergence of the State of Israel—Congress went on record as being favorably inclined toward the plan envisioned by the Balfour Declaration. And during the intervening period of isolation we expressed in such ways as we could an interest and concern for the success of this experiment. The continuance of Israel as an independent state certainly represents a basic foreign policy commitment of the United States, partly because it rests upon action by the United Nations and partly because it is a national obligation which we have voluntarily undertaken.

A further reason why Israel represents a priority is because it is the major interest of important groups of American citizens. Never before in our history has a foreign country stood in the same relation to the United States as does Israel. This is partly because Israel conceives herself to be uniquely related to a particular world-wide community. And since important leadership and support of that community resides in this country, the ties between the United States and Israel are strong.

Yet there is another standpoint from which Israel is *not* a priority. Clearly, the impasse between Israel and the Arab world is one of the major barriers to our successful exercise of influence in the area. If any other small country were a similar barrier in a critical area of the world, we would probably be prepared to act with considerable vigor to resolve the situation and gain for ourselves badly needed good will. This is not to suggest that the survival of Israel is at issue, for, as I said above, we have a foreign policy commitment to that effect. But there are certain moves which could be made to alleviate the tension. I believe the refugee problem might be settled and that many incidents could be avoided by a minor correction of the present, war-set borders. The difficulty is that measures such as these would have to be taken partly at the expense of Israel, and this is inhibited by our commitments to Israel. Thus our own basic objectives—our own priorities—are in sharp conflict with each other, making a consistent and effective policy in the Arab world almost impossible to achieve.

Finally, there are some who would say that a high priority in

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the Middle East is economic and social development. Our initial program of economic and social development was partly based on humanitarian impulses, but underlying it was the conviction that through such development we could bypass political questions. We reasoned that the basic cause of instability in the Middle East lay in the incredibly low living standard of 85 percent of the population; if we could raise the living standard we would get at the basic cause of the trouble and perhaps the political problems would become less pressing and so their solution could be postponed.

Although our analysis of the basic character of the problem was valid, our conclusion that by this means we could escape the necessity of making difficult political decisions was quickly proved false. Moreover, we early found that we had to use our aid program for political ends, and it therefore ceased to be devoted solely to economic development and became a facet of our anti-Russian foreign policy. In Iran, American aid was a crash program at the time of Mossadegh's fall and the beginning of the Zahedi régime. It was entirely unrealistic of Congress, in reviewing the Iran program, to rule out any consideration of its political effect, for this was precisely its purpose. On the other hand, when we ran into political difficulties with Egypt we stopped our economic aid program as a way of applying political pressure—even going so far as to halt CARE shipments of surplus food which had been providing supplementary meals for village children. Under such circumstances it would seem that our economic program, while still a priority, has taken second place in the face of the political issues confronting us.

III

Now let us see what are the priorities or basic issues as the Middle East views them. First, only two countries in the area fully share our sense of the threat of Russia to the extent of considering it *the* priority. These are Turkey and Iran—willing, enthusiastic and coöperative members of the Baghdad Pact. What criticism there is of the Pact in Iran exists not because it is aimed against Russia but because its effectiveness in defending Iran is doubted. Iraq is a member of the Pact, but many Iraqis refer to it as the Nuri Said-Mendaris Pact, indicating that they feel it has an ephemeral quality. And indeed, when the Baghdad Pact was tested in the recent Syrian crisis we saw that Iraq felt constrained

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to join other Arab nations in backing Syria rather than Turkey.

In much of the rest of the Middle East the Soviet Union occupies a position of priority, but a priority of quite a different kind. Both in government circles and popular opinion, Russia is not seen as posing a threat but as representing an opportunity. She offers the Middle East what appears to be a new chance of sharing in the benefits of the Western world. Charles Malik, the Foreign Minister of Lebanon, has made the point strongly that the Middle East *must* have a European partner; that throughout modern history, its trade, ideas and political protection have been posited upon a relationship with the European world. Yet during the past five years Europe and the West have become not a partner but a problem in Eastern eyes. This is especially true of the United States, which is now the chief representative of the Western world in the Middle East. Many Arabs, including intelligent and educated ones, feel that it is the United States, not Russia, that is trying to take over the Middle East. And they feel that we are trying to divide the Arab world in cases where we cannot oppose Russia successfully.

The Soviet Union offers the Middle East a new opportunity to relate itself to the Western world. When Western markets cannot use Egyptian cotton, the Iron Curtain countries undertake to buy it. When the Western countries offer economic aid—but with political strings attached—Russia makes a counter-offer without any formal conditions. When the World Bank offers to loan Syria some $30,000,000 for development at 4.75 percent interest, but requiring that the projects be directed by Americans, Russia counters with a larger loan (perhaps $100,000,000) at 2.5 percent and no favors asked, at any rate openly.

And so Russia emerges in Middle Eastern eyes not as a threat but as an opportunity—an opportunity to counterbalance the Western world, to offset our pressure, to check what the Middle East believes to be our imperialism. But surely, it will be said, the Middle East realizes that Russia is more dangerous than the West. The answer in many cases is "No." The East remembers that it was the "free world" Powers that created Israel; it was they who gave the sanjak of Alexandretta to the Turks; it is they who, in Arab eyes, are suppressing freedom and independence in North Africa. Many Middle Easterners are outspoken in saying they do not see any difference between this and the kind of danger presented by the Soviet Union.

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What of our second priority—the need to align the Middle East with the West? Do the countries of the area share this objective with us? Here we observe that those which accept alignment with the West are those that have always been at least technically independent. Although Iran was almost taken over by British colonialism at the end of the First World War, she did rally from it and, with Turkey, is now strongly aligned with the West. But when you move away from these old imperial Powers down into the Arab areas long controlled or dominated by foreign Powers, you find that the idea of alignment with the Western world has little, if any, priority. One reason is that these countries do not accept our definition of the Middle East as a "power vacuum." When Britain controlled the area a generation ago, they note, there was no Iraq, Jordan, independent Egypt, Lebanon or Syria. These states refuse to admit that they are a "vacuum." As independent nations they do not consider they can be talked about as though their lands were a howling desert waste waiting to be occupied by Powers from without.

Another reason why parts of the Middle East are not eager to align themselves with the West is that Russia is a little too close—not close enough to teach them as much as Turkey knows, but close enough to convince them that Russia should not be offended. The northern countries, which have done business with the Russians for centuries, harbor no illusions. But further south, where Russian penetration historically has not taken place, there are many illusions as well as fears of the risks involved in joining an alignment against the great northern Power.

Finally, an alignment with the West is not a priority for the simple reason that pan-Arabism takes its place in the Arab mind. The substance of pan-Arabism is not easily defined, but there can be no question that a vague feeling of community is stirring among the Arab peoples. This feeling emerges only under certain circumstances, but a threatened attack on the Arab world such as was allegedly posed against Syria is sure to bring out some sense of unity. Lurking in the minds of many responsible Arab rulers is a dream of the day when the real alignment of the Middle East will come about through a confederation of Arab states.

What of our third priority, Israel? As we have seen, this is not a priority in the whole area. But in the Arab part of it Israel is most certainly a priority, perhaps the number one priority. The point needs no laboring. Like our own commitment to the

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independence of Israel, the opposition to Israel is a foreign policy commitment of the various Arab states. That policy does not seek the complete annihilation of Israel, although Arab radio broadcasts to this effect are common and talk of annihilation is often heard. The fact remains that at one time or another within the past four years (especially at the Bandung Conference) the various Arab states have gone on record in favor of United Nations resolutions relating to border questions, the internationalization of Jerusalem and the return of refugees. To what extent they really mean this cannot be known, but formally it represents a foreign policy commitment.

Behind this commitment of the national leaders lies a great deal more, however. The feeling against Israel is a concomitant of the political consciousness of the Arab world. To say that it is universal is not true; but it goes as far as political consciousness goes, which includes the upper and middle-class groups that set policies and provide leadership. Therefore, Israel represents a commitment on which it is practically impossible for Arab governments at the present time to turn their back.

Beneath the obvious reasons for this, I believe, lie two fundamental causes. The first is that Israel is a symbol of the past imperialism of the West. When the fighting broke out over the partition of Palestine it was apparent that the Egyptians were not just fighting the Zionist colonists in Palestine; they were fighting the British Occupation, the French in Syria—and all the long history of Western intrusion in the Middle East. It has been almost impossible to quench this emotion; the Arabs have poured into the Israel issue all the pent-up anti-imperial resentments of generations.

The other fundamental cause for the extent of Arab feeling about Israel is that it violates the deep sense of connection between a people and their home. It is sometimes said that with time the Arabs will forget Israel. But the Jews did not forget Israel after nearly 2,000 years. Is there any reason to believe the Arabs will forget more quickly? Possibly—but in any event there is a deep feeling for the land among the Arabs that will not die for a long time.

Finally, there is the question of social and economic development. This is certainly a priority, but the concept is quite different in the Middle East. In the Western world we think of social and economic development in terms of humanitarianism and of its

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value in fighting Communism. But from neither standpoint is social and economic development a priority among Eastern nations although there is certainly humanitarian concern among many significant groups. Middle East leaders rather talk about "national development" as a concomitant of nationalism—the necessary condition of independence. Their concern is to reshape government, society—all the institutions which will make the nation strong and free and able to take its place in the world.

As a result, the Middle East has given far more attention to social progress than the West often recognizes. Take education as an example. In Egypt, between independence in 1922 and the Egyptian revolution, the annual state budget for the school system increased more than 1,000 percent; the number of children enrolled increased over 1,300 percent. In Saudi Arabia today there are approximately a thousand schools; five years ago there were less than 40. In Iraq, 70 percent of the oil revenues are set aside for the next seven years as a national development fund. In terms of what they have, many Middle East countries are making very remarkable progress.

But though social and economic development is clearly a priority in the Middle East, it is extremely difficult to implement without a revolution. That is why the Egyptian revolution is so basic and so significant for the whole area. We think of it in terms of Nasser and his military junta, but I believe that in the perspective of history the Egyptian revolution will be to the Middle East what the French Revolution was to Europe. It, too, had its self-seeking leaders, its power cliques, its political nationalism; but it let loose forces that finally changed the pattern of social life in most of Europe. That is what the Egyptian revolution has begun to do in the Middle East and that is why it strikes fire in some form in every country.

We must conclude, then, that on the most crucial issues we and the Middle East are essentially talking about different things. Our difficulty is that, while we have a clearly expressed stake in the Middle East, the Middle East has not found an equally clear stake in us. We are for defense against Russia; they are looking for independence and integrity. We are concerned about alignment; they are concerned about national development. Until, in our sympathies and our foreign policy, we find some way to take account of their basic priorities I doubt if the situation can be greatly improved.

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THE REVOLUTION IN SOVIET STRATEGIC THINKING

By Herbert S. Dinerstein

NO one is likely to deny that since August 1945, when the first atomic bomb was used, the nature of warfare has changed. In the United States the great importance of the change was quickly appreciated, and as nuclear weapons have developed the doctrine for their employment has been continuously revised. In the Soviet Union, by contrast, the first years following the American acquisition of nuclear weapons were marked by the ostensible rejection of any belief in their exceptional importance. Since 1953, however, the Soviet Union has come to grips with the problems posed by the existence of these weapons. In this article we shall examine how Soviet military thinkers have radically altered some of their hoary ideas about warfare and how differences on military policies played an important rôle in the political crises terminated by Malenkov's demotion in February 1955. By contrast, Zhukov's dismissal in October 1957 probably arose from differences on political rather than military policy.

Soon after Stalin died in March 1953, Russian military leaders began to incorporate the problems logically raised by the existence of nuclear weapons into more or less public discussions of military matters. Until that time Soviet ideas on warfare had been formed by combining the lessons of World War II with Marxian theories. The Soviet concept, in essence, was that modern war was necessarily a war of attrition in which political factors played a major rôle. Stripped of excess verbiage, "the teachings of Marxism on war" said that the morale of the fighting front and the home front had grown in importance since the time when mercenary armies fought with forces in being without appreciable accretions in strength through mobilization. Although the validity of this idea was widely recognized, the Marxists pretended to a monopoly of the concept.

In Stalin's version of this view of war, surprise was minimized; the factors emphasized were those that would be of greatest importance in a war of attrition. In 1942 Stalin listed certain "permanently operating factors," as they were called, which he said determined victory or defeat in war. These factors were the sta-

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bility of the rear, the morale of the army, the quantity and quality of divisions, the army's weapons, and the organizing ability of the commanding officers. Nothing but these permanently operating factors counted in the final result. Transitory factors, such as the use of military surprise, could not in themselves determine the outcome of the war. Under such a theory, surprise attack with nuclear weapons could not be decisive.

While Stalin lived, this theory was imposed as dogma on all Soviet military thinking. It fostered complacency and a false confidence in Soviet strength and hampered an open-minded examination no less of the country's military opportunities than of her difficulties. It was more the tone than the content of Stalin's formulation that was harmful. What Stalin said was so truistic that it had little practical utility. Who could deny that a country with a larger, better-equipped, better-led force, a country which enjoyed superior morale and had a superior industrial base, would win a war with a country notably inferior in all these respects? But, since such a discrepancy between the capability of warring nations is rarely found, Stalin's dogma is of limited use as a guide for achieving the proper military posture.

Stalin's dogma was not merely too general to be useful; it was positively harmful, because it was interpreted to mean that the Soviet Union was and always would be superior to other nations in the permanently operating factors, and would therefore automatically win any war in which it became involved. When the Soviet authorities stated that the Soviet Union would always be superior in the permanently operating factors, they meant that the political advantages inherent in a socialist society more than compensated for its inferior economic strength.

Thus, Soviet morale had to be superior, for Soviet citizens love the state in a way impossible for the victims of capitalism, and they fight and toil more valiantly in the knowledge that theirs is the just cause. Socialist leadership was better because it rested on Marxism; Soviet military science was better because it was Marxist. The Soviet Union also had important material advantages because it was a Marxist state. It could mobilize for war more rapidly and thoroughly than the capitalist countries because its economic organization was better planned and more efficient.

All this was not so much a theory of war as an elaborate ritual of reassurance. Complacency this was, but not the kind of complacency that breeds apathy. Convinced that History helps those

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who help themselves, the Soviet leaders imposed great sacrifices upon their people in order to create a formidable military establishment. But was it formidable in the age of nuclear weapons?

The Soviet military establishment had been designed in accordance with Stalin's theory that the Soviet Union could win a war of attrition against capitalism, and that only a war of attrition was possible. It was not admitted that the employment of nuclear weapons might compress the effects of years of normal attrition into a few days. Under Stalin the Russian military leaders could neither analyze the situations where defeat was probable nor devise measures to reduce its likelihood. To establish an adequate military posture in spite of the dogma that your side will inevitably win is to do it the hard way—if indeed it can be done at all.

After Stalin's death some of his successors still felt that the old way was the only way; others wanted to break the fetters of the past. The innovators won the argument after a hard fight. Its course can be followed in the pages of *Voennaia mysl'* (*Military Thought*), the organ of the general staff, which has only a limited circulation within the Soviet Union.[1] At first the controversy was confined to its pages, but when the issue was finally resolved, in early 1955, in favor of a revision of Stalinist military thinking, the whole military press reflected the change in the official line.

The first public indication of a conflict behind the scenes was an article written for *Military Thought* in November 1953, by its editor, Major General Talenskii, a general staff expert on military history who had formerly been editor of *Red Star,* the daily organ of the Ministry of Defense. When he opened what was obviously the most far-reaching discussion of military theory in the Soviet Union in a quarter century, it was clear to Soviet readers that he was speaking for others beside himself.

Talenskii's arguments were couched in the language of Marxian philosophical generalization, but the conclusions were down to earth. His main point was that the battle was what counted. Attention had to be focused on the armed conflict itself, which the Soviet Union might win or lose, depending on the situation. Talenskii made three main points. First, the military planner had to abandon his slavish adherence to the permanently operating factors as the only possible basis for all military planning. Second,

[1] With the exception of a partial account by Mr. N. Galai in the June 1956 issue of the *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R.*, no comprehensive account of the debate appears to have been published outside the Soviet Union.

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he had to restrict the discussion to military factors and avoid all the political considerations which automatically led to the conclusion that the Soviet Union would win. Third, he had to insist on the essential identity of the principles of warfare for both sides.

Talenskii dealt with Stalin's dogma concerning the permanently operating factors by flatly stating that it did not constitute a law of war. Talenskii and his supporters rejected not the importance of making the Soviet Union superior in these factors, but the unquestioning assumption that the Soviet Union, by virtue of being a socialist state, must always be superior in them. No longer was the phrase "permanently operating factors" to be regarded as an abbreviated article of faith, and by early 1956 it disappeared from the Soviet military press.

Talenskii's second argument was a corollary of the first: military people and military science ought to stick to military matters and leave political considerations to the Party. Marxist-Leninist teachings, he said, are not within the purview of military science. In the past, reference to Marxist-Leninist teachings automatically led military theorists to the conclusion that a socialist state had the advantage in war because, by definition, a socialist state was superior in political strength to its capitalist enemies. Talenskii's abandonment of the assumption of inevitable Soviet victory was a most important step toward realism.

Talenskii's third point was the essential identity of the principles of warfare for both sides. The Stalinist view was that a socialist society was governed by basic social laws different from those governing a capitalist society. It followed that the war activity of these two kinds of society was also governed by different laws. Talenskii firmly insisted that, in armed conflict, the same laws governed both sides. The consequence of this position was again to focus attention on the battle and to push aside the social and political differences between capitalism and Communism.

In rejecting the rigid dogmatism of the Stalinist approach, what was Talenskii putting in its place? Victory, he said, is to be accomplished by successive blows of cumulative force delivered by a Power superior in the basic economic, political and military potentialities. Although Talenskii's preferred war is the extended war of attrition, he makes it unequivocally clear that in certain conditions the issue might be decided in a short time. But he does not substitute one dogma for another. In harmony with the new realism, he does not insist that the war of the future *must* be won

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or lost in the first phase: given the proper measures in air defense and intelligence, a surprise attack need not decide the outcome during the initial stage of the war.

In his article of November 1953, Talenskii made no explicit connection between the possibility of a short war and the employment of nuclear weapons. During the ensuing year, this connection was made in passing by others in the many pages of *Military Thought*. But it was only after the clear-cut victory of the new view early in 1955 that the connection between surprise attack, nuclear weapons and the possibility of a short war was made sharply and prominently in the general press.

The proponents of the new view did not win easily. Talenskii's views were described as anti-scientific and anti-Marxist. For espousing "naked" strategy he was compared to Douhet and Fuller. The majors and colonels who discharged these damning epithets in Talenskii's direction could hardly have done so if Talenskii's views had already represented official thinking about war. Any doubts on this score would have been dispelled by Marshal Vasilevskii's statement in an article in *Red Star* for February 22, 1954, that Soviet military science was based on the permanently operating factors which determined the fate of war. Vasilevskii reiterated his rejection of the new trend in *Red Star* for May 7, 1954, where he quoted Stalin as having demonstrated "that the outcome of war is determined not by the collateral factors but by the permanently operating factors." Vasilevskii's stand on the tried and true Stalinist formula was echoed in the pages of *Military Thought,* in *Red Star,* and in books on military doctrine. In fact, in mid-1954 Talenskii was relieved as editor of *Military Thought.*

The turning point came after Malenkov was demoted. In February 1955, after Marshal Zhukov had become Minister of Defense, the new editorial board finally agreed to print an article by Marshal Rotmistrov, "On the Rôle of Surprise in Contemporary War," which spelled out the full implications of Talenskii's cautious statements of November 1953. Talenskii had said that his formulation of the basic law of war did not "exclude the possibility of a decisive defeat in a limited time of one or the other opponent, given the existence of certain conditions." Rotmistrov's formula was positive: "It must be plainly said that, in the situation of the employment of atomic and hydrogen weapons, surprise is one of the decisive conditions for the attainment of success not

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only in battles and operations but also in the war as a whole."

When, in April of 1955, the editors of *Military Thought* officially endorsed the major points of Talenskii's position and rejected the criticisms of his opponents, it was something of an anticlimax, for the belated publication of Rotmistrov's article in February 1955 had already spelled the end of the orthodox Stalinist view of military doctrine.

II

One is immediately struck by the timing of the Rotmistrov article. Its appearance, signifying that the bitter and extended controversy had been decided in favor of the innovators, was practically simultaneous with the demotion of Malenkov, the elevation of Khrushchev, and Marshal Zhukov's assumption of the post of Minister of Defense in February 1955. Zhukov's dismissal from that post last fall is probably not a sign that the strategy then adopted will now be dropped in its turn. The strategy officially adopted in 1955 was based on Khrushchev's conviction that the Soviet Union must be ready for a nuclear war even though the likelihood of such a war was small. Both Malenkov and Khrushchev apparently agreed that Soviet policies, including military ones, had to be changed to meet the requirements of the nuclear age.

But they differed as to what these changes should be. Malenkov thought that Soviet policies should be based on the assumption that the United States was effectively deterred from initiating war on Russia. Five months after Stalin's death, Malenkov, in a major speech, pointed to the basis for the Soviet policy of deterrence and, at the same time, proposed a radical redirection of Soviet economic policies. He announced that the Soviet Union had developed an H-bomb (though it had not yet exploded one); and he said that the time had now come to force the development of light industry. Malenkov was suggesting, but not quite saying, that the new Soviet strength had changed the situation so radically that one could revise the traditional Soviet formulation that war was inevitable as long as capitalism existed. If existing Soviet strength was enough to keep the peace, greater attention to Soviet consumer needs was justified. If the United States was deterred from making war because of Soviet strength, Malenkov's often-repeated statement that all international problems could be settled by negotiation was a reasonable hope.

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An obscure writer, M. Gus, in the November 1953 issue of *Zvezda* made explicit what was implicit in Malenkov's position. He wrote that it was possible "to paralyze the law of the inevitability of war," and he advocated a foreign policy for the Soviet Union which would involve "wise compromise" and "expedient and necessary concessions." This revision of doctrine was immediately rejected in the following issue of the magazine, and in other places prominent Party and military writers reiterated the standard position that war would cease to be inevitable only when capitalism was destroyed.

Although no one after Gus has ever flatly said that war is no longer inevitable, many prominent Soviet leaders made speeches whose tone was consistent with this assumption. On Lenin's anniversary in January 1954, Pospelov made a speech in which there was not a single word about the danger of war or the warlike plans of the capitalists. In March of 1954, Mikoyan said in Erevan that the danger of war had receded largely because the Soviet Union possessed the atomic and hydrogen bombs. The United States now had to face the possibility of the destruction of American cities, and was therefore more inclined to negotiate with the Soviet Union. These paragraphs in Mikoyan's speech were excised from the accounts carried by the Moscow press. In the same month, Malenkov made his famous plea for an end of the cold war.

Malenkov and his group were proceeding from the assumption that the destructiveness of nuclear weapons had created a real opportunity for reliance on a policy of deterring the United States. But they went beyond the mere statement of a theoretical position; they came into open collision with others on the subject of the military budget. In March 1954, Malenkov, Pospelov, Pervukhin and Saburov made speeches in which they said that the armed forces of the Soviet Union possessed everything necessary to carry out their functions. Khrushchev, Bulganin, Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov were clearly ranged on the other side of the argument. Using the old formula about capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union, they insisted again and again that the armed forces had to be further strengthened.

Any doubts as to the existence of fundamental differences between Malenkov and his opponents were dispelled in April 1954 when Malenkov, probably under duress, suddenly abandoned the line that peace might be preserved through fear of the "destruc-

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tion of world civilization," and substituted for it an orthodox prediction that, if war came, only capitalism would collapse. In the same statement, he also reversed his position on the armed forces and called for an increase in military strength. From that time forward, Malenkov's opponents were unchallenged in their general assertions that the capitalists wanted war, and their more specific warnings against surprise attack with nuclear weapons. Khrushchev and Bulganin having warned in a general way that the Soviet Union should be prepared for any surprises, their supporters spoke explicitly of the danger to the Soviet Union if the capitalist enemy succeeded in a surprise nuclear attack. Clearly, if it was at all possible for such a surprise attack to win a war, it would be reckless to rely on American fear of the "destruction of world civilization" to protect the Soviet Union. Soviet prospects for deterring the United States had improved, but possession of nuclear weapons did not guarantee immunity from attack.

It is unlikely that Malenkov believed war was ruled out by the existence of nuclear weapons and that, as long as the Soviet Union had some sort of nuclear striking force, her interests were securely guarded. It is equally improbable that Khrushchev and his supporters believed a nuclear attack by the United States to be imminent. More likely, Malenkov expected that a combination of Soviet nuclear strength and conciliatory policies could assure peace for a long time with no necessity for important changes in the Soviet military posture. Khrushchev, in turn, probably reasoned that, although a United States attack upon the Soviet Union was unlikely, the Soviet Union had to be prepared to meet such an attack, and that the better prepared the Soviet Union, the smaller the likelihood of such an attack. This he expressed at the Twentieth Party Congress, in February of 1956, when he revised the formula of "inevitable war" to read that war was not "fatalistically inevitable."

Khrushchev's position was the more traditional and more cautious of the two. It took into account the worst that might happen. Military planners like to be prepared to deal with a presumptive enemy's capabilities irrespective of his good intentions or self-restraint. During the spring of 1954, Khrushchev frequently pointed to the irrationality of American behavior and warned that the Soviet Union must depend on its own strength, without relying on the enemy's desire for peace. The military posture required to deter a *potential* enemy from nuclear attack is not

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identical with that required to fight an *actual* enemy in nuclear war. The bare minimum required to deter the United States would be the capacity to inflict great damage on the United States. For deterrence alone, the survival of the Soviet retaliatory force was sufficient; it would not be essential to protect Soviet cities. But Khrushchev's position necessitated a more elaborate and more expensive military establishment. If one granted that deterrence might fail and the Soviet Union be compelled to wage a nuclear war, then a major objective must be to minimize destruction in Soviet Russia. This would require elaborate warning systems and extensive defense measures, both active and passive. The only real limit on expenditure for such a posture is the extent of available resources.

The most recent Soviet developments in weapons are the fruits of the decision taken some years ago to have not only a deterrent capability, but also a war-making capability. The requirements the Soviet leaders have placed on the ballistic missile demonstrate that the missile is not viewed primarily as a blunderbuss with which to threaten the United States, but as a weapon intended to destroy military targets. As early as 1956, Major General Pokrovsky characterized the missile as an excellent weapon because (1) it could be developed to high accuracy, (2) launching platforms could be readily built and easily concealed, and (3) the missile, once it had been launched, was difficult to detect and intercept. After the official announcement of a successful test of a long-range ballistic missile, the chief of the Soviet Air Force, Marshal Vershinin, repeated these points, emphasizing the reliability and accuracy of ballistic missiles. Other Soviet military writers have also stressed that accuracy is an essential requirement for the ballistic missile.

All these reflections on the military value of the ballistic missile as the most perfect weapon of surprise reinforced the conviction that surprise could make a vital difference. It was precisely this need to prepare for more than deterrence and to prepare against surprise nuclear attack that was spelled out for the first time in Marshal Rotmistrov's article, published in February 1955, immediately after Malenkov had lost out to Khrushchev. Rotmistrov stated that the Soviet Union must be ready to strike a preëmptive or forestalling blow, in case the United States was about to attack. In the public media, only General Shatilov, in his speech of May 1955, preserved this em-

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phasis on beating the opponent to the punch, when he referred to surprise as a "double-edged weapon." Several other Soviet generals, including air force generals, restated Rotmistrov's position more guardedly when they said that the Soviet Union must be able to deprive the enemy of the fruits of surprise and be prepared to do more than trade blow for blow. Quite obviously, whatever the formulation of the problem, the emphasis was on the conduct of nuclear war, and not only on the deterrence of it.

More was to be gained from strengthening the Soviet armed forces than a better military capability to meet a possible, but unlikely, threat from the United States. In 1954 the United States had a clear preponderance in air nuclear strength and warned that it was prepared to employ that strength, not only in the event of a direct attack upon the United States, but also in the event of Soviet aggression anywhere in the free world. Since that time the Soviet Union has increased its nuclear air strength, thereby increasing the damage the United States might suffer in responding to Russian aggression by an attack upon the Soviet Union. Thus, Khrushchev and his colleagues may reason, American retaliation against Soviet aggression becomes less certain and perhaps uncertain. Consequently, new opportunities open up for Soviet expansion. Whether the Soviet Union will assume the terrible risk of exploiting such opportunities by making war for limited objectives no one can say. But without a military establishment roughly equivalent to that of the United States in nuclear strength, the Soviet leaders would never be in a position to even consider running such a risk. Greater military strength increases the policy alternatives among which Soviet leaders can choose. That, by itself, could be a sufficient argument in the Soviet Union. Coupled with the other considerations described above, it won the day against Malenkov.

The allocation of resources to the armed forces, to heavy industry and to light industry was a function of the military posture adopted. A posture directed primarily to deterrence would obviously leave more resources available for light industry. Shepilov, however, in a *Pravda* article of January 24, 1955, pointed directly to the consequence of Malenkov's policy for weapons procurement. If the Soviet Union had adopted the policy of the "pseudo-economists," said Shepilov, the result would have been to "surrender the privilege of the forced development of heavy industry, machine construction, energy, chemical industry, electronics, jet

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technology, guidance systems, etc. to the imperialists. . . ." The progression of items from the general category of "heavy industry" to "guidance systems" made it clear that Malenkov was being charged, among other things, with failure to push the development of guidance systems which are an essential component of satellites, long-range missiles systems and active air-defense systems.

Since Malenkov's deposition in February 1955, the Soviet armed forces have greatly improved their capability both to deter and to wage nuclear war. The ground forces have received large quantities of improved equipment; the strategic air force has been expanded; active and passive air-defense measures of impressive proportions have been taken; the possession of a long-range ballistic missile has been announced, and this claim is supported by the successful launching of two heavy satellites which testify to Soviet advances in power plant and guidance systems.

It was between the launching of the first and second satellites that the Soviet war hero, Minister of Defense and member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, was dismissed from all his high offices. This dramatic event seems to have been connected with the problem of army-Party relations rather than with questions of military policy. The armed forces have participated in high-level Soviet politics since Stalin's death. They played a rôle in the elimination of Beria and in reducing the influence of the secret police. The air force excepted, they evidently sided with Khrushchev during 1954 in the struggle against Malenkov's conceptions. Significantly, Marshal Zhukov was immediately promoted to the Ministry of Defense and to alternate membership on the Party Presidium—both offices never before held by a field general. As the army forces increased in strength, Party control declined. In fact, Zhukov publicly charged the political officers with interference in proper military training. The political lectures which had been separate and under the control of the political officers were now combined with regular military training; the whole of the soldier's education, political and military, became the direct responsibility of the regular officer, who could call upon the political officer for assistance.

In June 1957, when Khrushchev evicted Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov from the Party Presidium, the generals publicly endorsed the change; indeed both Zhukov and the military

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press were more extreme in their charges than anybody else. Zhukov now was elevated to full membership in the Presidium. The best clue to the reason for his dismissal five months later is the absence of any successor to Zhukov in the Party post of Presidium member. The Party's ascendancy is demonstrated.

Zhukov's removal from power does not portend major changes in Soviet strategic thinking. Since 1955, billions have been spent on making the Soviet armed forces fit both to deter and to wage a nuclear war. The military parade on November 7 emphasized tactical weapons designed for both purposes. The very magnitude of the investment in the present military posture makes it doubtful that the Soviets will turn back to what Malenkov advocated —primary reliance on deterrence.

Yet the strategy imposed by present conditions cannot be completely satisfactory to the Soviet leaders. The strategy of fighting a preëmptive war—getting in the first blow against an opponent poised to strike—as advocated by General Rotmistrov and officially adopted in 1955, is essentially a strategy of the second-best. For under these conditions, it is the opponent who chooses war; the Soviet Union simply makes the best of it in seeking by earlier action to blunt the opponent's first blow. As long as the Soviet Union has no hope, in its first strike, of hitting the opponent's striking forces effectively enough to preclude retaliation, the initiation of war is an act of extreme desperation. If the Soviet Union could create a weapons system permitting the elimination of our striking force without fear of effective retaliation, the Soviet leaders could attack if and when they pleased.

If the Soviet Union should continue to gain technologically while the NATO alliance made little progress, the Soviet Union would be able to make war without fear of the consequences. It will be difficult to attain the ability to eliminate the opponent's nuclear striking forces in a single blow. But that is the goal which the Soviet leaders must strain to reach. If they should acquire such preponderant military strength, they would have policy alternatives even more attractive than the initiation of nuclear war. By flaunting presumably invincible strength, the Soviet Union could compel piecemeal capitulation of the democracies. This prospect must indeed seem glittering to the Soviet leaders.

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GANDHI TEN YEARS AFTER

By Frank Moraes

"IN times of crisis and difficulty," I asked Nehru recently, "do you inquire of yourself, 'What would Gandhi have done?'" Nehru reflected a moment before he replied. "It's a difficult question but I'll answer it frankly. In moments of crisis, political or personal, I *do* think of Gandhi but for a somewhat selfish reason. I think of him because I would like to recapture his serenity of mind, the calmness of spirit with which he used to face a crisis. But if you ask me, do I consciously inquire of myself, 'What would Gandhi have done?' well—no."

It was an honest answer and typical of the man. Here was Gandhi's heir whom the Mahatma in his own lifetime had named as his successor confessing that not in every moment of crisis did he turn instinctively for inspiration to the Master.

"And yet," Nehru went on, "Gandhi typified the spirit of India in a curious and characteristic way. He had the same strong core of tradition and thought to which he remained loyal. But outside that he could adjust himself and his views to the impact of others. He was resilient and flexible. He would bend but he would not break."

As I listened to Nehru I felt that that was probably how the Mahatma would have liked it, for Gandhi had never insisted that his followers should live in the image of himself. True, he was an exacting taskmaster who expected and insisted on scrupulous adherence to certain standards of conduct, of discipline and rectitude. But even within the idiosyncrasies of his own personal mode of life Gandhi was prepared to make concessions to others, whether in the way of diet, tobacco, tea or celibacy. It was one reason why he attracted such diverse individuals as the exuberantly extroverted Sarojini Naidu on the one hand and the saintly but astringent Vinoba Bhave on the other.

Looking back over the past ten years from January 30, 1948, when the Mahatma was assassinated, it would be pharisaical to pretend that Gandhi's ideas and teachings survive and shine as vividly as they did in his lifetime. Like Hinduism, Gandhism is much more than a way of life for, just as the mere observance of caste, ritual and the institution of the joint family does not constitute Hinduism, so also the adoption of ascetic habits,

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verging on the masochistic, does not in itself generate the "soul force" which is Gandhism. Paradoxically enough, while Hinduism is beginning to shed its outer habiliments such as caste and the joint family, the present-day exponents of Gandhism, with rare exceptions, prefer the façade to the faith. The result is a general debasing of Gandhian gold.

Service was the master passion of Gandhi's life, and although he was not the first Indian to preach political liberty he was distinctive in so far as he was the first to identify himself with the people. This quality of never standing apart from the people is what distinguished the Mahatma most clearly from the older school of Indian politicians. An English friend describes how he once asked Gandhi whether his service was done through love of the cause or love of the people. Gandhi's reply was characteristic. "For love of the people," he said, and added, "To serve a cause without serving persons is a dead thing."

To the end of his life Gandhi combined with a basic, often extreme conservatism a heterodox outlook on many matters, and the rebel was as strong as the puritanical streak in him. The rebel in Gandhi drew Nehru to the Mahatma.

"Sometimes," Nehru confesses in his autobiography, "his language was almost incomprehensible to an average modern." Many of his ideas appeared to the younger man to be mediæval and revivalist. Nehru recoiled from the Mahatma's idealization of poverty and suffering, his doctrine of wealth as a trust, his frequent stress on the religious and spiritual aspect of the civil disobedience movement, his attitude to machinery and modern civilization and his vagueness in defining political and economic objectives.

Yet behind Gandhi's gentle mien Nehru detected a resolute purpose. The Mahatma, he discovered, was different from the older school of Indian politicians in another respect, for while the latter had consisted largely of armchair politicians who delighted in marathon speeches and in the passing of long-winded resolutions, the Mahatma insisted on action. A wrong, he declared, should provoke not only protest but active resistance, and such resistance should be non-violent.

We come here to the core of Gandhi's teaching. Blended in the doctrine of *ahimsa* or non-violence are two of Christianity's outstanding principles—the precept of returning good for evil and the promise that the meek shall inherit the earth. The idea

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of using moral suasion rather than force is not new to humanity but to Gandhi belongs the credit of employing it as an instrument for political and social regeneration. In this the Mahatma was influenced greatly by the ideas of an American and a Russian, by Thoreau and Tolstoy.

With Thoreau he believed that in a time of injustice the place of the just man was in prison, and from the American he drew strength in his own way of life, in "the joy," as Thoreau put it, "of possessing all and owning nothing." It was to Tolstoy that Gandhi sent an account of his first non-violent campaigns in South Africa. Tolstoy's reply ends on a prophetic note: "Your activity in the Transvaal, as it seems to us at this end of the world, is the most essential work, the most important of all the work now being done in the world, wherein not only the nations of the Christian, but of all the world will inevitably take part."

To many this will seem an extravagant prophecy which indeed it was. But its interest lies in its irony, for there is no notion more mistaken or fanciful than the widespread belief that India and the National Congress Party were at any time, in Gandhi's lifetime or after, committed to non-violence as a creed. The Congress Party, including Nehru and other prominent leaders such as the late Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, accepted non-violence but only as a method. With them it was an instrument of political practice, not an article of faith. The distinction is important for it explains many of the contradictions, seeming or real, in Indian policies at home and abroad since the Mahatma's death.

To Gandhi non-violence was a dogma, a creed and an article of faith, but the majority of his followers saw it only as a worthy means to a worthy end. They approached non-violence pragmatically whereas Gandhi's faith in it was absolute and immutable. Good means, he insisted, must lead to good ends while bad means could only vitiate and defeat the ends. In so far as he viewed ends as a projection of means he was often wont to regard means *as* ends and thus non-violence became with him a mission.

Most of the Congress Party, more especially Nehru, never shared this view. If they did, it is difficult to reconcile some of their actions with their speeches. Thus on the outbreak of the Second World War Gandhi urged that Indian aid should be given to the British unconditionally but that it should be of a non-violent character. Nehru's view, like that of the majority of his colleagues, was different. India, they felt, should assist Britain in

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a war against Nazism even to the extent of armed support, but it could do so only as a free nation. Subsequently, differences arose over a later resolution adopted by the Congress Party which Gandhi interpreted as committing the Congress to non-violence, even in external war. With this interpretation the majority of his colleagues, notably Nehru, Patel and Azad, disagreed, explaining to the Mahatma that their acceptance of the principle of non-violence was limited only to the country's internal political struggle and was never intended to be extended to external war. Significantly they also pointed out to him that the Congress had never applied the principle of non-violence to the Indian armed services and police since the Congress Party had frequently urged more rapid Indianization of the army.

Gandhi, having listened to them patiently, was adamant. "It is my certain belief," he said, "that only non-violence can save India and the world from self-extinction." But his colleagues would not be convinced, and so—not for the first time—the Mahatma relinquished the leadership of the Congress Party.

The interesting fact that emerges from all this is that neither India nor the Congress Party accepted Gandhi's doctrine of non-violence as a creed. Even the Mahatma's effort to equate non-violence with Hindu teaching was vigorously contested, not least by Hindus themselves, many of whom pointed to the *Mahabharata,* the great epic poem which has as its central theme the war between the Kauravas and Pandavas. In the *Bhagavad Gita,* which is an interpolation in the *Mahabharata,* Krishna addressing his disciple, Arjuna, urges him to play his part in the destruction of the enemy in war. Gandhi's attempt to explain this as symbolic of the eternal conflict between good and evil, right and wrong in the human soul, is not convincing for it cannot be reconciled with Krishna's address to Arjuna as a soldier whose duty it is to defend the community uninfluenced by fear. Nor in the Mahatma's lifetime was the modern educated middle class easily impressed by non-violence as a political faith. It seemed to them to lack an intellectual basis because violence by any rational thinking was permissible in defense of personal honor and against aggression.

Here Nehru, by rationalizing those of Gandhi's teachings which were not easily acceptable to the sophisticated intellectual, did much to reconcile this class to Gandhi's leadership and induced them to follow him. "A worthy end should have worthy

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means leading up to it," he observed, in commending non-violence. But clearly he himself accepted it as a political weapon not because he respected it as an absolute creed but because he regarded it as the right policy in the conditions which prevailed.

One might almost say in the light of present-day events that Nehru used Gandhi's means to achieve what have proved to be largely his own political and economic ends. But this would be demonstrably unfair since at the time he could not have foreseen the future. That, however, is what has actually happened. The Indian Government of today, headed by Nehru, favors industrialization and high power projects, stands for a socialistic pattern of society, refuses to regard wealth as a trust and has put private enterprise on the defensive—developments at which Gandhi in all likelihood would have looked askance. On the other hand it is attempting to enforce prohibition over wide areas of India, to encourage the handloom, spinning wheel and small-scale industries, and to accelerate land reforms—measures which the Mahatma would have blessed. The Government has also been active in initiating birth-control clinics within ten years of the Mahatma's death. It will be remembered that Gandhi denounced artificial birth control as "sin" and preached the rarefied cult of *brahmacharya* which means chastity or voluntary restraint.

Only a few months ago I asked one of Gandhi's oldest English associates, H. S. L. Polak, who had worked with him in South Africa, how much of Gandhi's teaching he thought survived in India. "Ostensibly a great deal," said Polak. "In reality, very little."

I think he was right. The façade of Gandhism is there and many Congressmen still talk of the Mahatma as "the voice of conscience," but the voice, if ever heard, seems rarely to prevail. In the ten years of independence there have been more police firings on workers, students and other demonstrators, admittedly obstreperous, than there were in the ten comparatively quiescent years between 1932 and 1942 when the British *raj* held sway. According to a survey carried out by the central office of the Socialist Party, the police have opened fire on over a thousand occasions in the past ten years. (The exact figure is 1,020 for nine and a half years.) In all, 840 persons were reported to have been killed and 3,136 injured. These figures have not been contradicted by the Government. Of non-violence, save as an expression of India's foreign policy, there is therefore little evi-

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dence inside India—which is not to say that a state of turmoil persists (it does not) but that authority as represented by those in charge of law and order is more trigger-happy in independent than it was in British-ruled India.

Two facts explain this paradoxical state of affairs. In the first place, the majority of Gandhi's teachings, including his basic tenet of non-violence, were accepted by the majority of his followers not as doctrinal articles of faith but as practical weapons in the fight for *swaraj*. Other tenets, such as *brahmacharya*, were regarded as harmless fads springing from an excessively puritanical nature. Certainly Gandhi's attitude to sex and his ideas on diet appear curious not only to a modern but to a normal individual. It is difficult, for instance, to conceive of many persons (including Indians) subscribing to the Mahatma's theory that harmless beverages such as tea were dangerous and passionate drinks calculated to stir the animal in man.

The second explanatory fact arises from this highly repressive attitude which saw life as a series of taboos. Here Gandhi differed from his great contemporary Rabindranath Tagore who wrote lyrically of the joyous life and of the need for savoring thankfully the mundane and spiritual gifts of God. Gandhi saw life as renunciation. "There is no limit to the possibilities of renunciation," he preached. In this perhaps he reflected the older Hindu thinking—that austerity as expressed in extreme simplicity is the highest virtue. But as an English friend of Gandhi and India, Henry Brailsford, once queried, "Is it wholly admirable? This Indian road to God narrows and empties the universe. It achieves unity too easily by omission."

One need not necessarily subscribe to Brailsford's view to agree that a repressive life when practised by those to whom exaggerated austerity does not come easily leads to an unnatural way of living, productive of many complexes and contradictions. In the Mahatma's immediate entourage which adopted this repressive habit of life, these complexes and contradictions were abundantly manifest. They were by no means confined to an inner circle, for on the outer fringes there also popped up a series of minor Mahatmas who sought to mold themselves in their Master's image. Flaunting their outward austerity as a sign of inward grace, not a few of these individuals came to regard themselves as representing the authentic voice of the Mahatma. More than anything else this trend has been responsible for the slightly shop-soiled hy-

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pocrisy which characterizes some Congress circles, and detracts from the intrinsic virtue of much of what the Mahatma taught.

From this taint happily Nehru has been free. He did give up smoking at one stage during his association with the Mahatma, but as a matter of discipline and not as a virtuous gesture. In more recent years his diet has been predominantly vegetarian but the reason he gives for eating less meat is that he finds the habit "coarse." Although Nehru is inclined to agnosticism, Gandhi once described him as "nearer God than many persons who profess to be His followers."

I remember asking Nehru some years ago, when the Mahatma was alive and the Congress Working Committee was meeting for a busy and protracted session, whether he could find time to see me. He puckered his eyebrows fretfully, for his day was very crowded, and then suddenly he smiled. "I know," he said. "Come and see me during Gandhiji's prayer meeting. I'm never there!"

It might have marked the beginning of the secular approach. Yet I feel he is less than just when he describes the foreign policy he now pursues as rooted in Indian tradition and deriving from Gandhi, the Buddha and Asoka. It is true that these great sons of India preached peace and good will to all men, and that in so far as non-alignment represents good will to all men it is in line with ancient tradition. But neither Nehru nor the Congress Party has at any stage accepted non-violence as a doctrine or a creed. Indeed they repudiated this concept of non-violence in Gandhi's own lifetime. Many Hindus repudiate it as contrary to Hindu tradition. Perhaps some might also see significance in the fact that of the three men, one, Gandhi, was assassinated by one of his own countrymen, while the religion preached by another, the Buddha, was gradually edged out of India and mainly flourishes abroad, in Thailand, Ceylon, Japan and elsewhere. Prophets rarely flourish in their own country.

Moreover, the Mahatma's conception of non-violence or *ahimsa* was never passive. He certainly never compromised with evil for he insisted that a wrong should not merely provoke protest but that it should be actively resisted. The practical expression of *ahimsa* was *satyagraha* which literally means "the power of truth" but is generally described as "soul force." *Satyagraha,* which came to be known in its political form in India as civil disobedience, was described by Gandhi as the weapon of the strong, not the weak, its motive force arising from a feeling of inner

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strength and its practice calling for self-discipline. For *satyagraha* inflicted physical injury on none but the exponent who by enduring the maximum suffering without thought of counter-violence sought to shame or inspire the wrongdoer into doing right.

I think Gandhi would have approved wholeheartedly of Nehru's foreign policy of non-alignment, as the majority of thoughtful Indians do; and indeed Nehru proclaimed his policy even in the Mahatma's lifetime. Where Gandhi might—and in all likelihood would—have differed from Nehru would have been in some of the attitudes adopted and emphasis placed in implementing the policy. He would certainly not have approved of carrying non-alignment to the point of being privy to anything wrong or evil. I feel he would have come out as unequivocally against the Soviet butchery in Hungary as the French butchery in Algeria. And not on the ground of violence alone but on the ground of wrongful oppression. Although his belief in the intrinsic goodness of man—which again is at the root of the Christian doctrine of saving souls—led him to appeal equally to Roosevelt and to Hitler during World War II and did not permit him to differentiate between Communists and non-Communists as human beings, he was implacable in his opposition to what he felt was evil.

"I do not know," he told some Indian Communists who tried to convert him as far back as 1924, "whether Bolshevism is for the good of Russia in the long run. But I do know that in so far as it is based on violence and denial of God it repels me. . . . I am an uncompromising opponent of violent methods even to serve the noblest of causes."

Gandhi believed in the spiritual nature of man, and for him a world or doctrine which denied the existence of God was meaningless and abnormal. It is here that modern India departs markedly from the Gandhian tradition, for to the Mahatma individuals were more important than governments and he worked passionately to uphold the individual's right to freedom of opinion and action. In a curious and distinctive way he was more concerned with individuals than causes. On one occasion he held up a meeting of the Congress Working Committee whose members had come hundreds of miles from various parts of India while he listened gravely and earnestly to the pleas of a widow who was there to consult him on a personal problem.

"Who can judge?" remarked a spectator who told me of this incident. "His sense of values is probably more true than ours."

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Socialism sees society not in terms of individuals but as a conglomeration of groups, of classes and masses, of workers and capitalists, of peasants and landlords, of various forces operating at different strata to change the face of society. This is how Nehru and the Congress Party view India today, and it is here that they deviate most significantly from the Gandhian outlook and tradition. For to the Mahatma society meant individuals not groups, and he saw India as much in the faces of a peasant or a landlord as in the eyes of a child or a teacher. Gandhi was primarily a humanist and only next a politician. He was more concerned in achieving the ultimate slowly than in seizing on an immediate advantage and exploring it. This explains his weakness as a purely political negotiator. He was more interested in the purpose than in the mechanism of modern politics.

He functioned, it is true, in opposition to an established alien order whereas Nehru and the Congress Party operate today as the government in power. Political, economic and social values tend to change when viewed from different and opposite vantage points. This partly explains the movement of the Congress away from many of Gandhi's teachings, but the divergence is also influenced by the sharp difference in attitude or approach. The Gandhian emphasis was on the individual whereas the present-day Congress stress is on the State. Men appear differently when seen as individuals or as members of groups. The group outlook blurs the individual image. Gandhi put the human personality higher than the leviathan of the State.

On the domestic and foreign planes this difference of approach has led to an imperceptible but none the less definite demarcation between Gandhian precept and Congress practice. Socialism utilizes the machinery of the law and the State to set right what it believes to be an inequitable order of things. The ethical ideal of socialism is not far removed from Gandhism, but according to the Mahatma change should come through conversion and not through compulsion. The same motivation inspires Vinoba Bhave's movement in *bhoodan* or voluntary renunciation of land, the spirit which animates it being in line with Gandhian teaching and tradition. Compulsory acquisition of land with or without compensation would be strictly contrary to Gandhian principles. To state this is not to justify the Mahatma but merely to point out the divergence between his precept and Congress practice, for looked at from a modern point of view Gandhi's attitude

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seems perilously close to that of England's Victorian Liberals who opposed the Factory Acts on the plea that they infringed the freedom of the individual.

Just as Gandhi saw *satyagraha* as active resistance to wrong and evil and would therefore never have been quiescent on the international plane towards what he believed to be oppression or injustice, so also his concern with the individual would have far outweighed any attraction he might have felt for a particular ideology. In his eyes the Americans and Russians would not signify members of two opposing blocs but men, women and children belonging to the great company of the human race, and a wrong done to an American or a Russian would equally arouse his protest and resistance, for it would be a wrong done to a human being, quite irrespective of his political affiliations. Were Gandhi alive his influence, I feel, would have been exerted decisively in keeping India's policy of non-alignment, of which he approved, really non-aligned. He would have done so in the spirit in which he wrote during the Second World War, "I will not hurt England or Germany to serve India."

The twin stars of Gandhi's teaching were *ahimsa,* or non-violence, and *satya,* or truth. Truth, like love, is a many-splendored thing, and its effulgence shines with a varied glow on individuals and governments. Truth presents a different facet to a politician when in office and when out of it. And to the politicians of the Congress Party now in office it appears to be a slightly different article from what it was when they followed the Mahatma in the battle for freedom. The Congress is no more or less fallible than political parties the world over. Truth is the first casualty when men climb to power. The *nishkām* (desirelessness) which Gandhi preached as an ideal regarded office only as a means of public service.

In his autobiography Nehru recounts a conversation which reveals Gandhi's uncanny prescience on things relating to his own people and country. The conversation took place some 15 years before independence, and in the course of it Gandhi inquired of Nehru how he visualized the future of the Congress and what form the organization should acquire when freedom came. Nehru replied that when independence came the Congress should cease to exist as a party. Gandhi demurred.

"I think the Congress should continue," he said, "but on one condition. It must pass a self-denying ordinance that none of its

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members should accept a paid job under the State. If any one of its members desired such a post he should resign."

What was in the Mahatma's mind? Clearly he visualized the possibility of power corrupting the fine fibre of Congress character, of dulling the spirit of service, of blunting honesty, and of eventually influencing Congressmen in their capacity as ministers and officials to stand apart from, instead of with, the people as he had always taught them to do. Paradoxically but perhaps significantly, the political power of the Mahatma over his colleagues waned as independence approached, though his moral authority over them and the country was still strong enough to compel the Indian Government soon after partition to hand over to Pakistan 53 crores of rupees ($106,000,000) which the Mahatma felt belonged rightly to the latter.

Yet it would be unfair to infer from all this that Gandhism in India today is more honored in the breach than in the observance. The ideals which Gandhi symbolized and which he attempted to impress on his people were uncommonly, even transcendentally high, and not many men were as well equipped as the Mahatma either in experience or character to maintain such demanding standards. Despite the drawbacks and deficiencies inherent in the Indian situation and people, Gandhi has left on his country the stamp of his moral impress. This survives.

It survives in many ways. If Nehru, by insisting that India's struggle for freedom could only have a global significance as part of the broad stream of world progress, made Indians aware of others, Gandhi made India aware of herself. He imbued his countrymen with a sense of dignity, service and self-respect. He put spring into their tired muscle and taught them to hold their heads erect again. "Do not fear and do not hate," he adjured them. "Above all, reform must start from within." He was a hard, exacting taskmaster, "the beloved slave-driver" as one of his followers called him, but he practised all that he preached.

What was *satyagraha* with its message of self-discipline but "reform from within"? The same principle inspired his creed of *swadeshi* which might be translated as "made in, or belonging to, one's own country," but to Gandhi it had a special connotation with again an underlying stress on self-discipline. The *swadeshi* movement aimed at encouraging the manufacture and use of indigenous, homemade products. Within the Congress Party it took the form of popularizing *khadi* or homespun cloth. It thus came

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to signify two things—self-sufficiency and the duty to employ your neighbor. "So when we find," wrote Gandhi, "that there are many things that we cannot get in India, we must try to do without them. . . . Once we adopt this *swadeshi* rule of life, a burden will roll off our backs and, like Bunyan's Pilgrim, we shall go on our way rejoicing, freer than we were." To reduce one's personal wants to a minimum was the Mahatma's conception of the *swadeshi* way of life.

Gandhi's message of *swadeshi* survives but of some of its manifestations today, such as heavy industrialization, he would probably not have approved. The Mahatma's opposition to industrialization was focussed mainly on the big machine which in his opinion tended to displace labor and to create unemployment. He was not against all machinery. "What I object to," he once explained, "is the craze for machines, not machinery as such. The craze is for what they call labor-saving machinery. Men go on saving labor till thousands go without work and are thrown on the open streets to die of starvation. I want to save time and labor not for a fraction of mankind but for all. I want the concentration of wealth not in the hands of a few but in the hands of all. Today machinery merely helps a few to ride on the backs of millions. The impetus behind it all is not philanthropy but greed. It is against this constitution of things that I am fighting with all my might. The supreme consideration is man. The machine should not tend to atrophy the limbs of man."

In a country of arrested economic growth such as India with small capital resources and a vast reservoir of labor, small-scale industries and handicrafts must necessarily supplement the bigger industries in the towns and cities. Gandhi's solution was the *charkha* or spinning wheel, and he was fond of saying that India could spin her way to *swaraj*. In the *charkha* he saw another symbol of self-sufficiency. I doubt if he would have approved of the new India's Five-Year Plans, for his approach to economic planning was basically different, having its roots in the villages. He would at the very least have questioned the priority given to heavy industrialization with its concomitants of modern machinery and multi-purpose power projects. "Power," said Nehru in a recent broadcast, "is the foundation of all development today." He is right. None the less it is difficult to conceive of the Mahatma approving or blessing India's strenuous efforts to industrialize.

The village community projects would have had his warm

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endorsement. To Gandhi the basic fact of economics was that man must eat. His views on politics and economics, because they were fundamental, appear to many to be elementary. They were founded deep in an understanding of the human personality and in an appreciation and awareness of the basic needs and desires of India's common man. Among the many enduring lessons which Gandhi taught is his insistence on the dignity of manual labor. The *charkha* symbolizes self-sufficiency but it also demonstrates the beauty and value of working with one's hand. Gandhi's sense of social service took many forms, from his passion for nursing the sick to performing the most menial tasks such as cleaning latrines. There was no trace of squeamishness in his make-up.

If he imbued many in India with a sense of service he also set up both for himself and others an exacting code and a meticulous standard of conduct and performance. He set scrupulous standards which the people of India came instinctively to expect from their leaders and which, despite a marked deterioration after the Mahatma's death, continue to influence and to govern the conduct of public men and affairs. Therein lies Gandhi's greatest legacy—the spread of a moral climate of thought, behavior and action which serves as the "voice of conscience" to many thousands of Indians, just as the Mahatma himself relied on what he called his inner voice which was really his sense of intuition.

Alongside the setting up and observance of standards, Gandhi made another distinctive contribution. He taught the Indian people to respect the simple way of life. This lesson lives. If in the process he tended sometimes to idealize poverty, he strove more than any of his countrymen to lift the common man from the degradation of poverty.

Of the many times I have seen Gandhi and Nehru together over the years one incident comes back vividly to mind. It was at the meeting of the Congress in Bombay in August 1942 when overnight the entire Congress executive was clapped into jail. Nehru was speaking. "There is nothing beautiful about poverty," he declared passionately. "I hate poverty." Gandhi, immersed in a pile of papers, looked up quickly, for Nehru's declaration was an oblique though unconscious rebuke to his idealization of poverty. The Mahatma smiled, and in his smile was all the indulgence of a fond father for a slightly willful son.

The relationship between Gandhi and Nehru highlights another remarkable trait of the Mahatma which derived from his

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human, individual approach to all persons. Apart from his ability to attract followers of the most diverse personalities and temperaments, Gandhi was able to transmit to many of them his own inspired sense of dedicated service. Notable among these was the late Thakkar Baba who worked selflessly for many years among the so-called untouchables and aboriginals. Vinoba Bhave is another—some say the only genuine Gandhite alive today. But working unknown and unsung in the villages far away from the floodlight which beats fiercely on Delhi are many hundreds of humble Indian men and women inspired with the dedicated zeal of the Mahatma.

The cause of the untouchables which Gandhi regarded among his prime missions is unhappily not receiving the same close personal and national attention which it did when he was alive. True, the Indian constitution makes the practice of untouchability a criminal offense. But there are vast areas of rural India where this pernicious practice continues to flourish. Were Gandhi alive he would have tramped the countryside using his great moral authority to exorcise this scourge. But the Congress Party is now in office and, sad to relate, the business of winning elections has even led it to compromise with casteism in areas where votes depend on pampering the susceptibilities of caste. Here perhaps is the most illuminating and devastating commentary on how far the Congress Party has strayed from the Gandhian way. What the Mahatma foresaw many years ago when he advised Congressmen to impose a self-denying ordinance on themselves has unhappily come to pass. But millions of humble Indians exercising neither office nor authority continue to remember the still, small voice of Gandhi.

The late Charles Andrews, who might be described as the Mahatma's closest English friend, recalls a scene in South Africa when Gandhi, tired after the labors of the day, sat in the twilight under the open sky with an ailing Zulu child on his lap. He asked Andrews to sing his favorite hymn, "Lead Kindly Light." "I can remember," writes Andrews, "how we all sat in silence when the hymn was finished, and how Gandhi then repeated to himself the last two solemn lines:

> And with the morn those angel faces smile,
> Which I have loved long since and lost awhile."

Who knows but that the message of Gandhi for India has only been lost awhile?

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LAWS AND MEN IN SOVIET SOCIETY

By John N. Hazard

STALIN'S death in 1953 started his heirs on a hurried effort to modify the severity of Soviet codes of criminal law and procedure. In March of that year Beria promised that new codes would be ready in six months. Yet, as the year 1957 came to a close, the task was still in the hands of the law professors. No new codes have yet become law. Only a patchwork has been carried out to eliminate a few of the major points of complaint against the criminal code.

The silence of the Soviet legislators stands out the more strongly in contrast to the extensive debate currently proceeding in Soviet law institutes and the press. This debate is symbolic of widespread dissatisfaction within the U.S.S.R. over conditions in the courts as they had developed during Stalin's tenure. Even the most dogmatic of the present Communist leaders seem to appreciate that they and their predecessors have pressed too hard, and that the public will no longer conceal its repugnance at the practice of convicting the innocent on a grand scale under the excuse that a dragnet policy was necessary to terrorize political enemies and preserve the state. Long gone are the days when Soviet agitators could argue with some plausibility before Soviet audiences that the vague and sweeping provisions of the criminal code and the extremely meager defense opportunities offered by the code of criminal procedure were designed only to trap the sly "bourgeois" foe and need not strike panic in the hearts of citizens loyal to Party and country. Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in February 1956 told even of loyal Communists convicted for things they never did.

With Khrushchev's example of plain speaking before them, technicians of the law institutes have been emboldened to suggest a housecleaning, involving many changes in the present law, so as to establish what they call "legality." A committee of experts was created in 1956 in the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to prepare drafts for submission to the Supreme Soviet for enactment. Whether the committee can hasten legislation will depend upon the politics of the moment when the drafts are ready. Under Soviet conditions it is the Communist Party, as always, and its First Secretary in particular, that will decide the question.

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There are Soviet specialists placed to know the inside story of the past who confide that it was Stalin himself who stopped the formal enactment of earlier drafts. It is not impossible that the committee of experts may again complete its work and again find its drafts buried on a desk higher up in the Party hierarchy. Still, some citizens think that pressure from the public is now so great that long delay in enacting the drafts, once they are ready, would be exceedingly difficult. The year 1958 will indicate the speed with which action is to come, for evidence is accumulating that the drafts are nearing completion.

In discussing their new drafts Soviet experts criticize above all else imprecision in the definitions of the present criminal codes of the various Soviet republics. Since 1922 judges have been permitted by law to inflict punishment for what they will, regardless of whether the act complained of was defined as a crime in the code. Authority for such a decision lies in the "analogy" article, by which a court is permitted to find any act "socially dangerous" and to punish the offender appropriately, using as legal basis for the sentence any article of the code which the judges believe to define analogous action as a crime.

In the 1930s the Supreme Court sought to limit widespread application of the analogy article, but it was restored to vigor during the war, and the late Andrei Vyshinsky used his great authority as supreme arbiter over the "legal front" to prevent its elimination in postwar years, despite a strong movement among law professors to discard it. Now that Vyshinsky is dead and his era of dictatorship in legal matters is widely denounced, the majority of Soviet law professors have declared themselves in favor of eradicating this unpopular principle from the new code.

In the words of a rapporteur before a meeting of 115 legal specialists held in early 1957 in the All-Union Institute of Juridical Sciences in Moscow, "the principle of further strengthening of socialistic legality in the sphere of criminal law must be reflected in the codification by the republics of criminal legislation. This task will be served by the rejection of analogy and by straightforward declaration in law that punishment may be applied only for a crime provided for in the law." In July 1957, an *Izvestia* author demanded that "penalties be applied only through the courts and that the only basis for criminal liability be the existence in a person's act of the elements of a crime as stipulated by

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law." This required, in his view, the exclusion from the code of the principle of analogy and inclusion in the codes of an exhaustive list of crimes.

The analogy principle bears the brunt of the law professors' attack, but none of them has so far criticized the imprecision of articles of the criminal code punishing as "counter-revolution" a wide variety of activities including such matters as "the undermining of state industry, transport, trade, currency or system of credit, or of the coöperative system, with counter-revolutionary intent, by utilizing the state institutions or enterprises concerned or by working against their normal activities." This was the article under which large numbers of industrial managers were convicted during the purges of the late 1930s. The recent denunciations of the excesses of the purges have not yet been reflected in any published attack on the articles under which much of the blood-bath was conducted. The most that has been said on this score is in the vague criticism of the *Izvestia* author who urges the deletion of unspecified articles "that provide for the possibility of punishing persons who have not committed a specific crime but who are dangerous because of their connections with the criminal world or because of their past activities."

While the definition of "counter-revolution" in the codes remains uncriticized, the whole concept of the lesser type of "state crimes" (called in the code "other crimes against the administration") is being reconsidered. It is suggested that smuggling, evasion of military service and violation of labor discipline, which rank now second only to the "counter-revolutionary" category of crime, should be reduced to lower categories bearing a lesser stigma and lower penalties. It is also recommended that obsolete crimes, such as having belonged to the Tsarist secret police or to governments which sought to supplant the Soviet government during the Civil War, be declared outdated and eliminated.

The cry has also gone out against the notorious provision authorizing exile to remote places in Siberia for periods up to five years for members of the family of a soldier who flees the country, even if the family knew nothing of the planned escape. The reformers seem to have no objection to existing provisions punishing family members who knew of the plan and failed to report it.

Proposals for defining specific new crimes as a means of re-

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placing the analogy article have not been numerous. Those of major note call for implementing the constitutional guarantees of inviolability of home and correspondence. Officials who now enter a home or read correspondence without a prosecutor's approval are punishable under the code provision authorizing prosecution of an official for exceeding his authority. Apparently, this threat has not been sufficiently frightening to overly zealous or oppressive officials, and the law professors want to be able to point to precise language in the code.

Moderation of existing forms of punishment is currently a major demand. Current codes provide for penalties ranging up to ten years for non-political crimes and up to 25 years for those committed with intention to injure the state. Execution by shooting is permitted for traitors, spies, subversives and saboteurs as well as for sadistic murderers. Reformers of today are of two minds. Some think the provisions excellent and without need of change. Some would reduce the maximum to 15 years, while still others point out that in Lenin's time the maximum prison term was ten years and that sentences less severe than imprisonment were more often handed down than is now customary.

Return to the ten-year maximum prison term seems to have the support of the majority of legal experts; a draft, as yet unpublished but apparently circulating in Soviet legal circles, is reported to incorporate this change. Capital punishment, for those presently subject to it, seems also to have been retained in the draft. Nothing is said in the debate about the apparent tendency of the Supreme Court to extend the death penalty to murder which is less than sadistic, even though the circumstances of the crime, as reported in the judicial decisions, are admittedly outrageous. The evidence in the debate suggests that severe penalties will be retained for the active enemy of the régime and for the brutal enemy of society generally, but that elsewhere there will be an attempt to return to policies of reform and rehabilitation which were widely and favorably publicized during Lenin's time.

The effect upon a man's reputation of having served a prison term is now being discussed. It is suggested that prison should be reserved only for offenders who have committed acts sufficiently serious to require elimination of the offender from society for a period of at least one year. The pressure from some quarters to apply penalties of three months in prison for minor offenses is being resisted as ruinous to a man's reputation. It is thought

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sufficient for a light offense to punish with less opprobrium, presumably by application of the long-established practice of assigning the criminal to a job outside of prison for a fixed term, with deduction of a portion of his wages as a fine and loss of accumulation of seniority rights during the period of the penalty.

Mounting distrust of the criminal repeater is evident in articles disclosing some soul-searching as to why crime should persist in Soviet society. Doctrine in revolutionary days laid crime to poverty and social protest. Doctrine since 1936 has announced full employment and achievement of a socialist society which is by Soviet definition beneficial to all. Yet, crime persists. In the words of two authors in June 1957: "No doubt we have liquidated the social and economic conditions that lead to mass impoverishment of the capitalist countries and force thousands into crime. But along with the objective conditions existing at a given stage in the building of Communism, there exist conditions of a subjective order. One cannot overlook such a factor as the lag in individuals' psychology, which is where survivals from the past most often roost." For such retarded individuals Soviet authors demand "reëducation strengthened with effective means of compulsion." In other words, hard labor is proposed for the professional criminal who has become a social parasite, and the new codes will not be lenient with him.

Juvenile delinquents have been worrying Soviet law officers as they have officials in other lands. To cope with the problem, law reformers in 1935 reduced the age of responsibility to 12 years if the offense was larceny, mayhem, murder, attempted murder or violence causing bodily injury. The culprits were to be tried before regular courts and not a special court for youthful offenders, and penalties were to be the same as for adults. For other offenses responsibility at 16 years of age was continued.

Raising the age of responsibility from 12 to 14 for serious crimes is now recommended, and it is urged that under the new code sentences for offenders in these categories from the ages of 14 to 16 should be less severe than those for adults. Some specialists propose to recreate special juvenile courts, although this was not a part of the rapporteur's suggestions at the 1957 meeting of legal specialists, and it seems unlikely that the wheel will turn completely back to the policy of the early days.

Procedural protection of the accused has also been placed high on the agenda of reform. Soviet law professors have long been

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at odds on this subject with Stalin and his principal henchmen. While Stalin was still alive one professor kept arguing that a presumption of innocence existed in Soviet law, but he could point to no provision of constitution or code to support his assertion. He could say only that since counsel was permitted, it was logical to suppose that he had a function to perform, and this would not be the case if there were a presumption of guilt. Now, all reformers want to see the principle of presumption of innocence established in print, probably because they know, as Soviet authors have admitted in the past, that Soviet pre-trial proceedings often lead a judge to assume in advance that the prisoner before him is guilty.

The state of mind which accepts a presumption of guilt is encouraged by the fact that no individual comes to court in any but the most minor case without having been subjected to a preliminary investigation by an official charged with exploring the case in every detail. This official is not supposed to content himself with establishing a *prima facie* case as would be done before a grand jury at common law in the United States, but the present code requires him to hear the defendant and his witnesses and examine the defendant's evidence. The investigator's duty, if honestly performed, causes him to conclude when he prepares the indictment and turns over the case to the prosecutor for trial that the prisoner has already been given a chance to defend himself and has been found wanting.

The judges at the trial know what has preceded preparation of the indictment, and by their own admission they often assume that the accused is guilty unless he can prove himself innocent. The present reformers feel that their task is to protect the defendant against this presumption of guilt, and they propose to do it in two ways. One is to declare specifically in the new code that the accused is to be presumed innocent when the trial begins, and the second is to give him counsel not only at the trial but during the preliminary investigation.

Present procedural codes in the various republics make no provision for the right of counsel in all cases, even though the 1936 Constitution created such a right. Ever since 1936 Soviet legal authors have written that the right must be held to exist even though the codes have not been amended to incorporate it. Now the reformers would specify the constitutional right in the codes, and they would go further. They would have the codes state all

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of counsel's rights including the right to communicate privately with a defendant, to familiarize himself with the materials of a case, to request the court to summon witnesses and require the production of evidence, to participate at every stage of the trial, to plead in court and to appeal and participate in the appeal. Some of the reformers want also to have counsel admitted at the preliminary investigation so that no person will have to rely on his own resources at this crucial point in the proceedings.

Opposition to the proposal to permit counsel at the preliminary investigation still seems strong, and it may even be that dominant opinion still suffers from the old fear that a lawyer's presence at proceedings before trial will lay bare the prosecution's case before it is complete, thus giving the defense an opportunity to frighten witnesses or conceal evidence which might otherwise become available. Those who favor the presence of defense lawyers are strengthening their hand with an argument unfamiliar in Soviet circles; they are saying that such a right of counsel at the stage of preliminary investigation already exists in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and East Germany, and this is sufficient reason to consider the adoption of the principle in the U.S.S.R. itself. If the argument prevails, it will be the first time that Soviet law has been known to copy procedural practice in another state of the Soviet bloc.

A form of jury trial for very serious offenses may reappear in the Soviet Union, if reformers have their way. For some time after the Revolution major crimes were heard by a jury, and it was in 1922 that one professional judge and two lay assessors became the standard trial bench. Since that time no suggestion has been made for a larger number of laymen to serve as a form of jury. Soviet law professors seem to have been content with the three-man bench, on which the lay assessors shared with the professional judge the decision of both guilt and penalty. Now the proposal has been made to increase the number of lay assessors for serious crime, sometimes described as crime for which capital punishment may be prescribed. Some authors ask for four assessors and others for six, and some suggest that the laymen should constitute a "jury." Some would permit this jury to decide only matters relating to the guilt or innocence of the accused, leaving to the professional judge the determination of the appropriate penalty. Others feel that a division of functions would provide a contrast between judge and lay assessors which

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does not now exist, and that it is desirable to have laymen share in determining the penalty, perhaps as a restraining hand upon an overly severe judge.

Soviet legal scholars sometimes refer to the revocation, in September 1953, of the authorization of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to conduct hearings before special boards constituted by the Ministry to determine "social danger" in individuals and to exile them or imprison them in hard labor camps for periods up to five years. It was this administrative institution which constituted the chief mechanism of Stalin's terror apparatus. Curiously enough, the 1953 law of revocation of which the reformers are proud has never been published. It is said to have been exhibited to a group of French socialists in 1956, but it has not even been printed in a recent volume purporting to contain all laws enacted between 1938 and 1956 except those concerning the budget and those awarding medals. In spite of the secrecy still surrounding the text, the revocation seems to be a reality, for the foreign correspondents stationed in Moscow hear of no mass arrests which would suggest that the police are acting outside the courts as they did during Stalin's time. It is probably in hopes that this state of affairs will not be permitted to return that the reformers demand that the courts alone be entitled to apply penalties.

A new element is creeping into the Soviet system of law enforcement, however, and it conceivably could create some of the danger which law professors thought had been eliminated through the abolition of the special boards of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and generally through the current effort to revise the codes. This new element is the "social assembly." In a series of draft laws published in the various republics for discussion during the spring and summer of 1957, there began a campaign against "anti-social parasitic elements." To cope with this menace it was proposed to vest authority in a "social assembly" to vote a "social sentence" under which any adult refusing to participate in "socially useful work" and also living on "unearned income" might be exiled to remote regions for a term of from two to five years with the obligation to work at the place of exile.

The "social assembly" was to be summoned by a street committee or a housing administration and was to include all adults living in the given street or multiple dwelling. The provincial or city soviet's executive committee was to review any such sen-

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tences to assure adherence to common rules of justice and to ascertain that the sentence was grounded on firm evidence. Such a review was presumably to make certain that angry neighbors did not punish an unpopular person who was really doing no wrong.

Commentaries have been published, most of them accepting the general principle of the law; but many criticize its details, especially the vagueness of its definitions, the long terms permitted as penalties, the inadequacy of the quorum requirement for the assembly passing the sentence, the failure to establish procedural rules to govern the hearing and the absence of a right to appeal. Some have suggested that the assembly be replaced by a "comradely court" similar to that now operating to enforce discipline in industry or the court of the same name which functioned before the war in multiple dwellings as a device for disciplining disorderly tenants. Such a court would be small, composed of highly responsible citizens chosen especially for the function, and it might be subject to review by the professional courts, as it was in the 1930s.

Some Soviet law professors have indicated that the "social assembly" could negate much of the current move toward restoring legality to the process of maintaining order and could expose individuals to the emotional action of neighbors having no training in the evaluation of evidence or the determination of appropriate penalties. The foreigner cannot but wonder why this new element has been permitted to creep into a system undergoing a reform which seems to lead in the opposite direction. Possibly the absence since 1953 of the special boards of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is regretted by the administrators and their high Party superiors.

It may be that senior administrators, long accustomed to exiling without public trial individuals who had committed no overt act prosecutable as crime, find the prospective reforms a hindrance—especially the abolition of the former special boards. By appearing to be an instrument of the general public, though one that can be manipulated by skilled agitators, the proposed "social assembly" may seem to them to be a useful device for bypassing the newly sanctified rules of the criminal courts. Time alone will tell whether the drafts become law in all 15 republics and whether administrators can resist the temptation to bend the assemblies to their special needs. Already several repub-

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lics have enacted the draft law as it is presently written, but resistance to enactment has developed within the largest and most influential of them all—the Russian Republic.

To students of Soviet law, and especially to skeptics both within and without the Soviet Union, the post-Stalin campaign has a familiar ring. At intervals in Soviet history there have been much-publicized efforts to restore "legality" to the activities of Soviet officials. Following the excesses of collectivization of agriculture in the early 1930s the law professors demanded close adherence to the provisions of the codes and even some revisions in them. Stalin declared that "life has become better, life has become gayer," and the law professors took this as presaging a relaxation of severity. However, the era of good feeling which reached its zenith in 1934 and 1935 was short-lived.

By 1936 the purge trials had begun, and the wheel had turned full circle. The country was subjected to a reign of terror which reached into the highest levels of the Communist Party itself. The Constitution of 1936 now seems to have been but a delayed response to the era it brought to a close, for its promise of a rule of law is now declared by the Soviet press to have been an empty one, as outsiders knew at the time. Eminent Communists executed during the purges are now being restored posthumously to honorable standing with announcements that they had been convicted through falsified evidence and forced confessions to untrue charges.

The soul-searching of the mid-1930s was repeated by Soviet professors after the Second World War, only to be silenced in 1949. The very voices that are raised today said some of the same things just after the war; yet then they fell silent under what must have been the weight of Stalin's displeasure.

The ebb and flow of liberalizing proposals have established an historical perspective which cannot but make foreigners and even some Soviet intellectuals skeptical of the success of present efforts. The skepticism is heightened by the delay with which the process of codification has been progressing. Legal draftsmen of all countries know that codification takes time, yet the sand in the Soviet codifiers' hourglass has been running for years. The process began in 1937 when the professors started to implement the Constitution of the preceding year; Stalin's death in 1953 only gave impetus to a task which has been in progress for 20 years without concrete results.

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There is a final reason for skepticism, one which is inherent in modern Communist doctrine. Soviet Party leaders conduct themselves on the assumption that their Marxist philosophy and their 40 years of experience have provided them with absolute truth. There are astute individuals, even within the U.S.S.R. itself, as the foreign traveller can discover, who wonder whether this attitude of mind does not militate against the adoption of legal reforms which are designed as a means of arriving at the truth through a strengthened adversary procedure. What many of the law professors are probably hoping is that in 1958 they can convince the Party leaders that their absolute monopoly on the truth in broad matters of policy is not being challenged, but that the aim is only to make certain that the guilty are punished. The lawyers will argue, as they have in the past, that they are not asking for a return to "liberalism," but that their proposals will enhance the security of the state by assuring that dangerous criminals are not left to roam the streets while courts relax their vigilance in the belief that they have already convicted the guilty man. They may also argue that the people will tend to feel a stronger loyalty to a state which strives to render justice, and that such an attitude among citizens will permit the administration to economize on the cost of maintaining power.

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NATO: DETERRENT OR SHIELD?

By Malcolm W. Hoag

> THE hard core of the West's military strength is its retaliatory forces. Their most powerful single element is the United States Strategic Air Command. . . .
>
> In spite of the retaliatory forces, there remains the possibility that war could start because the enemy made an error in judgment or took some reckless or opportunistic action. Because of this chance—rather, mischance—we cannot omit or skimp at any point along our eastern frontiers the defense strength which the Soviet threat dictates. For if our line is not defended throughout, the enemy might trump up a pretext for crossing it. We would then face not only an accomplished fact, but also a dilemma: If we did *not* take immediate action, we would fail to meet the commitments of the Alliance; if we did take it, *we* would start a war.
>
> On the other hand, if our line is being held in reasonable strength, and if the enemy knows this beyond doubt, then any inclination on his part to cross the line makes *him* face the terrible decision of detonating World War III, with a sure prospect of his own annihilation. The defensive forces deployed on our eastern boundary thus become an essential part of the deterrent.
>
> —*General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe*

IF one looks only at the second paragraph above, the case for sizable NATO ground forces seems to be based on a very understandable reluctance to initiate all-out atomic war: we need forces tailored for wars limited in scope and in the weapons employed. Then we can meet limited provocations without starting all-out atomic war.

Yet if it appears that the United States Strategic Air Command (SAC) will not necessarily be unleashed against the Soviets in response to enemy attacks in Europe, the enemy becomes less worried about initiating such an attack. Our main deterrent is weakened. Acknowledging this as they must, proponents of "graduated deterrence" none the less prefer to accept some weakening of the big deterrent in order to lessen the probability that any hostilities will degenerate into total war. NATO military commanders naturally want the best of both worlds: no weakening of the supreme air-atomic threat against the Soviets, and yet sizable land forces in case aggression does occur. But we cannot have the best of both worlds. One kind of military preparation diverts resources from another. Should the NATO compro-

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mise between land and other forces follow the new British pattern, with our ability to fight an old-fashioned ground war in Europe being further reduced?

There are many reasons for maintaining a sizable ground-war capability in Europe, but the conventional ones, premised on a strategy of total war, are suspect.

First, why maintain land forces to serve as a "trip-wire" to trigger retaliatory air blows? If the line between the NATO Powers and the Soviet Bloc is sharply defined, we and the Soviets will know when it is crossed. If they believe that crossing the line will unleash our full atomic capability, only one course of military action is sensible for them. If they attack at all, they must try first to eliminate our retaliatory airpower. Otherwise the aggressor loses any chance of destroying our air forces on the ground, so that many more bombers fly against him, greatly increasing the probable damage to his homeland. We may then destroy much of the Soviet strategic air force on the ground, limiting the size and disrupting the planning of any following Soviet air strike. Furthermore, any smaller, less well-organized Soviet strike that follows will be much less able to cope with our alerted air defenses. Enemy losses are multiplied at each stage, compounding the supreme risk he runs in foregoing the strategic air initiative. Consequently the much-touted "trip-wire" function of NATO land forces is highly unlikely to be fulfilled whether our troops are many or few in number.

This simple argument is based, of course, upon two premises: (1) the enemy believes that SAC will attack in response to aggressions in Europe, and (2) the "line" between East and West is sharply defined. Altering either premise changes the strategic argument, and both must be altered to be realistic. The extent to which our extreme threat is believed in by the enemy is likely to vary widely, depending upon what we do and what we say we will do. Our utterances are conflicting enough. Nowhere in the Western Alliance are there more than pitifully ineffective civil defenses against atomic bombing—a condition which hardly contributes to the credibility of our threats of massive retaliation. And, especially relevant to this discussion, NATO offensive military forces have not as yet been reorganized to fit a massive retaliation strategy, despite all our talk about doing so. How is the enemy to interpret the lag in revamping our forces?

The more we strip our conventional land defenses, the more

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credence the enemy is likely to place in our expressed willingness to use, by default, the strategic airpower that is our remaining alternative, whereas the more we emphasize the continued desirability of sizable land forces, the more he is likely to suspect that we regard them as an alternative to using strategic airpower, thus reducing his belief in our intent to use the main deterrent. One can escape this dilemma only by establishing other strongly complementary uses (as distinct from alternative uses) for strategic nuclear airpower and conventional land forces when both are to be employed in total war; and the case for this is vanishing.

Beyond serving as a "trip-wire," land forces are often said to complement airpower by protecting air bases. This was notably the case in World War II when our airplanes were relatively "short-legged" and a bomb packed but one-millionth the explosive power that it can today. Then, many repetitive mass air raids were required to cause extensive damage to the enemy economy as a whole. Now, if we get in one or only a very few mass sorties, we can probably achieve devastation on a scale that dwarfs the total destruction of World War II. Many sorties per month from constantly operating overseas bases are consequently dispensable luxuries—luxuries we are highly unlikely to enjoy anyway, whether the bases are attacked by surface forces or not. Unless the enemy air force is destroyed at the outset—the "pie in the sky" case where we win overnight—the soft portions of our overseas bases, including parked aircraft on the ground, are obviously vulnerable to enemy atomic air attack. Also, of course, we must expect many of our bombers to be lost to the enemy's air defenses on our first strikes. We shall lack the wherewithal to mount many sorties, although our first strike alone may be deadly. Our system of overseas bases is a tremendous contributor to the efficacy of our big deterrent, but its utility is not dependent upon prolonged protection against surface attacks. The vital complementary rôle for surface forces lies in protecting our air bases against sabotage or surprise assault from the air, not mass ground invasion, in order that we may have a good chance of mounting one or two mass attacks.

II

Both the "trip-wire" and base-protector arguments for land forces lose most of their appeal when examined realistically in the context of fighting modern total war. But, of course, much cur-

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rent discussion about the utility of military preparedness properly emphasizes deterring wars, not winning them. A strong NATO land force in Western Europe certainly helps inhibit the Soviets from launching total war. The important question is, by how much? Its gross contribution to deterrence may not be great, while its costs detract from the power of the main airpower deterrent so much that the net contribution of land forces to deterrence is negative.

One can imagine a land force so strong and securely protected that it offers the enemy a high probability of having his territory occupied if he is rash enough to attack. Such a force would be a tremendous deterrent. But our army planners have never sought nearly enough trained divisions to fit a calculated offensive strategy of overmatching the 175-odd divisions of the Soviet Union. Their requirements were designed from the outset to fit a much more modest, although still formidable, objective. And in NATO there has been, as we know, an always sizable "gap" between the resources called for even by these requirements and the lesser resources actually made available. Consequently the Soviet leaders cannot suppose that NATO's strength on the ground offers them much of a threat. In contrast, they must regard as feasible the prospect of their society being devastated by an air-atomic assault. This is the main deterrent, a deterrent which depends little upon the size of NATO land forces.

Some believe that NATO land forces help deter total war merely because of their defensive capability. Do not such forces prevent the Soviets from quickly conquering the economic riches of Western Europe in compensation for a Russian economy devastated from the air? To this one can only reply: compensation to whom? How many Russians would survive to inherit the riches? Furthermore, getting intact Western factories in return for smashed Eastern factories is by no means equivalent to acquiring an entire substitute economy. The argument that the Russians would regard an occupied Western Europe as a good trade for a devastated Russia is simply incredible.

Thus if we are really committed to a total war response to any Soviet aggression against NATO Powers, even large numbers of land troops can add little to the deterrent power of our retaliatory air forces. Resources diverted to enhancing our retaliatory airpower then promise a stronger deterrent, especially when the deficiencies in the main element of our airpower, publicly drama-

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tized by the recent Symington Committee hearings, are noted. To repeat an old but terribly important point, there can be no logical argument against spending enough on protecting our strategic air forces so that they are not obviously vulnerable to enemy attack. Our posture must preclude this extreme kind of deadly speculation by the enemy: "Why does he have so threateningly big but so unprotected a striking force? Surely such a combination is only rational if he is planning to strike first. If this is the case, should I not forestall his move, especially when my chances of destroying his air forces on the ground look so good?" Protecting SAC is imperative but not easy. We cannot even now count on the luxury of hours of radar warning, and when the enemy has operational intercontinental ballistic missiles our maximum warning will be measured in minutes.

There is a lot of uninformed talk about automatic self-protection for SAC because, though concentrated on just a few bases, "it is always ready to go in force almost instantaneously." The forthright statements by our Air Force officers make clear that this is not the case. To be always ready to go in force requires ready planes and stand-by crews, which in turn implies several crews per airplane so that a full shift is always available. As it is, we have less than one crew per aircraft. To get extra crews would mean many more training hours in flight, probably more planes, and certainly a greatly increased burden on already strained maintenance resources. The acute shortage of skilled personnel for maintenance and flying has been identified by General LeMay as SAC's most critical deficiency. To protect our strategic force adequately is bound to involve some combination of a greatly increased state of around-the-clock alertness, dispersal of vulnerably located aircraft, hardening of vital base elements against bomb damage and increased provision for warning of enemy air attack. A judicious combination of such necessarily expensive measures is our most imperative need if we seek to deter the enemy.

In consequence, the NATO strategist who wants the United States to support more land forces in NATO faces more, not less, budgetary competition from our Strategic Air Command. Funds must be provided both to protect SAC much more adequately against a growing enemy threat and to complement SAC bombers with guided missiles.

Even if one grants the force of these arguments that belittle

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the contributions of land defenses either in deterring or fighting total war, there remains another to be considered. Truly effective land forces promise a bonus to threatened Europeans beyond any contribution to deterrence. If adequate in number to implement the celebrated "forward strategy" of stopping a Soviet invasion, such forces can prevent the feared sequence of fighting on Western European territory, Soviet occupation, and then fighting again. To mitigate disaster is obviously important if you have failed to avert it by a policy of deterrence, and a preparedness policy which promises to do so offers an important asset. But how important? Is there a case for diverting resources to land defenses merely to mitigate disaster?

Suppose NATO land forces were adequate to contain a Soviet invasion. If the Soviets initiate total war against NATO countries by massive air assault, how can immediate casualties be held below the tens of millions in either the United States or Europe? And even if Western defenses are greatly improved, there is very little chance that casualties would be less in the future because of the steadily growing Soviet air threat. Consequently, no assured protection against catastrophe in NATO countries is possible however strong the defense ground shield. If the Soviets initiate total war, therefore, what would the defensive land shield accomplish? Who then would worry about occupation?

Our European allies are now nakedly vulnerable to Soviet air attack. They still lack an integrated radar network and interceptor missiles. More important, most of them are but minutes of jet flying time away from the Soviet threat, and for this reason it would be expensive and perhaps impossible to build a defense system assuring high attrition of the enemy. Passive defense measures, the alternative form of protection, have always been neglected by all NATO members. Nowhere in the West have we created anything approaching the hardened and dispersed underground civilizations required for protection against thermonuclear weapons. Though invulnerability cannot be achieved, some appreciable reductions in vulnerability may be purchased at reasonable cost. The very greatness of our deficiencies suggests that there may be some first-order things to do that promise sizable payoffs for modest investments. Tying together existing radar networks in Europe may be one of them; providing fall-out shelters for civilian populations may be another.

Are these things worth doing? The proponent of large armies

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often argues that resources should not be diverted on any sizable scale to such purely defensive purposes. But if he denies the usefulness of purely defensive measures, then the value of land forces as protectors against occupation is likewise small. In the context of total war, such forces also promise only to alleviate one kind of enormous damage. And if, on the other hand, the army proponent concedes the usefulness of purely defensive measures, the case for remedying the most glaring deficiencies against air attack becomes strong.

One recourse of the army proponent is to stress the advantages of a blend, while minimizing its disadvantages: "True, dollar for dollar we contribute less to the main deterrent than strategic airpower, but we offer a shield against invasion that it cannot provide. True, some measures to defend against air attack might do more to alleviate destruction, again dollar for dollar, than we can promise to do, but we contribute to the deterrent more than do such purely defensive measures." This is the logical argument of the army proponent who clings to a total war premise, an argument whose persuasiveness naturally declines with the spectacular growth of Soviet atomic airpower. The greater this threat, the more we must protect our own strategic air forces and insure that their protected strength is adequate. Hence the greater the tendency to pull resources away from armies to enhance airpower. With respect to air defense, the same growth of the Soviet air threat naturally increases vastly the prospects of bomb damage in the West if war occurs. As the terrors of bomb devastation loom steadily larger relative to those of occupation, the land shield loses its relative appeal as a mitigator of disaster. Hence the greater the tendency to divert resources from armies to air defenses.

Moreover, air defense measures for the United States contribute to the main deterrent beyond protecting our air striking forces. Their contribution is that of "backbone stiffening." How much the enemy is deterred from all-out air assault depends presumably upon his assessment of the security and power of our retaliatory forces and upon little else. But for aggression short of all-out air assault, his assessment is compounded by an additional factor: what is the probability that the United States would counter with everything it has? In seeking an answer to this question he necessarily assesses the resoluteness of our political leaders who must authorize the use of atomic weapons. His

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estimate of the risk will obviously depend upon how determined they appear, which in turn may depend upon how well equipped this country is in fact to withstand a retaliatory blow. After all, one chance in 20 that the United States would respond to a flagrant provocation by initiating total war is a tremendous risk for the Soviets. Increasing their assessment of the risk even a little by toughening our air defenses, thus appearing more resolute, would be an extremely handsome payoff for us. By how much we can increase his assessment of the risk is exceedingly difficult to quantify. But at least we see that those who desire some secondary strengthening of the main deterrent can argue as effectively for more air defense as for a stronger land shield.

The foregoing arguments all presuppose total-war planning designed to maximize deterrence of the enemy. Cling to a premise of total war and one can logically expect the other NATO Powers to follow the British example in respect to the reduction of conventional forces, thereby touching off the "chain reaction" so much feared by NATO military commanders. There is a strong temptation among NATO countries to pin their hopes upon deterring enemy provocations by the threat of SAC retaliation, for this has the great merit of permitting large budgetary economies. The cheapest solution is to have no strategic air force of one's own, to do nothing about vulnerability to Soviet air attack, and to raise only such conventional land, naval and tactical air forces as are required to take care of one's own colonial and other "brushfire" requirements. This solution, we note, implies no national contribution to collective defense, and hence strikes at the foundations of NATO.

Before criticizing the logic of this cheap solution, it is necessary to acknowledge its appeal. It is not the blind economizers alone who are attracted by it, but reasonable men who recognize that assured protection against all military eventualities is simply not procurable. They will not, as is sometimes done, overstate the main objection to a massive retaliation policy, namely that no enemy will credit you with any serious intent to retaliate massively because to do so would amount to an irrational policy of "suicide." It may be perfectly rational to commit yourself to a response which, *if* the enemy commits certain actions, does amount to mututal homicide. The probability that he will take these actions may be driven very low by this policy compared to alternative policies open to you. Suppose the "if" means that he

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sends troops across a clearly marked line which certainly could not have been crossed accidentally. Our policy does not in the least amount to saying that we value the territory in question more than our life. It amounts only to saying that since we believe the enemy values it much less than he does *his* life, our commitment will serve to reduce the probability of his crossing the line to the irreducible minimum.

The objection that "massive retaliation is an irrational policy because suicide is irrational," however, is less easily dismissed when applied to alliance strategy. It is more believable that America would retaliate massively against an attack upon Alaska than upon the United Kingdom, although a dispassionate analysis might well conclude that of the two the security of the United Kingdom is the more valuable to America. For America's partners in NATO, placing so great a reliance upon retaliatory power alone is uncomfortable, and this is doubly true when the retaliatory power is somebody else's. They must be sorely troubled by the thought that the credibility of a response by SAC to Soviet provocations in Europe declines as the Soviet airpower threat against America grows. On the other hand, the power of SAC grows steadily too, so that the net deterrent effect upon the Russians of a less certain but more powerful response by SAC may decline only a little or not at all. Still, depending upon an ally for the main deterrent is uncomfortable for Europeans. Yet what is their alternative?

One alternative is for each to create atomic weapons and a little strategic air force of its own. This course has the drawback of sizable expense, especially for the United Kingdom which has developed no less than three types of V-bombers and its own bombs, while it now faces, at the very least, the operating costs of the intermediate range ballistic missiles promised by the United States. They are paying a very high price for some prestige and a limited degree of strategic independence. But for other European countries, doubts about the advantage of such forces should give them greater pause than the certainty of sizable expense. First, would such forces really give them an independent capability to retaliate? Second, if such a capability is possible, would it actually strengthen Soviet inhibitions?

Doubts on the first score arise primarily because European-based planes or missiles are so close to Soviet airpower that protecting such forces is a much more formidable problem than pro-

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tecting forces based in America. And protecting U.S. forces is difficult enough, while not protecting them vitiates a strategy of deterrence by inviting all-out attack. Forces in Europe are but minutes of jet flying time away from Soviet air bases and are exposed to very heavy and accurate attack with little warning. It may not be feasible to protect European-based forces against massive surprise air assault in the face of this geographical disadvantage; or, if feasible, it will almost certainly involve much more expensive forms of protection per plane or missile than to provide comparable security for SAC.

Doubts on the second score should compound those on the first. Assume that an independent retaliatory capability is attainable at reasonable cost, say a small missile force so protected that several missiles could probably survive Soviet all-out attack, and then penetrate to Soviet cities by virtue of phenomenal speed. The Kremlin's logic may then be this: "Although European Country X now has a limited capacity to retaliate with air atomic weapons, this independent capability decreases the probability that SAC will respond to our provocation, because the Americans now have an excuse for 'contracting out' of any alliance obligation. On balance, the small additional decline in the probability of the enormous American threat being made good outweighs even a sizable increase in the threat posed by Country X because its strategic force is so much smaller. Conclusion: we can feel freer to provoke." In brief, little strategic air forces in Europe can weaken the West's deterrent power either because they are so vulnerable as to invite attack, or because their existence weakens the bonds of alliance by making a SAC response less likely.

The uncomfortable but cheap solution for European governments—continued reliance on SAC—may well be the least unappealing of the poor alternatives available as long as NATO strategy is one of total war. It promises economy, while other feasible military alternatives probably offer at considerable expense little if any reinforcement of the main deterrent and little protection in the event of war. We may lament the failure of our European allies to put forth greater military effort, but we cannot upset the logic of their failure to do so. If we want more European military effort, especially a genuinely balanced collective effort, we had better reshape our NATO strategy to supply reasons and incentives for it.

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III

Everything changes if America announces that tactical forces and not SAC will be used in response to limited Soviet provocation in Europe, and that, moreover, various other political constraints may be imposed upon the degree of violence with which we respond—a policy of "graduated deterrence." Under these conditions our allies in Europe have a renewed incentive to supply conventional forces because their own security depends upon the use of such forces against Soviet threats short of all-out assault.

We would necessarily pay a heavy price in adopting any such strategy, whatever specific variant we chose. If we make clear to our allies that our main deterrent threat may not be invoked, we cannot avoid making it clear to the Russians at the same time. Qualifying our main deterrent would embolden our enemy and frighten our allies. In addition to being frightened, they would face the sizable cost of reversing the decline in their conventional forces. We would run a risk of impairing their morale rather than raising it. Only one thing could justify such a heavy price, and that is lowering the probability that total war would occur. Paradoxically, such a reduction is a reasonable prospect even should our main deterrent be weakened.

Going back to the second of the main premises on which a strategy of massive retaliation is based, we must now bring it into serious question. The "line" between East and West is not clearly defined nor mutually agreed upon. The "line" in Europe may be "the most sensitive, most sharply defined political line between East and West," but this is a relative observation. It serves only to emphasize the fuzziness of the line elsewhere in the world. The trouble with threats of massive retaliation is that they can deter only those conflicts that the enemy deliberately provokes, not those that arise accidentally or because events get out of his control. Consequently massive threats may well decrease the probability of war starting, but not to the vanishing point, and only at the tremendous cost of increasing the probability that a war, once started, becomes total. What happens if each side attempts to resolve local conflicts in its favor by invoking the threat of strategic air blows? Either side loses greatly if it backs down first by withdrawing its threat, encouraging further provocation. Consequently there is a great temptation to increase the magnitude of the threatened strategic air blows to increase the chance that

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the other will back down first. The strategic equilibrium is unstable, and the probability that total war will be precipitated is uncomfortably high.

If NATO countries are to have a sufficient incentive to supply tactical forces designed primarily to meet local conflicts, we and our allies must be persuaded (1) that qualifying the use of the main deterrent—a policy which, to a degree, encourages small wars—will reduce the probability of total war; and (2) that for all or most of our allies the damage associated with small wars is likely to be considerably less than the damage associated with total war. If we are so persuaded, the weighty budgetary argument against supplying sizable tactical forces can be countered in its own terms. What other military alternative then promises an equally low mathematical expectation of war devastation (probability of war multipled by expected damage in war) for comparable or lower expense? If the probability of total war rises with reliance solely upon strategic airpower to deter the enemy, then only heroic air or civil defense measures promise an equivalent reduction in the expectation of war devastation. These measures can be incredibly expensive. The undeniably expensive land forces that supply an alternative are probably cheaper. True economy may best be served by the apparently uneconomical policy of preparing for two kinds of wars to be fought in considerable part by different forces.

Implementing an acceptable policy of "dual preparedness" is bound to be very difficult. It is hard to meet the second condition for acceptability noted above, namely, that damage in limited war be much less for all or most of our allies than in total war. Substituting "merely tactical" atomic weapons (how defined?) for troops does not meet this condition. "Taking war back to the battlefield" is a fine slogan, but if used to rationalize unlimited theater employment of atomic weapons it becomes a mockery to the allies over whose territory they are being employed. The battlefield will be deep, because tactical air bases, missile launch sites and logistic supply lines are obviously prime targets. Hitting them hard and early is terribly important. And military commanders have compelling reasons to use big weapons rather than little ones to compensate for inaccuracy in their delivery. The battle line itself may be fluid and deep penetration of enemy forces into allied controlled areas must be expected. These are chilling prospects indeed for our allies, for the distinction between

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limited and total war becomes less and less discernible to them. To cap their disillusionment, the economies promised by substituting tactical atomic weapons for troops turn out to be small and perhaps negative. True, a small force equipped with big-bang weapons can pack a large destructive power, thus permitting manpower economies for any given level of combat potential. But planning for full tactical use of atomic weapons in a context where the enemy's stock of such weapons grows steadily means that a higher and higher level of combat potential must be attained. As estimated casualties rise, so do force requirements, thereby offsetting the manpower economies hoped for by the introduction of atomic weapons.

Thus we are driven to a conclusion doubly unpalatable to some NATO commanders: the use of the main deterrent must be qualified, and there must even be severe constraints on employing atomic weapons in tactical operations. But if these commanders want strong incentives for Europeans to raise land troops, they must accept this conclusion, however reluctantly, and then face explicitly the terribly hard but enormously important practical problems of working out sensible weapons limitations. Weapons limitations must be acceptable both to the West and to the Soviets; the rules for limitation must be reasonably clear, so that violations are unlikely to be accidental and can be detected when they occur; and obviously there must be sanctions. Here, above all, is the place where strategic airpower must complement the tactical forces that may be operating under irksome restrictions, and here we must remain resolute despite the fearful stakes. SAC must continue to play the supremely important rôle of prime deterrent not only before war breaks out, but during war itself. The enemy must be persuaded that violating the weapons limitations or engaging in all-out land assault may bring against him a massive SAC strike. Then the terrible double penalty he faces operates to dampen hostilities rather than aggravate them: (1) the local war serves to alert SAC and our air defenses, so that enemy chances of precluding retaliation by an all-out assault diminish appreciably; (2) violating weapons limitations in the field, his alternative means of gaining a victory, runs a serious risk of giving SAC the enormous strategic advantage of the first strike.

The key to any policy of weapons limitations must be a reasonably clear definition of provocations that would invoke

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massive retaliation. We cannot expect to find an absolutely clear one, but we can certainly hope for something less fuzzy than current notions about what will trigger massive retaliation, and so reduce the chance of stumbling into total war. One limitation that possesses the great merit of clarity is simply non-use of atomic weapons, a policy, however, which maximizes the Soviet's advantage in mobilized manpower. Another radical possibility is for each side to restrict the use of atomic weapons to the open seas or to those territories clearly recognized to be one's own. This is not as clear a policy, but it does permit the defender, but not the aggressor, to concentrate his troops, thus enhancing the normal advantage of armies on the defensive and making a few troops go a long way. In these circumstances atomic weapons could be used against enemy aircraft and submarines certainly, and in a restrained way in tactical land operations probably. In land operations, each side would have powerful reasons to use fewer atomic weapons, and ones that are cleaner and smaller, because the territory affected would be his own or that of his allies. These drastic limitations have their obvious military disadvantages in terms of destroying enemy armies, but anything less drastic might well involve such levels of mutual destruction that fighting a war would be tantamount to losing it. In that case why not pin everything upon strategic deterrence?

That we can even discuss the feasibility of limited-war strategies for NATO today stems in part from our past inconsistencies. We have talked total war, but built mobilization bases that in the event of total war would probably be destroyed before they could be used, provided reserve forces that could not be mobilized, and built elaborate logistic facilities and bases that would be smashed. These legacies do possess great utility in limited war. Furthermore, we must always remind ourselves that it is the West that has by far the greater economic potential, a fact still relevant for conventional war if not for total atomic war. Moreover, NATO "dual preparedness" for old-fashioned war in Europe backed by a mainly American retaliatory force capable of waging total atomic war can take advantage of the great economies latent in a natural division of military labor. Within limits, of course, inexpensive European manpower can substitute for expensive American troops, while the advantages of geographical protection and operational concentration can be realized by strategic airpower that is primarily American. Should we throw

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away these advantages at a time when the contribution of Soviet satellite troops has been shown to be dubious or even negative?

The danger is that we will throw away these advantages by remodeling our tactical forces to suit exclusively the needs of a total atomic war in which their utility is problematical. Surely it is sensible to provide alternative sets of bomb-racks on all NATO bombers so that we can use either atomic or non-atomic weapons, or to supply cheap, unguided missiles to our allies, the Honest John, for example, that can be used either way. Some compromising of our ability to deliver conventional weapons is inevitable in enhancing the flexibility of our response to provocations, and this is a price to be cheerfully paid. But providing NATO with elaborate guided missile installations, revamped logistic systems, and greatly increased air defenses are very different matters. We can pass a point of no return at which our capability for limited warfare has been fatally compromised. Indeed, we should have passed this point already if our actions had been as prompt and unequivocal as our doctrine implied.

Total reliance upon threats of massive retaliation is a frightful risk to run, in Europe as elsewhere. So we return to our opening quotation, holding that General Norstad is profoundly right in appealing for maintenance of a sizable shield in Europe. But the case for maintaining the shield can no longer be based effectively on the grounds that it complements strategic airpower when both are used in total war. The possibility of keeping war limited, difficult though it may be, is what provides the incentive to retain and enlarge the shield, while strategic airpower imposes on both sides the obligation to keep the war limited.

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THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF NEW POPULATION TRENDS

By Kingsley Davis

SIX months ago, the Chinese Communist Party newspaper, *People's Daily*, carried its first editorial on birth control. Asserting that China's population is increasing by more than 13,000,000 per year and that economic development cannot yet catch up with this rapid multiplication, the editorial urged the Government to spread the use of birth control and to encourage youths to postpone marriage until age 25. This authoritative statement of policy was not the first indication of Red China's concern with population. In 1953 the State Council had instructed the health department to give public instruction in birth control, and efforts were made in 1954–56 to strengthen this program; abortions were permitted as early as 1954 under certain restrictions, and the restrictions were subsequently eased; Party journals and the press carried articles on birth control. In 1957 intensive propaganda for family limitation began throughout the country, and a birth-control exhibition was opened in Peking on March 8, three days after the editorial in *People's Daily*.

Although not sudden, this recognition of the emergence of a population problem in Red China represents a dramatic shift in Communist strategy. Russia's early liberality with reference to abortion and birth control ceased in 1935, and the official Communist line has always been that socialist economics alone can benefit people, that overpopulation is a myth designed to conceal the true cause of misery—capitalism. Russia still clings to this view. If, therefore, Red China is in practice deviating from the Soviet line, it is not out of caprice but because of her own severe problems. The census taken in 1953 reported a population of 583,000,000 in mainland China, over a hundred million more than the United Nations had been estimating. The Red officials, faced with more hungry people than they had expected and with a rate of increase that taxed their ingenuity, doubtless found the mental gymnastics of reconciling birth control with Marxism easier than taking the awesome risk of doing nothing about the frightening accumulation of people in an already crowded country.

China's population problems are by no means unique. The same demographic trends that force the Red Government to adopt a

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population policy are affecting other areas of the world as well. In fact, Red China is now following, doubtless by conscious imitation, the examples already set by Japan, India and Puerto Rico, where governments are encouraging the limitation of births. Other countries with analogous problems may adopt a similar policy in the future, regardless of whether they are Communist or non-Communist.

It is not easy for a nation to admit openly that it has too many people. It is hard to rise above the old elemental belief that numbers as such mean power, that multiplication and fruitfulness are identical. The forces leading to official anti-natalist policies must therefore be powerful ones; and if they are spread widely as well they have international significance. Indeed, the population changes now occurring throughout the globe are so novel and so immense that they render obsolete much of the existing literature on political demography. Among other effects, they tend to widen or at least maintain the gap between the have and have-not nations, to exacerbate the political instability of the latter, and to give national population policies a new rôle, the reverse of those of Hitler and Mussolini but greater in importance.

The most salient demographic change is the astonishing rise in the rate of growth of the world's total population. Another fact of the greatest importance is that the poorer countries are now contributing far more than their share to the inflated growth of the world's population. This means, for one thing, that the areas from which the industrial countries draw many of their raw materials are becoming glutted with people. It means that the greatest advances in science and technology are being made in those countries which have the least need of it in terms of population expansion. Above all, it means that the gap in wealth and power as between the rich and poor nations is becoming wider.

Frequently the process of economic development in "retarded" areas is spoken of as if these areas were on the way to catching up with the industrial nations. This is not the case. Fifteen of the richest industrial countries in 1938 had an average per capita income roughly ten times that of 20 non-industrial countries. In 1952–54 the same industrial countries had an average per capita income about *eleven* times that of the same non-industrial nations. Over the period covered the population of the 15 industrial countries rose by 7.6 percent, that of the 20 non-industrial countries by 10.7 percent. If the rates of human multiplication had been re-

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versed, national incomes remaining the same, the gap between the two groups in per capita income would have been narrowed rather than widened.

Further evidence of the influence of population in widening the gap between industrial and non-industrial nations can be seen with reference to raw materials. Since 1929 the underdeveloped areas have substantially raised their share in the *production* of primary materials, but their share in the *consumption* of these has dropped. In other words, they are consuming less and less of the raw materials they produce, despite the fact that they are adding more and more people. A French demographer, Frédéric Tabah, writing in the French journal *Population,* has calculated that between 1929 and 1950 the underdeveloped areas increased their relative production but lost in relative consumption of seven out of ten important primary materials. "In the aggregate," he says, "two-thirds of humanity consumes less than 5 percent of the primary materials."

The continuing economic disparity between industrial and non-industrial nations comes from the technological advance of the one and the excessive population growth of the other. These two factors are inter-related. Unimpeded human multiplication is giving the non-industrial countries exactly what most of them do not need—more people. It is hindering their acquisition of what they do need—more capital, more skill and greater productivity. As the struggle for resources intensifies, complex technology will play an ever greater rôle. Technological advances, however, will hardly be made by peasant populations living near the subsistence level and multiplying at a rate close to 3 percent per year. Unless some *deus ex machina* intervenes, the gap between the industrial and non-industrial countries will not be narrowed.

II

Drastically lowered mortality with continuing high fertility has not only burdened the underdeveloped nations with the greatest increase in human history but has also given them exceptionally young populations. Contrary to general belief, reduced mortality does not usually contribute to an aging of the population. The reason is that most of the reduction, especially when the death rate has been high, occurs in the younger ages. The advanced countries today, because of their secular decline in fertil-

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ity, have between 2.5 and 3.5 people aged 15 or over for each child under 15. The non-industrial countries have between 1.2 and 1.8. The latter countries accordingly have to struggle with a high proportion of child-dependency, not fully compensated for by their lesser old-age dependency; and the high proportion of youth affords a fertile source of political instability. Unless jobs can be found for the swelling waves of young people coming into the labor market each year, their ebullient energy turns to agitation, revolution and war. The recent Youth Festival in Moscow was a tremendous demonstration of the skill and sagacity of the Soviets in whipping up youthful enthusiasm. Colonel Nasser and Cheddi Jagan also understand what youth can do, as does Robert Lacoste. The degree to which students influence politics in many areas is one expression of the importance of youth when their number is disproportionately large and their opportunities disproportionately small.

Much of the demographic and political future lies with the still underdeveloped majority of the world. Here, with the breakup of colonies, the number of sovereign nations has expanded. Here the squeeze of population growth and adverse economics on the one hand, and rising aspirations and popular discontent on the other, have become most intense. Under the circumstances, what are the leaders of these countries to do?

What the United States would like to see them do is to foster peaceful and democratic industrialization, a rising level of living and, in general, adherence to our side. To this end we have given or lent money for agriculture, industry, transportation, public health and arms. We have maintained that this is an effective way to head off Communism because, as we say, chronic poverty breeds Communism. This reasoning has much to commend it, but it ignores population trends and thus runs the danger of underestimating or misinterpreting the requirements for economic development. Envy and revolt are nurtured not by absolute but by relative poverty, and such economic progress as the underdeveloped countries are making is not lessening the gap between them and the richer ones.

We ourselves have contributed to these difficulties. The United States, perhaps the most generous sponsor of public health programs around the world, has as yet done nothing, at least officially, to aid the reduction of birth rates. At the same time we have enjoyed a continuing technological advance that enhances both our

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need for and our ability to command raw materials from abroad. Above all, our example encourages very high aspirations which, if reached at all by the rest of the world, cannot be reached in the foreseeable future.

III

The recurrent crises in the Middle East illustrate the effects of runaway population growth. Despite sharp diversities, this region is characterized generally by the world's highest birth rates and by high but falling death rates. Its people, already multiplying rapidly, may increase even faster in the future as their still excessive rate of mortality is reduced. In view of the tenacious poverty, illiteracy and economic wastefulness that characterize the region, this continued demographic expansion promises more trouble ahead.

Egypt's population, for example, has grown at an accelerated rate from 14,218,000 in 1927 to approximately 24,000,000 today. The gain during the last decade alone has been 26 percent. The *registered* birth rate (known to be deficient) averaged 44 per 1000 in 1950–53, while the *registered* death rate, having fallen 30 percent in ten years, was 19 per 1000. The fact that the population has grown some three times faster than the area under cultivation would not be deleterious if productivity in agriculture had quadrupled or if the country had industrialized; but neither of these things has happened. In 1947 the proportion of the labor force in manufacturing was still what it was in 1927—8 percent. Half of the male working force is still trying to make a living from farming, which means an astounding average of about 1,250 people dependent on farming for each square mile of cultivated area (as against 35 in the United States). No wonder Egyptian cities are filled with refugees from the destitute countryside. No wonder the experts find a long-run decline in the Egyptian level of living.

A "solution" has been commonly considered to be more dams on the Nile and increased land for agriculture; the United States has been berated for reneging on the financing of this "solution." But schemes of the magnitude of the Aswan Dam take time as well as money. Furthermore, economic development does not consist in simply extending the cultivated area but in altering the economic and social system. With Egypt's population growing so rapidly, the new lands would be filled with surplus people

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as fast as they were opened up, with no relief to the farmers on the old lands. The Economic Sub-Committee of Egypt's Population Commission reported in 1955 as follows: "All that can be hoped for [from the Aswan Dam and reclamation projects] is that the rapid fall in the standard of living would be halted." The government is tentatively examining the prospects for fertility control, but in the meantime Colonel Nasser, faced with a virtually hopeless domestic situation, has had to use his one great asset (Suez) and his one great issue (Arab-Jewish antagonism) to wring every possible concession from both Communist and Western Powers and to garner every possible ounce of support from his restless populace at home.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is now supported by the United States in four ways—by direct subsidy to the Jordanian Government, by contributions to the U.N. relief funds for the country's large Arab refugee population, by bilateral grants of surplus agricultural products and other benefits, and by the promise of military protection against foreign intervention. What manner of state is this that draws sustenance from the American taxpayer? It is an artificial state with a serious population problem and little or no future as a viable entity. Its citizenry, now a million and a half strong, is growing at an estimated rate that will double the number in 25 years. One reason for such rapid growth is that roughly a third of the people—the Arab refugees from Israel—have for years had no obligation to support themselves. In 1953 the refugees on UNRWA relief rolls came to 475,000. Though gradually being absorbed into the local economy, they have long lived on the United Nations, with no penalty for unlimited reproduction. Since Jordan's most striking geographical feature is a large expanse of desert, the farming area is so limited that the nation has 622 persons per square mile of cultivated land. Most of this land itself is so marginal that the pressure on it by Jordan's overwhelming agrarian population is equal to that of Egypt. The only real way of increasing the cultivated area is by impounding the waters of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers, but the most ambitious plan yet set forth for doing this would add only 200 square miles to the irrigated area. At the minimum this operation would take 15 years, at which time the population would have grown sufficiently, at the present rate, to put 4,500 people on each of those 200 miles. Actually, the squabbling with Israel has delayed the Jordan Valley develop-

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ment indefinitely, but not the population growth. It looks as though the American taxpayer, dubbed as "materialistic" by his Arab friends, will have in Jordan an increasing opportunity to demonstrate his largesse.

Syria's ratio of cultivated land to population is much higher than Egypt's or Jordan's, and her agriculture is more capable of expansion. However, although nobody knows how many people there are in Syria, one can be certain that they are rapidly multiplying. Since cultivation has expanded primarily by putting new rainfed regions to the plow, the fertility of the virgin soil has provided an agricultural bonanza that cannot last. To overcome her poverty Syria must therefore turn to irrigation and industrialization, both of which take time and money. Her present position illustrates the principle that it is not alone density of population in ratio to resources that affects economic prospects, but also the rate of population growth. Even an underpopulated country (a category that hardly describes Syria) may have too rapid a rate of human increase. The reason is that, with population constant, it requires an investment of 3 to 5 percent of national income to produce a 1 percent increase in per capita income, whereas, with a population growing at 3 percent per year, the rate of investment must be somewhere between 12 and 20 percent—extremely hard to achieve under conditions of poverty and governmental inefficiency. Rather than face squarely economic problems of such magnitude, the Syrian leaders are seeking other means to power. They exploit the emotional crusade against "imperialism" and Zionism and regularly spend at least one-third of the national budget for "defense."

Israel's success in a world of hostile Arabs not only suggests that a nation's most precious resource is a highly trained citizenry but also illustrates the complexities of internal political demography. In 1947, on the eve of Israel's national birth, Palestine was a crowded country. The Jews, however, comprised less than a third of the population, and their natural increase was only two-thirds that of the Palestinian Arab majority. The prospect for a Jewish state in Palestine looked hopeless. The solution came in the form of a successful war. A new ethnic state embracing slightly more than three-fourths of Palestine was created by the exodus of some 700,000 Arabs, leaving only a small Moslem minority in Israel. This gave room for more Jewish immigrants, who came in such huge numbers that in seven years from 1949

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to 1956 the population grew by 80 percent. Israel's population now almost equals the number who were in all of Palestine in 1947, and again Israel faces a crisis. There is not room for many more immigrants. Hemmed in by intransigent Arab nations, the nation has only the assets of a highly trained and united citizenry at home and Jewish capital abroad. Her ideological commitment is to accept more Jewish immigrants, which would give her a continued population growth out of all proportion to her territory and resources. She cannot fulfill this commitment unless she gains either more territory or more economic opportunity; she may have to cut off immigration and even lose some of her own nationals to other countries, where, because of their skills and the helping hand of co-religionists, Jews are often welcome. On the other hand, with Israeli aspirations frustrated and Arab emotions inflamed by their own domestic problems, war may again flare up as a desperate gamble on both sides.

IV

The rôle of population as a guarantee of national strength is waning while its rôle as an economic and military liability is increasing. The ever larger dependence of industry and warfare on scientific technology enhances the value of trained manpower; yet the unique rate of population growth now prevailing severely hinders an increase in the proportion of highly trained people, especially in the underdeveloped countries. It also hinders their employment when trained, because the capitalization of long-run industrial and developmental projects, which employ trained manpower, is difficult in the face of rising consumption demands on the part of indigent but increasing millions.

It is no accident, then, that similar policies aimed at halting runaway population growth are emerging in countries of opposite political persuasion and contrasting demographic doctrine. If today China is following Japan and India in this regard, other Communist as well as capitalist countries may do so in the future. As excessive population growth continues, they will feel the need of overcoming the effect of one government policy (mortality control) by another government policy (fertility control).

How effective the anti-natalist policies will be is hard to say. In Japan the Government's encouragement of family limitation is certainly an important factor in the dramatic 41-percent drop in the birth rate from 1948 to 1955. In Puerto Rico the drop over

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the same period was 13 percent. In India a slight drop has probably occurred, but the Government's policy is too recent there to have had much effect. It is too much to expect that a sufficient number of underdeveloped countries will adopt anti-natalist policies, or that if adopted they will be sufficiently effective, to reduce the rate of population growth soon. Many of the weaker countries still feel too unsure of themselves, too lacking in sheer manpower, to follow the radical lead of more secure nations like Japan, India and China.

It looks, then, as if the pace of human multiplication will rise still further before it reaches its peak and begins to decline. Even after the *rate* of increase starts declining, as it must eventually do, substantial growth can continue for many decades. The added strain upon resources and the exacerbation of existing inequalities is therefore likely to continue to complicate international relations. If the Communist nations are beginning to abandon the dogma that economic development alone is the panacea, independent of all else, it is time for the free nations, and particularly the United States in its foreign policy, to do the same.

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LAST CHANCE IN NORTH AFRICA

By Lorna Hahn

AT present North Africa is the great unsolved problem of Western diplomacy. France is spending a billion and a half dollars a year and deploying nearly three-quarters of a million men to fight a war in Algeria which she alone cannot win, and which is draining her financially and psychologically; at the same time, she is unable to exploit the 100 million tons of oil recently discovered in southern Algeria which could help recoup her world economic position. Her relations with Tunisia and Morocco have been strained, at times to the breaking point, because of the latter's support for the Algerian cause, and the two former protectorates have received little of the economic assistance they need from France. And, although Tunisia and Morocco have the most pro-Western governments in the entire Arab world, the United States has refused them long-term assistance out of deference to French fears that we seek to "replace" her in North Africa. The Algerian issue has aggravated our relations with France at the same time that it has exposed us to charges of supporting "imperialism," weakened the appeal of the Eisenhower Doctrine throughout the Middle East and Africa, and provided powerful propaganda for those who would like to oust Western influences from these areas.

There is, however, a rational solution to this problem on which much planning has already been done: a confederation of North Africa, which would include Tunisia, Morocco, an autonomous Algeria, and Libya. It would be organized independently—in fact, in defiance—of Cairo, and would be linked with France economically in what President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia has described as "a French-North African community," a pro-Western bloc at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and Africa.

The implications of this project are immense. First, its mere formation would be a stunning blow to whatever remains of Nasser's pan-Arab ambitions. It would effectively wean Libya away from the Cairo orbit. It would mean that the six American air bases in Morocco, the Bizerte naval station in Tunisia, and the Wheelus Field base in Libya would be on safer political ground. Finally—and probably most important in the long run—it would have a powerful impact on the policies of other newly-

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independent or almost-independent countries of the Middle East and Africa. For it would provide the opportunity to prove that dignified ties with the West are indeed possible, and can be a more productive course of action than neutralism.

It might be well, then, to examine the plans for the confederation of North Africa, and see what can be done to establish, for the first time, a positive Western policy towards this crucial area.

II

The idea of North African unity is implicit in the very concept of "North Africa" itself. Geographically, ethnically and—particularly in the last century—historically, the Arab-Berber peoples of the traditional Arab Mahgreb (west) have long been linked in every sense but the political. They are now, however, being drawn together in this sense also—a process in which France, ironically, has been the catalyst.

In attempting to maintain her hold over North Africa, France always stressed the differences between "integrated" Algeria and the protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco, and even between the latter two. Thus she would temporarily pacify one area (most often Tunisia, which she considered the most advanced) by giving it some concessions, at the same time suppressing the other two. In this way she hoped to prevent concerted nationalistic activity, and until the Algerian conflict reached war proportions, the plan worked well enough. Yet, apart from the policy of divide and rule, the very fact of French control created elements of unity which could be seen as early as the 1920s.

In the first place, the opportunity to attend Parisian schools brought together young people from all parts of North Africa who otherwise would probably never have met. France, through her educational policy, was hoping to make Frenchmen (or at least pro-Frenchmen) out of all of them. What she produced in fact, however, was a group of young people who felt they were as educated and capable as their French comrades, but who were none the less often discriminated against in the metropole simply because they were "North Africans" or "Moslems." Common problems, coupled with common interpretations of Rousseau, Voltaire and other Frenchmen who wrote of the dignity of men, led to the formation of North African student associations. For example, the Moslem Student Union, or *Union nord-Africaine,* founded in 1930, was dedicated to the proposition that:

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1. North Africa is one and indivisible.
2. North Africa is a single nation and ought to become one forever.
3. North Africa is one single people whose language, culture, customs ought to be the same.
4. North Africa is a single country whose sons should, in order to defend it, form a united front.

The members might well have added that they now shared a common second language, second culture and second set of customs (and, of course, common opponent), factors which set them apart from other Arabs and joined them together more closely than most of them realized at that time.

Much of this early idealism concerning "united fronts" was soon lost in the shuffle of strictly national movements. Tunisia's Neo-Destour party, following a program of Fabian nationalism, tended to feel it could accomplish more by unilateral action; the French were willing to negotiate with them and to grant concessions which they never would have considered granting to Morocco—let alone to "assimilated" Algeria. Why, then, felt Tunisian leaders such as Habib Bourguiba, Mongi Slim and Hedi Nouri, become associated with the haphazardly organized, more extremist groups in Morocco which could only give the Neo-Destour a bad name? Meanwhile, the Moroccans were spending most of their energies in trying merely to interest their young Sultan, Mohammed V, in the cause of independence. And although a small group in Algeria was striving for independence, the outstanding political leader in the country, Ferhat Abbas, was pushing in the opposite direction—toward complete assimilation.

Nevertheless, contacts were still maintained between the rising nationalist leaders, and on several occasions they even engaged in concerted activities against France. For example, the arrest of the Moroccan leader, Allal al Fassi, in 1936 caused sympathy strikes in Algeria and Tunisia.

World War II bridged many of the divisions between the three parts of the Mahgreb. First, promises by Allied leaders of freedom to "oppressed peoples" after the war encouraged Morocco's two leading nationalists, Ahmed Balafrej and Allal al Fassi, to join forces and form Morocco's first important nationalist movement, the Istiqlal, which received the open support of Mohammed V. Promises of freedom also led the majority of politically minded

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Algerians to think in terms of becoming not better Frenchmen but independent Algerians. Second, disappointment with the paucity of France's postwar reforms, and a belief that France had reneged on her promises resulted in a conviction that French tactics could be thwarted only by presenting a common front. Thus, in February of 1952, all the parties of Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria presented a joint statement of grievances to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, protesting against repressions in Tunisia. In December of that year, native unions in Morocco staged sympathy strikes and mass demonstrations of protest against the assassination of the Tunisian union leader, Ferhat Hached. Finally, there were several declarations of common aims, such as the agreement signed in Cairo in 1953 by North African leaders, promising that no one of them would make any arrangement with France which might be detrimental to the others.

The whole tenor of these agreements, however, was negative rather than positive: they aimed at thwarting France rather than uniting North Africa. And many of the old points of disagreement still existed. Bourguiba, although in exile, was prepared to negotiate separately with France if acceptable terms should be offered. Thus he signed the internal autonomy conventions of 1955, even though this freed French troops for duty in Algeria and Morocco. For this he was promptly excoriated as a traitor by the Moroccans and Algerians, who in October of that year placed their forces under joint command and swore to fight until both should be free. The Moroccans, however, forgot this pledge one month later, and laid down their arms when France promised them complete independence and the return of their exiled sultan. The Algerians were then left—officially, at least—to fight alone.

Until the end of 1955, in other words, unity existed between the North African areas only when it was convenient. And for the next few months the newly independent governments of Tunisia and Morocco were too busy setting their own houses in order to care much about each other, or about the struggle in Algeria. Furthermore, both Bourguiba and Mohammed V felt Algeria was too delicate a legal issue with which to become involved during a period when they were trying to iron out their own relations with France. But it soon became evident that Algeria could not be ignored.

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III

From the very beginning of their rebellion in November of 1954, the leaders of Algeria's *Front de Libération Nationale* decided they would get nowhere without foreign diplomatic support. And this, they felt, would not be forthcoming unless they could accustom people to think of Algeria not as "a part of France" in "rebellion," but as "another part of North Africa fighting for independence." This approach could be successful only by persuading other Mahgrebian leaders to stop speaking of "Tunisian" or "Moroccan" freedom, and to start urging "freedom of all North Africa, which is indivisible." They were particularly anxious to swing Bourguiba to this way of thinking. For, though angry with him for making what they felt was a premature peace with France, they realized that he was the only North African leader to whom the French would listen seriously.

Bourguiba at first rejected this approach, and even tended to scoff at the young *fellaghah* leaders, most of whom had been until recently Parisian students, lacking political experience. But he was soon forced to conclude that North Africa was indeed indivisible, and that the security of his own country depended upon a settlement being reached in Algeria. For one thing, although the French granted Tunisia full independence in March 1956, they insisted on maintaining 35,000 troops in Tunisia on the grounds that they were needed to guard the Algerian border. Their presence led to several unpleasant incidents and charges by Tunisians that "independence is only a sham so long as we still have French troops here." This situation was aggravated by instances of French troops in Algeria chasing *fellaghahs* across the border into Tunisian territory. Emotions were further stirred by the presence of Algerian civilian refugees, eventually totalling nearly 200,000, who streamed into Tunisia with tales of atrocities committed by the French. Bourguiba was soon convinced that real stability in Tunisia would be impossible without peace in Algeria.

Thus, in the late spring and summer of 1956, he worked as intermediary between the French Government and the Algerian *fellaghahs*. Assisted by the Sultan, he urged the Algerians to moderate their demands for full independence and to accept internal self-government, and he was instrumental in persuading Premier Mollet to accept the principle of administrative autonomy. After preliminary contacts had been established a con-

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ference was scheduled for October in Tunis, where a cease-fire might have been arranged. Due to an unfortunate *faux-pas*, through which five Algerian leaders were captured without Mollet's prior knowledge, the conference miscarried. But Bourguiba has not given up his efforts to end the Algerian War; on the contrary, he has been working at it harder than ever. For until peace is achieved, he cannot realize his grand scheme for the unification of all North Africa under his political leadership.

Habib Bourguiba, the undisputed "elder statesman of North Africa," is a great man who wants his small country to be doing big things. He has always felt that Tunisia, as the first North African country to begin the struggle against France, was destined for leadership in the area. To this has been recently added the conviction that, because Tunisia has for 3,000 years been at the cultural crossroads between the Middle East, Africa and the Occident, it is peculiarly suited to become a political meeting ground as well. These ideas, vague before Tunisia achieved independence in March 1956, have since taken definite shape.

Bourguiba's plans for North Africa crystallized under the impact of events around him. While his own country was able to hold elections and start a development program one month after independence, Morocco, despite its greater natural resources, was floundering for lack of experienced technicians and administrators, and was unable to obtain much foreign aid because Western sources feared the political instability there. Algeria was engaged in a war of destruction directed by young and inexperienced men; they would need the guidance of seasoned politicians in negotiating a peace settlement with France, and in organizing a new government afterwards. Finally, Bourguiba looked seriously for the first time at Tunisia's eastern neighbor, Libya, a country heretofore ignored but none the less part of the Mahgreb. Lacking adequate resources of any kind and pitifully poor despite years of United Nations spoon-feeding, Libya was being infiltrated by Egyptian professors, civil servants and technicians who were trying to weld her to the Arab League, which she joined for lack of any real alternative. Clearly the economic viability and political stability of all four countries would be enhanced if they pooled their human and material resources in a confederation.

But there are other considerations behind Bourguiba's wish to unify the Mahgreb. One is the need for more effective means of combatting Communism. Another is the desire to keep Egyp-

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tian influence out of North Africa, and to pursue a foreign policy independent of the Arab League. Even the politically uninformed Tunisian tends to dislike the Egyptians for what he considers a presumptuous attitude of superiority. The Tunisians feel their own civilization is at least as highly developed, their leaders as great, and they see no reason why they should look to Cairo for guidance. This general dislike has been intensified in the last two years by Nasser's open support of Bourguiba's bitter rival, Salah ben Youssef, whose extremist tactics were rejected by the Tunisians.

But above all, Bourguiba and the men around him are out of sympathy with the neutralism of the Arab League, which seems to lean always toward the Communists. Denouncing Nasser's foreign policy, "for which moderation is hardly a fundamental characteristic," Bourguiba declared last January: "We feel that this policy is adventurous and non-realistic, and we believe that its excesses run the risk of harming not only all Arabs, but also all peoples struggling for their liberation." Referring later to the talks last spring between Nasser and King Saud, he said:

> Their position in regard to the two blocs which share the world remains badly defined. Ours, on the other hand, was clearly defined in 1952 and is well known. I believe, in all sincerity, that real neutrality is impossible. . . . It is illusionary, and certainly not in harmony with our interests. . . .
>
> I believe that the doctrine which constitutes the basis of the Communist world could never be a good thing if applied to our country. I think that it is a necessity for us to coöperate with the democratic West.

IV

North African confederation, except in the case of Algeria, would entail no change in present governmental structures—at least not in the near future. It would involve merely the removal of customs barriers, the integration of development programs, and the coördination of foreign policy on major issues affecting all the members. Several momentous steps have already been taken toward these objectives.

First, a far-reaching "treaty of fraternity and good-neighborliness" was signed in Tunis on January 6, 1957, by Bourguiba and Prime Minster Ben Halim of Libya. Following a preamble stressing their solidarity and obligations for mutual defense, it provided for concrete measures to bring the countries into closer harmony: ending customs and police restrictions on tourists, simplifying

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laws and tax regulations, building up transportation and communications, providing mutual aid and assistance in matters of teaching, health and techniques. Mixed commissions were immediately formed to put these provisions into operation and, in May, Bourguiba, eight members of his cabinet and numerous technical experts visited Libya to observe their progress. Since then, Tunisian professors, technicians and engineers have rapidly begun to replace their Egyptian counterparts on the Libyan scene.

During the ceremony at which the treaty was signed, Bourguiba said:

> We have the conviction that in the Arab countries of North Africa, there exists a Mahgrebian solidarity imposed by economic, historical and geographic imperatives. . . . Our efforts have led us to harden that solidarity not in order to direct it against any other power, but in order to make of it an instrument of coöperation with the rest, particularly with the Western world of which we form a part. . . .

The only thing holding back the full realization of their goal, he added, was the Algerian crisis. Independence "is a necessary condition for achieving North African unity, and for establishing real coöperation between the Arab west and the rest of the Occident."

Devoting virtually the entire issue to the treaty, the official government weekly, *L'Action Tunisienne,* noted with obvious satisfaction that "on the banks of the Mediterranean, one can advance more quickly than in the salons of the Arab League or at Strasbourg," and it decried the fact that Paris "is unable to see the privileged position that France would have" in relation to a unified North Africa.

Fortunately, the desire to pursue a Mahgrebian, rather than a pan-Arab, policy is shared by the now King of Morocco and most of the Bekkai régime. They feel that His Majesty, who is a world religious leader as well as a nationalist hero, should remain above the mêlée of Arab League politics, and they see in Nasser's claim to leadership of the Arab world a direct threat to the King's position. They also feel that for their country, the farthest west in North Africa, the only sensible course of action is to establish strong economic and cultural ties with the Occident. Finally, close coöperation in North Africa would help solve some of Morocco's internal problems.

Many Moroccans, suffering from hunger and unemployment, have been following the pan-Arab, anti-Western exhortations of

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Allal al Fassi, Cairo-trained president of the Istiqlal Party. Refusing to take a post in the government because the other ministers, particularly Foreign Minister Ahmed Balafrej, do not share his pro-Nasser sentiments, he has agitated against the government. In order to combat his destructive influence, the King wants to obtain Western aid with which to provide food and jobs. He is also anxious to encourage Moroccans to think in terms of solidarity with "fellow North Africans," rather than "fellow Arabs." Therefore, despite some evidence of jealousy, he has coöperated closely with Bourguiba in the plans for confederation.

Negotiations which began with the King's visit to Tunis in October 1956 culminated on March 30, 1957, when Bourguiba made a personal visit to Morocco and signed, with M. Balafrej, the Treaty of Rabat. This "treaty of friendship and solidarity" is not as comprehensive as the treaty with Libya; it avoided anti-Nasser overtones because of the widespread sympathy for Egypt in Morocco, and it could not seek the immediate removal of customs restrictions simply because Tunisia and Morocco are not next-door neighbors. However, in addition to confirming "the solidarity between the two countries," and underlining "the ties of friendship which unite them," the treaty provided for consultation on "international problems of common interest to both countries," and "collaboration in cultural and commercial matters." Finally, it emphasized the "solidarity of all countries of North Africa" and "insisted on the necessity of finding a just solution to the Algerian problem which would conform to the principles of the United Nations Charter in respect to the rights of peoples to self-determination." There was also an understanding that Morocco would soon sign a treaty with Libya.

Perhaps even more significant than the signing of these treaties, however, is the method by which the Algerian problem has been handled in a "strictly North African context" in the recent United Nations debate. This time, instead of the Arab-Asian bloc countries presenting Algeria's case, Tunisia and Morocco have been speaking for the Algerians—not simply as sympathetic observers, but as official *port paroles* for the F.L.N. "The Algerians will be committed to anything we say," announced the Tunisian Secretary of State and Defense, Bahi Ladgham, on the eve of the debate, and the Algerians then confirmed their desire to have the other North Africans speak for them both in the United Nations and in possible subsequent negotiations with France. (They also

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declared, during the course of the debate, that the viewpoints expressed by the Arab-Asian bloc were not to be considered as theirs.) Thus France was at last forced to deal openly with the *fait accompli* of North African spiritual, if not yet physical, unity.

V

The plans for the North African confederation, then, are already well laid. They cannot come to fruition, however—nor can a real Western policy vis-à-vis all North Africa take form—as long as the Algerian conflict continues. Fighting has been protracted because the F.L.N. leaders, embittered after the capture of their five negotiators in October 1956, have reverted to their demand for a promise of complete independence before they will lay down arms. They have categorically opposed the *loi cadre,* passed by the Gaillard Government on November 29, which envisions a complicated federal system for Algeria, and, on the grounds that French promises cannot be trusted, have rejected all French proposals of a cease-fire followed by free elections. At the same time, no French government wants to accept the responsibility of "abandoning" Algeria to the F.L.N.—whom the French, on their part, claim they have no reason to trust—thus placing in jeopardy the lives of more than a million French *colons* and the tremendous French investments in Algeria. This determination to hold onto Algeria has been strengthened by the discovery of oil in the southern territories, which France is unwilling to see fall into "unfriendly" Moslem hands.

Confederation offers a way out of this impasse. If France would grant Algeria independence, or internal autonomy with a promise of complete independence at a given date, the safety of French citizens and investments could be guaranteed under a system of confederation not merely by the Algerians but also by Bourguiba and the King, in whom most Frenchmen do have confidence. Algeria's inexperienced rebel leaders could learn the more subtle art of self-government under the tutelage of their neighbors, particularly the Tunisians. Even the transportation of the oil would be facilitated by the laying of pipelines through Tunisia, which offers the best route to the Mediterranean.

The confederation scheme is important, however, not only as a means of solving the Algerian problem, but of answering other long-perplexing questions in the entire North African area. The strategic benefits the West would obtain from this arrangement

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have already been mentioned. But there are many other benefits, economical and political, to be derived.

North Africa at present suffers from chronic droughts, famine and unemployment. This is a tragic situation not only because it openly beckons to Communist offers of help, but because the area contains a wealth of untapped resources—oil, uranium, phosphates, iron—which, if developed, could not only make North Africa viable, but could be of tremendous value to the West. The separate independent governments have thus far been able to accomplish little in the way of development because of an uneven distribution of assets, a lack of trained technicians and, above all, a lack of foreign capital.

Confederation would allow a pooling of skills, and their use where they are most needed—as is already taking place between Tunisia and Libya, for example. It would also permit regional development planning and common marketing, rather than competition in the marketing of resources, such as phosphates, which are common throughout the area. Most important, it would establish for the first time a suitable framework for foreign aid.

Thus far, foreign assistance to Tunisia and Morocco has been grossly inadequate. Upon granting them independence, France announced that she would assume the responsibility for their development, and warned other countries—particularly the United States—that they should not try to supplant her interests there. But of promised French aid, amounting to some $28,000,000 for Tunisia and somewhat more for Morocco, little has been delivered, and the constant threat of withdrawing it has been used as a means of obtaining political concessions. The political strings were obvious when France interrupted aid to Tunisia in May, after Bourguiba refused to retract his statements that Algeria should become independent.

The State Department, reluctant to antagonize France, has done little to ameliorate the economic situation; whatever aid the United States has given has been of a stopgap nature, donated strictly as a supplement to French aid. Thus Tunisia, as of June 30, 1957, had received $5,000,000 in credits for merchandise to be sold in Tunisia, with the profits going into development, and $500,000 for technical assistance. In addition, she was given $6,500,000 in wheat. Morocco, as of the same date, had received some $20,000,000, all of it in consumer items such as edible oils and sugar, although the proceeds

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are to be used for agriculture and irrigation development. The Richards mission also was marked by deference to French wishes; Tunisia received the ridiculously small sum of $3,000,000, and Morocco $10,000,000. Even the much-publicized delivery of arms —worth merely $92,500—to Tunisia was accompanied by statements of hope that France would supply the rest of Tunisia's defense needs.

Peace in Algeria would make it possible to divert billions of French francs to constructive purposes. Confederation would make it possible for the United States to help in establishing those conditions of economic and political stability which could only benefit France and French investors. Economic and technical assistance in developing irrigation plans, modern farming methods and basic industries such as refineries and canneries need not conflict with French interests, which deal mostly with banking and mineral extractions. Furthermore, private investors from other Western countries would probably be encouraged by the prospect of developing a potentially rich area without the fear of nationalization or other sudden caprices by an unfriendly régime. North Africa could thus become a show window of Arab-Western coöperation.

A successful confederation of 26,000,000 people having close ties with the West could not only demonstrate to the Arab states the relative sterility of Nasser-type neutralism, but also would be in a position actually to counter the policies of Nasser. Furthermore, it could have a direct effect on the policies of newly emerging states in Africa south of the Sahara. The leaders of these countries, who like to regard the Mahgreb as part of Africa, have already shown a willingness to follow the advice of "fellow-African" Bourguiba, for they feel he has acquired the international respect they too would like to achieve. For his part, Bourguiba believes that the way to combat the appeals of Communism or neutralism is to establish an all-African bloc "stronger than the Arab-Asian bloc," but with "solidarity between Africa and the Occident, a true solidarity based on peace and prosperity."

While personally heading a large delegation to the ceremonies marking Ghana's independence, Bourguiba convinced President Nkrumah of the desirability of interesting other West African leaders in his plan. Their objective is to persuade each African nation, as it approaches independence, to cast its lot with other Africans and to coöperate with the West in modernizing their

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countries. For this purpose, an all-African conference is scheduled to take place in Ghana in 1958. Whether it degenerates into another Bandung, or whether it writes a new chapter in the history of Western relations with former colonies, may depend greatly upon the status of the Algerian problem at that time.

In sum, not only North Africa and France but the entire free world could benefit from a North African confederation. Fortunately, an increasing number of French leaders of varying political affiliations are beginning to realize this and to advocate independence for Algeria within such a unified framework. In the Radical Party Congress of October 1956, M. Mendès-France asserted that this solution "would advance the path of progress in North Africa so rapidly that the pole of attraction of the Arab world would quickly shift from Cairo toward the West." Others who have supported confederation are Socialists André Philip and Gaston Deferre, and Independents such as Raymond Aron, influential commentator for *Le Figaro*. Probably the most consistent advocate of confederation, however—and the man mentioned by Bourguiba as being most likely to put the idea across in France—is Charles de Gaulle, whose influence is reappearing on the French political scene. As early as April 1947, he stated that "the Algerian territories can never be assimilated into the metropolitan departments." And in June 1955, he proposed a French North African community, advising that "no policy except one which substitutes association for domination will be workable or worthy of France."

Whatever the outcome of the United Nations debate, it seems increasingly evident that the Algerian problem cannot remain a "family affair" indefinitely. Fortunately, the French appear to be considering the renewal of contacts with the Algerians—either in the context of the "North African Round Table" discussion suggested by Bourguiba and Ladgham in October, or through the "good offices" more recently proffered by Tunisia and Morocco. Through whatever channels it is arranged, the West has good reason to hope that such a conference materializes, and leads to a final settlement. The present situation can give comfort only to the Kremlin, whereas the alternative of a North African confederation having intimate ties with France offers conspicuous advantages to all concerned. It represents the last best hope of keeping the Mediterranean basin and possibly all of Africa in the orbit of the free world.

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THE INTELLIGENTSIA IN CHANGING CHINA

By Y. Chu Wang

SHORTLY after the Tientsin Massacre of 1870, China's leading statesman, Li Hung-chang, declared in a memorial to the throne: "China is faced with unprecedented changes in her history of over three thousand years." These words, which Li repeated on several occasions to his colleagues, were prophetic. More changes have taken place in China in the last eight decades than in the previous two thousand years. The political system has changed from a monarchy to a republic and then to a "people's democracy;" the economic and social structures have changed almost beyond recognition; and even the old cultural values have largely lost their meanings. How are these changes related to one another? I believe that the Chinese élite have played a central rôle in bringing them about.

A cardinal feature of traditional Chinese society was the bifurcation of the populace into a literate élite and an illiterate mass consisting mainly of peasants. Agriculture was by far the most important part of the economy, but the illiterate peasants, who accounted for 70 to 80 percent of the population, had little political influence and depended upon the literati for guidance and leadership. Among the literati, there was a hierarchy of higher and lower orders, but together they constituted the only articulate group and held the reins of government in their hands. They exercised power on the basis of Confucian ideals which were for some 20 centuries the dominant principles of life to all Chinese.

Broadly speaking, Confucianism consisted of an elaborate body of ethical doctrine dealing with man-to-man relationships. It emphasized harmony rather than competition. Harmony was to be achieved through self-abnegation and consideration for others. The conduct of man towards his fellow men was governed by explicit rules prescribed on the basis of his status relative to others. Thus, a man should be filial to his parents, loyal to his prince, respectful to his superior and authoritative but kind to his subordinate. The idea of obligation was ingrained in the minds of all. The individual could not exist apart from the whole. The idea of the whole and the emphasis on the hierarchy of status combined to assign to the family a place of paramount importance in

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man's life. The supreme obligation of a man towards his family was not to give them wealth and power but to reflect on them the honor that he could achieve by the strictest conformity to Confucian ethics.

A natural result of a social structure based upon a body of ethical doctrines was the rise of a small group of semi-theocrats who ruled according to the classics. More specifically, the literati of China acted in three capacities: as government officials, as teachers and writers, and as civic leaders. In their capacity as bureaucrats they had a firm hold on political power. The political hierarchy was headed by the emperor, who as the Son of Heaven ostensibly wielded unlimited power over his subjects. This was, however, more apparent than real. With rare exceptions the emperor had little contact with the outside world and relied heavily on the reports tendered to him for decision-making. Furthermore, the literati spoke in the name of Confucius, and the Confucian ideals were so woven into the social context that the monarch usually found it more expedient to conform than to deviate.

As teachers, the literati not only imparted book knowledge to their pupils but above all served as models of conduct. By his righteousness the teacher inspired respect on the part of his pupil and exercised beneficial influence upon society. The teacher's status was exalted, and the teacher-pupil relationship was nearly as sacrosanct as the father-son relationship. As writers, the literati controlled the only means of impersonal communication and compiled records by which events and personalities were known to contemporaries and to posterity. The literati were thus not only the source of public opinion but also the makers of history.

Under the traditional system the literati were not allowed to hold office in their native provinces. The rule was designed to avoid possible conflict of interest between their rôle as government officials and their rôle as civic leaders. In the sedentary life that they lived, most Chinese were virtually attached to the land where they were born. Hence there was traditionally a strong feeling for one's native area. When they were out of office, the literati were civic leaders in their home towns. In the traditional system of government the tentacles of the central power stopped at the county, or *hsien,* level. A county frequently consisted of half a million people and a few hundred square miles of territory. The magistrate had only a small official staff, and his tenure in

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a particular post was short. Hence communal activities below the county level were initiated and supervised by literati residing in the district, known as the gentry. They organized schools, raised funds to subsidize worthy students, and promoted the maintenance of Confucian temples and examination halls. They compiled local gazetteers and were often requested by the government to expound politico-moral maxims to the masses. They initiated famine relief, arbitrated in civil disputes, encouraged the building and repairing of dams, dikes, roads and bridges; and they organized associations in provincial and national capitals for the benefit of their touring townsmen. They also helped in the collection of taxes and often took charge of local defense.

Because they had excellent connections with the official hierarchy and yet occupied no formal status, the gentry were pressure groups par excellence. They functioned to protect the local populace against government exactions. If the magistrate sent an order to the village extracting special taxes or labor services, the local headman, often a minor gentry elected by his peers, would announce the order in the village teashop and discuss it with all who were present. The opinion of the gentry especially would be ascertained and a decision reached as to whether the order should be followed. If the decision was in the negative, a process of lobbying would immediately be started. The elders of the village would call on the magistrate, or appeal to someone of high standing to intervene. Sometimes the issue gradually moved up to the monarch himself, and pressure of the local interests was seldom without effect.

As an integral part of community life, the gentry existed everywhere in rural China. The main gateway to the status of gentry was through the civil service examinations, which were held at three levels—county, provincial and national. Generally speaking, the higher the level at which a candidate passed his examination, the higher he could rise as an official and the more prestige he had in his private capacity as a member of the gentry. Geographical quotas were enforced in all civil service examinations to give the natives of culturally less advanced areas equal or better opportunity to pass the examinations. As a consequence, geographical balance of leadership was obtained.

Papers in these examinations were limited to a few classics. In order to pass, a candidate had literally to know the classics by heart and understand their meaning in an exhaustive manner.

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This in itself constituted a process of indoctrination. It ensured a homogeneity of outlook among the literati and imbued them with a sense of mission towards the masses and indeed towards humanity. A strong sense of propriety and of *noblesse oblige* characterized the Chinese literati, and it was this that helped the Confucian society to last for so many centuries.

The active rôle played by the gentry in local affairs assured them a minimum understanding of the peasant's problems. The understanding was further enhanced by inter-group mobility. Empirical studies indicate that a large proportion of officials originally came from peasant stock in rural areas. The elevation was possible because education was relatively inexpensive. Outstanding students were helped by the clan, the village or the local school, and there was no high tuition to pay or expensive books to buy. In the best tradition of China, once elevated to the gentry status, a family did not give up farming but continued to lead a simple, frugal life at home. This was called the way of an "honorable family of farming-study background." Confucian ideals as well as legal restrictions forbade officials to engage in industry or commerce; hence as a rule they did not amass large fortunes. After an official's death, his family might revert to peasant status after a generation or two. Thus there was a two-way valve between the élite and the masses.

II

Confucian society, however, had certain weaknesses. Confucianism sought to achieve harmony among men by laying down rules for their behavior according to individual status. The way to conformity was by persuasion and social pressure rather than by naked coercion. The maintenance of a Confucian order therefore depended upon two major conditions. First, adherence to the rules had to be nearly universal. If an appreciable number of people were outside the orbit, the rules would become unenforceable for all, for self-abnegation could hardly lead to harmony unless it was met in kind. The second condition was that the people's pattern of life must remain constant so that established rules of conduct were sufficient to meet all contingencies. To prevent change, technological improvement was not favored; and the acquisition of wealth and indulgence in material desires were condemned. In short, the Confucian society was a closed system which sought stability at the expense of progress. It could not

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compete effectively with a more dynamic civilization. In her long seclusion, China was helped by geography; the cultural level of surrounding countries was so low that China could maintain tributary relations with them without sacrificing her sedantary way of life.

But in the nineteenth century an expanding West, equipped with superior technology, forced itself upon China. True to tradition, China sought to treat the Western states as tributaries and to impose the customary restrictions on contact and trade. But she emerged badly defeated from the wars that ensued. The humiliation was strongly felt by the literati, but their begrudging attempts at reform along Western lines were doomed to failure: most of them were unable to adjust their view that all foreigners were barbarians. Resistance only increased China's difficulties and developed a pent-up resentment against the régime. When the conservative stand finally collapsed in 1900, a reaction set in: the bewildered intellectuals rapidly came to view everything traditional with suspicion and all Western institutions with an admiring eye. The stage was set for an era of indiscriminate imitation of the West.

Of the numerous changes introduced, perhaps the most far-reaching was the educational reform. In 1902 a school system modeled on the West was decreed. Three years later, the time-honored civil service examinations were abolished. Henceforth school education became the major channel of advancement. Broadly speaking, there were three levels of education under the new system—primary school, middle school and college. To this must be added a fourth and highest stage—study abroad. For convenience we shall refer to the foreign-educated and the college graduates as the higher intellectuals. The middle school students stand apart and will be mentioned separately.

Because of the sudden reorientation toward Western education, study abroad became the dream of all college and middle-school students. Oftentimes a student spent years planning and seeking ways and means to go to America. Two occupations particularly favored by the returned students were government services and college teaching. Actually, all top posts in Chinese higher education were monopolized by returned students, particularly those from America. In the Chinese educational system, vocational training had little importance and the main emphasis was placed on preparing students for further study. For this

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reason, college curricula governed the courses in middle schools and the latter in turn influenced the courses in primary schools. By their control over higher education, men educated in the West controlled Chinese education as a whole.

The foreign-educated were no less prominent in government services. Their proportion among Chinese central government leaders rose from 42 percent in 1915 to 78 percent in 1932 and remained at that level right down to the end of the Kuomintang rule on the Chinese mainland. In the first two decades of the century a number of leaders rose to ministerial positions within five or six years of their return from abroad. Though this rapid rate of advance probably slowed down in later decades, the pattern of prominence held. In a survey made by the present writer in 1937, practically none of some 1,100 American-trained men was found to occupy a position classified as "poor."

Only scanty information is available about the employment pattern of Chinese college graduates, but it doubtless was broadly similar to that of the returned students, except that the latter had more prestige and therefore better positions. On the whole, the modern intellectuals can be said to have inherited the importance of the literati in the old society. The fact is not surprising when we remember that the masses in China remained illiterate. The key question then is, how did the training, outlook and performance of the new intellectuals compare with those of the old?

III

When the new educational system was introduced in 1902, the Confucian classics occupied from a quarter to two-thirds of the class hours in primary and middle schools. After 1912, under the influence of Western-trained educators, the classics were replaced by citizenship courses, and the hours were reduced. Gradually, ethical teaching all but disappeared from the curriculum while increasing emphasis was given to technical training. The majority of books used in colleges were in foreign languages and even the examples used to illustrate a principle were often of Western origin.[1] Few courses on Chinese culture were taught, and subjects such as Chinese economic history which had received relatively

[1] *Cf.* Wang Shih-chieh, "Education in China" (Shanghai, 1935), p. 18; League of Nations, Institute of Intellectual Coöperation, "The Reorganization of Education in China" (Paris, 1932), p. 165.

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little attention in traditional Chinese education, and which might have derived great profit from an application of Western scientific methods, were more neglected than ever. The heavy impact of Western education in China not only resulted in the absence of ethical teachings but also deprived the student of a minimum knowledge of Chinese culture.

The cost of education changed, too. With little free elementary education provided and practically no scholarships available in middle schools and colleges, study became limited to the well-to-do class. Farmers and laborers, the two largest occupational groups in China, were virtually barred. According to surveys made in the 1930s, a farmer needed to own some five acres of land to be able to send two children to primary school. Only about 11 percent of the farmers in China fulfilled this qualification. To send a son to a middle school, a farmer needed to have some 30 acres of land. Only about 1 percent of the farmers in China could meet this requirement. Since the cost of college education in Shanghai and of study abroad in America in 1930 was respectively about four and one-half and 21 times that of middle school education, it is safe to conclude that no farmer without other sources of income could give his children a college education.

The situation was equally striking among laborers. Between 1917 and 1931 some 82 surveys were made on their living conditions in various districts. Among 303 families in Shanghai, where wages were highest in China, only one youngster went beyond primary school and over 60 percent of the children had less than one year's education. The one exception came from a family which had other sources of income and hence was not typical. Education was largely confined to the families of government officials, educators, and professionals including merchants. In 1924, each of these groups accounted for about a third of the students at Tsinghua College, with a small residue—3.7 percent—coming from agricultural families. It is therefore clear that social mobility was sharply reduced under the new system. The valve between the intellectual élite and the masses was nearly closed.[2]

[2] *Cf.* Ho Jih-pin, "Chinese Education," in *Chung-hua Chiao-yü-chieh* (Chinese Educational World), v. 19, No. 3, p. 10–11; China, National Land Commission, "A Summary Report of National Land Survey" (Nanking, 1937, Table 21); Chou Yung, "The Reconstruction of Chinese Education," in *Chung-hua Chiao-yü-chieh,* v. 18, No. 12; Institute of Pacific Relations, "Agrarian China" (Chicago, 1938), p. 171; L. K. Tao, "The Standard of Living of Chinese Workers" (Shanghai, 1931), p. 4; City Government of Greater Shanghai, Bureau of Social Affairs, "Standard of Living of Shanghai Laborers" (1934), p. 158–159.

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A related phenomenon of the high cost of education was the geographical distribution of Chinese colleges. There was a heavy concentration in the large metropolises, particularly Shanghai and Peking. In 1934, out of a total of 111 institutions of higher learning, 25 were in Shanghai, 14 were in cities near to Shanghai, and 26 were in the Peking-Tientsin area. Some 60 percent of university students were found in 1930 in two cities alone, Shanghai and Peking. Large parts of China were unserved by any college.[8]

This pattern of uneven distribution had important social implications. Most large cities in modern China—particularly Shanghai—grew up under the direct influence of Western traders. In the process a distinct culture developed. Whereas life in rural China bore the marks of simplicity, frugality and traditionalism, the treaty ports were characterized by luxurious living, moral unscrupulousness and discrimination by Westerners against Chinese. The heavy concentration of schools in Shanghai therefore tended to restrict educational opportunities to youths reared in an atmosphere of self-seeking commercialism and also contaminated those students who came there from rural areas. It was commonly observed that once a student came to a large city, he stayed on after graduation, even when he was unemployed. The same urbanization tendency characterized the men educated in the West, a large part of whom were residents of treaty ports to begin with. In 1937, among 1,100 American-trained men, 24 percent were located in Shanghai, 39 percent were in six other major cities and 6 percent were abroad. Of the remainder, not a single person was in any town smaller than a county seat. Higher education drained the rural areas of men and leadership instead of feeding it.

In modern China, then, the higher intellectual stood in contrast to the old literati in almost every respect. He had little ethical training and was not particularly acquainted with China's cultural background. In all probability, he was a city-dweller. The geographical distribution of educated men was uneven. Most students came from urbanized merchant or official families. There was little mobility between the élite and the masses. The typical higher intellectual was one who knew nothing about the peasant or his problems.

[8] *Cf.* "Chinese Yearbook," 1935–36, p. 503; "The Reorganization of Education in China," *op. cit.*, p. 147.

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IV

By their nature, social phenomena defy simple cause and effect analysis. Nevertheless, the characteristics of China's intellectuals seem to have had a definite impact upon the Chinese body politic. The years from 1928 to 1948 were crucial. During this period the carry-overs from the old intelligentsia largely disappeared, and men educated in the new way dominated the scene. The political center shifted from Peking, the city of the mandarinate, to Nanking, located on the outskirts, so to speak, of Shanghai. The characteristic Kuomintang leader was the Western-educated son of a merchant. He maintained his residence in Shanghai and commuted to Nanking every week. Approaching politics from an urban point of view, he never seriously attempted to put through the agrarian reform program to which the party was committed. During its best years, from 1928 to 1937, the government very largely disregarded peasant and local government problems except in so far as they might be immediately involved in the military campaign against the Communists. The land tax was assigned to provincial treasuries in 1928. The attention of the government was concentrated on the urban sector of the economy. Eighty-five percent of the central government revenue was derived from taxes on foreign trade and commodities of industrial origin located in a small coastal area. To finance its costly military campaigns, the government borrowed heavily from banks in Shanghai at exorbitant interest rates. Yet the fiscal potentiality of the rural sector was untapped. At the height of Kuomintang power, the value of output taxed by the central government did not exceed 10 or 15 percent of the national income. On the other hand, speculation in commodities, government bonds and foreign exchange became a common practice among circles close to the government. Under official auspices, banking syndicates were organized to gain monopolistic control of industrial and financial enterprises. In all these developments the treaty-port orientation of the ruling hierarchy was unmistakable.

The impact of the new class of Chinese intellectuals upon local politics was even more serious, though here it was by default rather than by participation. A remarkable characteristic of Chinese politics from 1912 onwards was the absence of Western-educated intellectuals in governmental activities from the provincial level downwards. Out of 151 provincial heads in certain

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sample years between 1916 and 1947 that I surveyed, only six were Western-trained, and only three of these were appointed after 1932. Of these three, two either did not assume their posts or, if they did, remained in office for only a short time. The great majority of the provincial heads were militarists, veterans of civil wars who had had little academic education. A number of these militarists came from peasant stock. Oppressed and without hope of rising through regular channels, the peasant sometimes left the land and joined the army. He might in time rise to be a commander; and as most of the higher intellectuals were not particularly interested in provincial posts, he might be the logical choice for the provincial governorship. The opportunity for economic exploitation in such posts was great, and many militarists amassed large fortunes. While the rise of the soldier in a sense broadened the base of the Chinese ruling hierarchy, it differed basically from the old farming-study pattern in its implications. Whereas the traditional union of peasants and literati increased political and social harmony, the peasant-militarist and the intellectual were virtually two antibodies. They differed both in outlook and sphere of influence. As a consequence, neither contributed to political stability.

As I have indicated, local government below the county level had traditionally been in the hands of the gentry. The absence of educated men in rural areas caused a breakdown in the customary power structure and made good government impossible. Reliable surveys of rural districts in the mid-1930s demonstrated clearly the deterioration of local government. The old gentry virtually disappeared; their place was taken by petty militarists or their underlings, whose only concern was to loot the peasant to the maximum possible extent. These men were not infrequently known murderers, but there was little that the county government could do about them; indeed, there was a temptation for the magistrate to fall in with them in unsavory transactions. Much depended upon the locality: the riffraff were usually less active in areas close to the modern cities, where there was peace and order, and more obnoxious in the interior, where higher intellectuals were few and public opinion weak. In times of civil wars, usually confined to the rural areas, the situation reached its worst. The peasant had the choice of fleeing or staying on the land and taking the consequences. Either way he faced probable extinction.

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Of special interest is the educational background of the local riffraff. A number of them had been students at middle schools of one kind or another; but the middle school student was now far less favorably situated than the old literati of comparable rank had been. He had a training basically inferior to that of the college man and could scarcely hope for good careers and positions. He was not prepared to achieve success in the city, yet he was detached from the agrarian masses and looked down on them. He was a man with aspiration but no future; frustrated, he used his intellect to rob the peasants successfully. Thus, instead of being a stabilizing factor in the rural areas the rootless lower intellectual class became a source of evil.

The appalling conditions in rural China did not escape the attention of all Kuomintang leaders. Interest in rural reconstruction movements was widespread in the mid-1930s. But the effort was meager in relation to the task, and the time was short. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the government was entirely absorbed in the fight for national survival. The seat of government was moved into the interior, but there was no change in the top personnel or in their orientation. The tensions of war merely let the weakness accumulate beneath the surface.

When V-J Day came, all the evil symptoms reappeared with double vigor. Corruption in the government reached an all-time high. The head of the cabinet was absorbed in government financial operations which he directed mostly from his office in Shanghai. Meanwhile, large parts of rural China continued to fall into Communist hands. When the régime was faced by a large peasant army, led by the Communists, with nothing to lose but a world to gain, it crumbled like a house of cards.

V

So far as the rôle of the intellectuals in the Communist movement is known, the lessons seem to be similar. In 1915, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, a scholar of traditional background who had, however, studied in Japan and France, founded the magazine *Youth* for the purpose of reforming the thought and behavior of the youth in China. According to Ch'en, Confucianism represented fetters to progress which should be ruthlessly thrown off. Warmly supported by a group of foreign-educated professors and intellectuals, including Hu Shih and Lu Hsün, Ch'en's stand caught the imagination of the students, who, having been freed somewhat

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from the hold of tradition, were psychologically receptive to a new approach. The attack on Confucianism soon developed into a movement for "dumping the national heritage" in general. The students launched a "Family Revolution," a "Theatre Revolution," a "Funeral Revolution," a "Woman of Love Revolution," and so on. All existing institutions and authority now came under attack. On May 4, 1919, some 10,000 students stormed the residence of a high official, set fire to it and critically injured another official, all on mere suspicion that they were traitors. Faced with the crisis, the government faltered and dismissed the officials. From then on, discipline disappeared in Chinese schools. Students went on strike over trifles, and in many cases secured the right to hire and to dismiss their teachers.[4]

The intellectual and moral tumult of the May 4th period indicated that the collapse of Confucianism created rather than settled problems. For a society that had long been used to a comprehensive explicit system of beliefs, the downfall of Confucianism created a void that had to be filled. The answer of Ch'en Tu-hsiu and his friends was a cry for Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy. Neither, however, represented something easily comprehensible. What was the essence of democracy? How was it to be implemented in China where some 80 percent of the population were illiterate? Was science mere technology, or was it a way of thinking, a philosophy of life? Ch'en and his friends had no satisfactory answer. Lacking the essential knowledge to gain a real insight into Western culture, Ch'en soon identified production and technology as the keys to human progress. At this point a schism developed among the New Thought leaders. One group, led by Ch'en, became Marxists and founded the Chinese Communist Party. Another group, among whom Hu Shih was conspicuous, believed that the American way of life was the best and that by deduction Marxism was wrong. They continued to advocate "total Westernization of China." In time most intellectuals with the latter view were drawn into the orbit of the Kuomintang, while the Communists, after a series of unsuccessful urban insurrections, retreated in the early 1930s into the interior and joined forces with the peasants.

In its early stage, the Chinese Communist movement had a

[4] Tse-tsung Chow, "The May 4th Movement and Its Influence upon China's Socio-Political Development" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1955), p. 133; Tsi C. Wang, "The Youth Movement of China" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1925), p. 81; Tsao Chü-jen, "Wen-t'an San-chieh" (Hong Kong, 1950), p. 18.

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distinctly urban and intellectual flavor. The men most responsible for the founding of the Party were foreign-educated intellectuals. The main issue discussed at the first Party Congress was whether the Party should limit its activity to propagating the Marxist faith or whether it should organize the proletariat for seizure of power. From 1921 to 1935 the Party leadership was in the hands of returned students. Significantly, this was also the period of defeat and frustration for the Party. Dogmatism blinded the intellectuals to the reality in China; they placed their hope on a proletariat that was largely non-existent, and urban insurrections only roused the fear of the masses.

Communist fortunes did not turn until 1932 when the Central Committee under Kuomintang pressure left Shanghai for the interior. The move was decisive. For a decade and a half the Communists, as a result of Kuomintang strategy were confined to the rural areas and were cut off from practically all urban influences. The intellectuals in the Party were forced to reorient themselves towards the peasants. The Party leadership passed into the hands of Mao Tse-tung, a man of rural origin who had given up an opportunity to study in France and who had developed a taste and some aptitude for traditional Chinese poetry. Mao had long stressed the paramount importance of the peasants in a Chinese revolution. Under him, the proportion of men of rural origin in the Communist leadership steadily increased. The Party entrenched itself among the peasants. The old team of intellectuals and peasants appeared in a new form and eventually became invincible.

It is of course true that Communism and Confucianism differ in their basic stands. Confucianism believes in harmony among men; it is humanistic, and it deplores physical violence. Communism, on the other hand, views class struggle as the mechanism by which all political changes take place; it relishes violence and it suppresses all opposition with ruthlessness. Confucianism, despite its emphasis on the family, is essentially individualistic; it is concerned with man as an individual, and the hierarchy of status, so basic for the regulation of man's behavior in the Confucian order, is merely a scale of preference, built upon the proximity of one individual to another in their social relations. This contrasts sharply with the Communist notion that the individual counts mainly through his membership in the class because his ideas—his moral convictions and esthetic preferences—are in the

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main a reflection of the ideas generated by the class. Lastly, technological progress is inimical to the Confucian order but is actively pursued by all Communist régimes.

Despite these differences, however, certain similarities obtain between the two ideologies. Both are comprehensive explicit systems of belief. Both emphasize the rôle of the élite and exhort sacrifice and devotion on their behalf. Both are authoritarian and paternalistic. Both exalt the group, whether it is the family, the class, or the Party. Both are this-worldly and are little concerned with the supernatural. In both the charismatic quality of the leaders is important. In both the character of the cadres or the literati is cultivated by a process of indoctrination in which persuasion, self-examination and confession form the essential parts.

Weighing the differences against the similarities, one is tempted to conclude that the two ideologies differ more in their basic stands than in their approaches. Apart from the degree of coercion employed, there seems to be little difference in the *modus operandi* of the two systems. Perhaps it may be said that Communism in China merely turns Confucianism "right side up" by substituting struggle for harmony and the Party for the family. The affinity between the two ideologies is in contrast to the gulf between Chinese tradition and the Anglo-American tradition with its implicit political ideology, its cult of the individual, its economic free enterprise, and its religious belief. The incongruity between these two traditions appears to have been an important factor in China's inability to Westernize—or more specifically, to "Americanize"—herself successfully. Assiduous efforts made towards that end by China's leaders merely resulted in the rise of a treaty-port-oriented intellectual élite.

Looking back, we may conclude that Confucianism, while attaining social stability, impeded technological progress and reduced the adaptability of Chinese society. This constituted one of the basic reasons why the traditional social structure crumbled when a powerful West descended on China. The intellectuals were the first to feel the impact, but a gradual transition proved to be impossible. The reaction from staunch traditionalism was toward unqualified rejection of all of China's cultural heritage. In their pilgrimage to the West, China's intellectuals gained little insight into the essence of the civilization which they so much admired. Technology and production appeared to

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them the only keys to human progress. Once the necessary shift from a proletarian to a peasant base had been made, Communism provided a ready substitute for the traditional faith.

At another level, Westernized education and experience abroad alienated the top intellectuals from the rural masses. The elimination of ethical teachings individualized their attitude. As a consequence, the power structure in rural China broke down, and the peasants suffered unprecedented misgovernment. By simply adapting themselves to the situation, the Communists became invincible in China. All they needed was a period of consolidation, and this was afforded by the Sino-Japanese War.

My analysis embodies many generalizations that need qualification and omits many relevant factors. For instance, economic factors need to be brought into the general framework. But enough has been said to suggest that the political and social changes in China are largely explainable in terms of men and ideas, and that the success of the Communists is probably due more to their grasp of China's traditions than to the materialistic tenets of their faith. Unless this is recognized, contemporary China will remain a puzzle and the political measures adopted to combat Communism there will probably not achieve the desired effect.

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WHERE INDIA, CHINA AND RUSSIA MEET

By Kusum Nair

LADAKH, bordering on Sinkiang and extending even further north than Tibet, forms the eastern half of the wedge that peninsular India thrusts into the heart of central Asia. From earliest times great caravans of trade, tides of culture and sometimes waves of conquest passed through Ladakh and its capital, Leh, as part of a more or less continuous intercourse between India and Central Asia. It was by this route, through what is now the State of Jammu and Kashmir, that Buddhism travelled to China from India via Sinkiang, becoming the universal religion in the entire region in between, and as far as the shores of the Caspian in the west. As late as the seventh century, when the Chinese pilgrim Hsuan Tsang passed through Central Asia, he noted the dominance of Buddhism and Indian culture there. At that time, these regions which are now so remote were the crossroads of the civilized world.

With Vasco da Gama's discovery of the sea route to India in 1498, the centers of power shifted to the maritime countries of Europe and trade found new and cheaper routes across the oceans. Central Asia lost its importance, strategic and commercial. Then the great mountain barriers also closed in, and although a thin trickle of travel and trade continued in the traditional manner the local societies lapsed into serene isolation and became totally stagnant.

And so in Ladakh, while all its people know and worship the Buddha whose message probably came to them in the time of the Indian Emperor Asoka (circa 273–232 B.C.), they generally do not know today about Mahatma Gandhi. His photograph hangs in Hemis, an ancient and famous monastery 24 miles from Leh, to the right of the golden image of the Buddha. It had been presented to the monastery by the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, when he went there a few years ago. But when I asked the Lamas whose photograph it was, they did not know; and on being told it was Mahatma Gandhi, they did not know who Gandhi was. Similarly, while the Buddhist "wheel of life" literally runs the lives of the Ladakhis, the "wheel of the road" has yet to make its appearance. There is as yet nothing on wheels

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of any description in Ladakh—not even the slow, squeaking, venerable bullock cart, the familiar landmark of Indian scenes.

Leh itself is more of a village than a town, an untidy cluster of low, squat, flat-roofed structures made of sun-baked bricks and with a population of only 3,000. It has just one main broad street with small shops on either side selling cheap cotton prints, colored scarves, grains, salt, butter, tea and other similar humble requirements. The rest are narrow winding lanes lined with blank grey walls and barred doors.

Atop the eminences are the *Gumpas*—the Buddhist monasteries. Physically, materially and spiritually they dominate the lives of the people, who know no other "ism" except "Lamaism." They are so powerful that it has not been possible for the government to interfere with their traditional rights and privileges. Thus, though landlordism has been abolished in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the monasteries of Ladakh have been exempted from the application of the reform. Yet they are the biggest landowners in the district, each owning thousands of acres as against the average holding of a Ladakhi family of a meager three acres. They continue to rent out their lands at exorbitant rates and even exploit free labor. The Ladakhi local leader and political representative in the Kashmir state assembly and government is also the head Lama—Kaushak Bakula.

Actually, so long as Kashmir was an autonomous state under an Indian ruler, the Ladakhis were a forgotten and unknown people. The British considered their land as of great strategic importance and they posted a special officer in Leh to watch British interests; but nobody paid any attention to the people. And so until 1947 there were less than half a dozen primary schools in the district; practically no medical facilities, aside from the local *amchi,* who prescribes the same cure for both men and animals—by branding; the minimum of administration; in fact, no features or attributes of modern life at all. The state of society could only be described as primeval.

In 1957, also, there is no piped water; no telephone; no paved road; no industry; no newspaper; and no local democracy in any form. Till recently there was scarcely any money in circulation. The barter system prevailed and is still extensively in use. Almost none of the people has seen a train and very few an automobile. When they do see a car for the first time, they may rush to offer it grass and water. The mass of the people are exceedingly poor

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and there is no middle class. They live mainly by agriculture, near the perennial springs and streams, for everything, including trees, must be irrigated. In the extensive pastures of Chang Tang, to the east, they are still pure nomads exactly as their forefathers were three thousand years ago.



II

Such, then, in the mid-twentieth century, are life and its pace in this distant district, once considered an exceedingly important British outpost. The region of northern Kashmir as a whole, including Ladakh, Baltistan, Gilgit, Nagar and Hunza, forms a deep salient into Central Asia. Its frontier touches Afghanistan at the northwestern extreme; then it closely approaches the Soviet territory (some maps show a common border for about 20 miles); thereafter it runs in a southeasterly direction for about 400 miles along Sinkiang; and then turns south contiguous with

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Tibet for another 450 miles. At a pivotal point lies Leh, at the crossing of the routes from Yarkand in the north, Lhasa to the east, and Srinagar to the south.

This area came to be known as one of Britain's most "sensitive" possessions in the last century, both in the scheme of defense of British India and as a base for Britain herself to pursue a forward policy in Asia. For here also converged the other two of the largest empires of the world as it was then, the Russian and the Chinese. The confluence of these three impregnated once again the almost dead and forgotten heartland of Asia with a revived political and strategic significance.

China, however, was as yet a weak Power. She therefore avoided any international involvements and endeavored merely to keep her traditional claims open. The direct rivalry, accordingly, was confined to Britain and Russia, who after much intrigue and manœuvring, at the peak of their expansion, met appropriately around the Roof of the World—the Pamirs.

Throughout the last century Russia's expansion in Inner Asia, especially the fear that she might attack India, was the constant bogy of British statesmen. To a great extent it conditioned British policy in this part of the world and was one of the reasons for Britain's far-from-fruitful involvements in Afghanistan, Sinkiang and Tibet. In view of their constant state of unsettlement these countries were considered, to use a modern phrase, "power vacuums," and Britain sought to fill them lest Russia fill them instead.

Of these three empire builders in Central Asia, Britain has now withdrawn totally, and her legacy, including the northern districts of Kashmir, has been partitioned between the two new states of India and Pakistan. Both the Russians and the Chinese, however, are still there, firmly installed and consolidated. China, formerly the "weak third," is now herself a Communist Power and rapidly becoming modernized. Recently she has extended effective control, as distinct from the traditional distant suzerainty, over both Sinkiang and Tibet.

With extension of the mutual frontiers of the Soviet Union and China, now in friendship and ideological alliance, a new center of gravity likely to influence strongly the political balance of the world has developed in Central Asia. Both Britain and the United States are intensely concerned with the decisive area but neither has now any direct access to it.

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Obviously, any further Russian or Chinese expansion in Central Asia can only be southward at the expense of India or Pakistan. The danger is heightened by the fact that the borders are still largely undefined and several rights and claims are in dispute.

Thus, according to K.P.S. Menon, the Chinese during the T'ang dynasty "performed the remarkable feat of sending an army of 100,000 men which marched up the Pamirs from Kashgar, crossed the Darkot Pass (15,400 feet) into Yasin, occupied the whole of the Gilgit and Hunza valley, then known as Little Polu, and turned it into a military district with a garrison of 10,000 men. By the end of the eighth century Chinese authority in this region declined—and indeed disappeared forever; but the tradition of Chinese dominion over Kanjut has survived. And until the Revolution of 1911 the Rulers of Hunza used to send 16 misqals of gold to the Emperor of China for which they got handsome presents in return."[1] This "tribute" in recognition of Chinese suzerainty continued to be sent in spite of the fact that Hunza constituted a part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and was garrisoned by troops commanded by British officers.

On the other hand, adds Mr. Menon, "until recently Hunza had the right not merely to graze their cattle in the Pamirs but to levy grazing fees from others who did." In 1936, however, the Chinese encroached on these customary rights and seized sheep and two men of the Mir of Hunza in Sarikol.

Obviously, then, the Chinese frontier claims in the complex Pamir region are still open to definition and re-definition between India, Pakistan and China. In the circumstances, the strategic importance of Ladakh and northern Kashmir is self-evident, and in fact there is widespread apprehension that it offers the most facile route of entry to Communist forces, ideological and physical, into the Indian subcontinent. As Josef Korbel says:

> Expansionist powers have always moved into militarily undefended spaces, and it is no reflection on the fighting spirit of the Indian and Pakistani forces to state that they would be no match for the combined strength of a Chinese and Soviet onslaught, facilitated, as it would be, from within by the disruptive activities of the Communist fifth column and the almost paralyzing hostility that now exists between India and Pakistan. Indeed, one does not need to think in terms of an open attack, but rather in terms of spasmodic infiltration and the subjugation of exposed areas close to the Soviet-Chinese boundaries.[2]

[1] K. P. S. Menon, "Delhi-Chungking: a Travel Diary." New York: Oxford, 1948, p. 28.
[2] "Danger in Kashmir." Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954, p. 301.

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Almost every Western commentator has expressed the same fears. To what extent are they justified? How far is India unaware of these dangers or guilty of deliberately ignoring them, as some openly allege and others imply?

Let us note first of all that considerable parts of the area under survey, namely the tribal dependencies of Hunza, Nagar and Gilgit and the western portion of Ladakh and Baltistan, are occupied by Pakistan. The socio-economic condition of their sparse and scattered population is as backward as that in Ladakh, or even worse. One factor considered a safeguard against their being Communized is that they are all Muslims. But then so are their cousins and neighbors across the border in Sinkiang. Another is that Pakistan is a recipient of United States military aid and is an active member of the Baghdad Pact and SEATO.

The fact that India has not joined the Western defense system is important as regards the situation in Ladakh, which is Indian territory. Moreover, there is a solid bloc of 40,939 Buddhists there, all of whom are ecclesiastically under Lhasa. An added reason why the danger of Communist infiltration is considered a greater possibility and likelihood in this part of the territory is that it is contiguous with both Tibet and Sinkiang. Historically, further, Ladakh was a part of Tibet till the fifteenth century, when it became independent under a line of Tibetan kings who accepted the Dalai Lama as their suzerain. It was only around 1840 that Zorawar Singh, an Indian soldier of great repute, conquered Ladakh, Baltistan and Gilgit for his master Gulab Singh, who in 1846 was installed by the British as the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir. The modern frontiers of Kashmir were born at that time.

Racially, the Ladakhis are the same stock as the Tibetans. Economically, also, their traditional ties have been mainly with Lhasa and with Yarkand, in Sinkiang. From Yarkand came rice and mules, beautiful carpets, handicrafts and luxury goods. (This trade has ceased now and Sinkiang has been declared closed territory by the Chinese.) From Tibet came, and still come, salt, tea, butter, wool and so on. Local culture, the style of living, the household furnishings, the decorations and motifs of art are all from Sinkiang, Tibet or China beyond. From India the only import of significance seems to be Buddha, but his worship also is totally in "Lhasa form."

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III

There is obviously danger, therefore, that ideological propaganda will infiltrate from across the border and will find a favorable soil in Ladakh, despite all the precautions that the Government of India may take and is taking. Whether it will strike root is not quite so certain. Actually, it is not so much the ideology that is likely to arouse a response in the local people; they are perhaps too backward for it. It is the report of the "fantastic" development evidently taking place in Sinkiang and Tibet that has the simple Ladakhi agog with wonder and envy. There is not a single factory yet in Leh—no electricity even. Not so long ago Sinkiang too was jogging along in the "mule age." Now there is even an atomic power plant there.

No Communists are yet in Ladakh but the basic problem there is that of all new democracies: established order is very old, very weak and very tottering. Its powerful elements are also the reactionary elements, and although they can be depended upon to oppose Communism tooth and nail, because it will have no place for them, they must also become the first victims of any truly democratic reform. The choice for the Indian Government is therefore not easy. It is either to leave these interests intact, indeed bolster them further, and permit them to continue oppressing the population and holding it in ignorance and backwardness; or to destroy them and rapidly "democratize" the society and in so doing destroy the only existing social bulwark against Communism. The present administration in Ladakh is following a compromise policy of harnessing the traditional vested interests themselves to work to promote democracy—in other words, to commit suicide. It is tightrope walking and the outcome is difficult to foresee. But the sincere effort is there. In the meantime the government is also trying to counter the Red threat by improving the local standard of life by positive and constructive measures. Ladakh is now included in the development program of the State of Kashmir; it has a Five-Year Plan of its own and the necessary financial allocation.

As a result, there now are over 70 primary schools and two high schools in Ladakh. This year four Ladakhi students took science for their high school examination for the first time. The newest structure in Leh is the 20-bed hospital. Here the first batch of 12 midwives and eight apothecaries to man the first vil-

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lage dispensaries of modern medicine is undergoing training. Also as part of the Five-Year program, efforts are being made to improve the local breeds of cattle. New canals to reclaim lands for cultivation are being dug and experimental agricultural farms have been set up. This is highly important, as the area has only one crop a year, due to the severe winter, and its seed rate is very low. Only wheat, barley and gram are cultivated.

Above all, a motor road is under construction to connect Leh with Srinagar, a distance of 252 miles. Only this will be able to break the present chronic isolation of the land and its people. At present the only regular line of communication with India is an air service of Dakotas between Leh and Srinagar which is able to function once or twice a week for barely 20 weeks in the year, in summer when the weather is fine. Even the caravan route, which normally takes two to three weeks to traverse, is closed for pony transport from October to the end of May. To fly a bag of cement to Leh costs Rs. 40. No steel is to be seen there nor, of course, modern machinery or equipment of any sort. Practically the only "modern" tools that it has been possible to transport so far are a couple of "mediæval" spinning wheels and handlooms of improved design. The Ladakhis spin and weave their own domestic woolen requirements on *taklis* (hand spindles) and their looms are so primitive as to weave cloth only nine inches wide and of a very rough texture. Other cottage industries like carpet weaving are also being introduced for the first time.

IV

Official Indian policy discounts the likelihood of a physical invasion by this route by either Russia or China. But this is not because, as is widely believed, Nehru is convinced of the "non-aggressive nature of the Soviet and Chinese policies" and therefore "underestimates the outside threat to India."[3] That is an oversimplification. The position is that with the western part of Kashmir under the control of Pakistan, India for the time being does not physically adjoin any Soviet territory. There remains China. With China, India shares a common frontier for 1,800 miles, which means that the problem is not confined to Ladakh but is 1,800 miles long.

Most of this frontier with China runs over the world's highest and mostly uncharted ranges of eternal snows, the Himalayas.

[3] Korbel, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

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Here lies perhaps the longest and certainly the tallest and coldest divide in the cold war. Thus the only route from Leh to Yarkand, in Sinkiang, is across the mighty massif of the Karakorams, called "the whitest, snowiest and iciest range outside the polar regions." It crosses five passes, each more than 17,000 feet high.

As in northern Kashmir, most of this frontier is undetermined and open to dispute, for the McMahon Line, which was supposed to have demarcated the border in 1914, was never accepted by China. Several other caravan routes from Tibet into India may be more convenient than the ones to Leh. Moreover, along this same Indo-Tibetan border further east lie the three independent kingdoms of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, which are as vulnerable from every point of view as Ladakh. In 1887, for example, the Tibetans did make an "inexplicable invasion" into Sikkim, but were driven back the following year with British help. India is fully conscious of the possibility of these states being "Tibetanized." She is responsible for their protection should their security be threatened from any quarter. Repeatedly she has made plain that she will not brook any outside interference with their independence or in their internal affairs.

As for the "spaces" lining the Indian side of this front, they are not so much "militarily undefended," to use Mr. Korbel's phrase, as undefendable. Not even with much greater resources at her command, in fact, could India ever hope to guard wholly, much less seal, her entire border with China. What is more important, however, is that it is patently unnecessary to do so. For even though superior modern technology on the other side might overcome to some extent the difficult topographical and climatic conditions of the terrain, annexation could be achieved only at an inordinately high cost, for a short period and with barren results. The desperate enterprise would end ultimately in disaster for the aggressor. The entire area is so rugged, so poor, so desolate that it permits neither the movement of large bodies of troops and heavy equipment nor the stationing of sizable garrisons.

Furthermore, India has no rivalries, interests or involvements in Central Asia comparable to those of Britain in the past—except for the unfortunate dispute with Pakistan which is confined to the subcontinent. Moreover, India has no ambition to project herself or her influence beyond her frontiers. Today the northern border of India is no longer a part of the frontier of another nation involved in power politics on a world-wide scale. India's

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frontiers do not have their former international importance but have shrunk to their own national dimensions.

V

India has taken as her first premise, then, that it is utterly impracticable to try to fortify militarily the whole of her northern frontier with China. Even so, wherever it is defensible it is guarded.

The second premise is that it would be equally futile for any Power to try to cross the Himalayas to annex any nearby Indian territory. Apart from the cost in terms of hard fighting, it would not be profitable in any commercial or strategic sense. These regions offer a conqueror nothing except poverty. Strategically, while they are of great importance to India they would be a liability to anyone from the other side of the mountains.

The third premise is that though India today admittedly is not as powerful as Britain, there is no "vacuum" caused by the absence of Britain, militarily or politically. In defense, at least, India is highly competent in relation to her needs. She does not suffer from a false sense of security; she is prepared for defense.

However, India believes that, even though the policies of the Soviet Union and China may not be essentially non-aggressive (she is not as gullible as she is made out), her northern neighbors will not commit aggression without some *raison d'être* or provocation. On this northern front none exists at present. Moreover, war between India and China is a possibility for which, remarkably enough, there has been no historical precedent in the 5,000 years and more of known history. So far India has not been exposed to any diplomatic or military pressure from either China or Russia.

Meanwhile, India holds to the McMahon Line, although some Chinese maps have shown encroachments beyond it. As Mr. Nehru said in a speech in the Indian Parliament on November 20, 1950, the McMahon Line "is our boundary, map or no map. We will not allow anybody to come across that boundary." There has been no change or modification in the policy since. And the boundary he referred to definitely includes Ladakh.

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COMMUNISM IN ICELAND

By Mary S. Olmsted

COMMUNIST efforts to penetrate Iceland have existed for nearly 40 years. Popular support of Communism reached a high point in the 1940s when nearly 20 percent of the electorate supported the Communist Party. Today the Communists are again represented in the Icelandic cabinet, and to the established methods of political penetration has been added a Soviet economic thrust by means of increased trade and, according to reports, by substantial offers of credits and loans from the Bloc. In view of the strategic location of Iceland, its membership in NATO, and its importance as a NATO air base, we may reasonably inquire how and why the Communist movement became a significant factor in Icelandic politics.

Communist ideology was introduced into Iceland about the time of World War I. This was a period of rapid change when Iceland achieved sovereignty, emerged from centuries of economic distress, came into closer contact with the outside world, and established the domestic political patterns which, in essence, still prevail. Until 1918, Iceland was under the domination of Denmark, and domestic politics followed the traditional colonial pattern; the earliest parties were concerned solely with independence, differing only about tactics. After home rule was won and when independence could be foreseen, political parties began to form along economic lines. The Labor Party,[1] which shortly became a Communist target, was founded in 1916 to represent the Federation of Icelandic Labor Unions, established earlier that year. The Progressive Party (*Framsoknarflokkur*), also founded in 1916, represented the farmers and coöperatives. Two other parties, which merged to form the Independence Party,[2] represented the fishing interests and business.

Communism was apparently introduced to Iceland by students who had studied at European universities. Within a few years after the war a Young Communist League with a membership of 70 was reported to exist in Iceland. Certainly the Communist International recognized the existence of a Communist group in Iceland at an early date. At the Second Congress, in 1921, the Icelandic Communists were not affiliated with the Comintern, but the Icelandic representative promised that "when the revolution breaks out in England, we also will raise the red banner."[3] The Third Congress assigned the Icelandic body a consultative vote and the Fourth Congress reported that a fraction of the 450 Icelandic Communists had been admitted to the Comintern. It was the Fifth Congress, however, which gave careful consideration to the development of Communism in Iceland and indicated its wish to bolshevize the Icelandic group as it was then striving to bolshevize the continental Communist Parties. A resolution, "On the Icelandic Ques-

[1] *Althyduflokkur*, literally, the Party of the Common People, also often referred to as the Social Democratic Party.

[2] *Sjalfstaedisflokkur*, often referred to as the Conservative Party, although the literal translation is Independence Party.

[3] *Berichte zum Zweiten Kongress der Kommunistische Internationale*, Hamburg, 1921, p. 361–363.

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tion,"[4] referred to the Presidium by the Icelandic Commission, opened with a Marxist analysis of the political and economic situation in Iceland. The Labor Party was described as having two wings, the Social Democratic and the Communist, the latter characterized as "semi-Communist." The resolution called upon the Communists "to engage in an energetic campaign against the reformist, semi-bourgeois, and social democratic leaders" in order to establish a single revolutionary leadership of the labor movement and to establish a Communist Party. The Communist fraction was instructed to form cells in all the principal enterprises and to establish groups in the trade unions and coöperatives, and to collaborate closely with the Scandinavian Communist Federation.

The Icelandic group followed the Comintern's directives. Communist supporters became active in the fishermen's unions, the day laborers' unions and the women's unions, and also in the coöperatives. Frequent newspaper articles on the subject of Communist activity testified that this was not an underground operation. However, the establishment of the Communist Party of Iceland was delayed six years. It thus became one of the last of the Communist Parties to be formed and was junior even to many of the Asian Parties. The reasons for the delay are not known. Perhaps the Communists' first aim was to gain control of the Labor Party, and only after it became evident that they could not do so, they decided to form their own Party. Or they may have wished to entrench themselves more firmly in the labor unions and in the coöperatives before emerging as a party to face elections. The final impetus may have come from the Comintern which, in the late 1920s, was engaged in a bitter struggle with the Social Democrats all over Europe.

The Communist Party of Iceland (*Kommunistaflokkur Islands*) became a separate entity at the end of 1930 when the left wing of the Labor Party, undoubtedly the Communist fraction which had as early as 1922 affiliated with the Comintern, broke off. The first chairman of the new party was Brynjolfur Bjarnason, a school teacher who had studied in Berlin after the First World War. Nine Communist candidates were presented for the next parliamentary elections, held in June 1931, but none was elected and together they collected only 1,165 votes. However, the Party received 2,673 votes in the parliamentary election of 1933 and 3,098 in the election of 1934, but without electing candidates either year.

The Communist Party provided its own version of its early years in a report for the Seventh Congress[5] of the Comintern in 1935. This report described the labor strife of the early 1930s in which the Communist Party led the workers in numerous strikes and in clashes with the police "with resultant political arrests." It was stated that the labor force of 10,000 workers was organized into the Federation of Icelandic Labor Unions but that 3,000 of the members were under Communist leadership, including 1,900 members

[4] *V^e Congrès de L'Internationale Communiste*, Paris, 1924, p. 462. This resolution does not appear in the English edition of the Fifth Congress. The matter is somewhat confused by the fact that the index of the French edition, as cited, contains a typographical error by which *Islandaise* is listed as *Irlandaise*.

[5] *Die Kommunistische Internationale vor dem VII. Weltkongress*, Moscow, 1935, p. 334–5.

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of the North Iceland labor unions and 300 metal workers in Reykjavik. The Party claimed a membership of 700 in 1934 in 11 localities and six cells in ships and plants. A circulation of 3,000 copies was claimed for the three weekly Communist newspapers.

This account of the Communist Party's early years is probably fairly accurate. The period was one of labor unrest brought about by economic difficulties, political uncertainty and divided leadership in the non-Communist labor movement. Iceland suffered severely from the widespread economic dislocations of the 1930s, and unemployment reached serious proportions. A Nazi party was formed which, although never able to elect a candidate in a national election, was an irritant on the domestic scene. The formation of a sixth party, an offshoot of the Progressive Party, was further indication of the fluidity of the political situation and of the weakness of party structures. There was, moreover, dissension between the right and left wings of the Labor Party, and when, in 1934, it entered the cabinet for the first time, in coalition with the Progressive Party, it was of divided loyalties during the series of strikes that took place in the next few years. The Communist Party was able to claim that it alone was the protector of labor's interests.

Communism thrived in this situation, and in the elections of June 1937 the first Communists were elected to the Althing. They were Einar Olgeirsson, Brynjolfur Bjarnason and Isleifur Hognason, all of whom had been candidates on the first Communist slate in 1930. The Communist ticket received 8.5 percent of the vote. One of the unsuccessful candidates was a schoolteacher, Ludvik Josefsson, who is now a member of the Icelandic cabinet as Minister of Trade and Fisheries.

In 1937, the Communists tried to split the Labor Party again. They pressed for the union of the two parties and for a merger of the Communist and non-Communist labor factions, apparently in conformity with the Popular Front Movement planned at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern. Though the Labor Party refused the invitation, its unity could not be long maintained. In the spring of 1938, Jon Baldvinsson, the head of both the Labor Party and the Labor Federation, died, and a struggle for succession ensued between the leader of the radicals and the leader of the moderates. The moderates won, and the left wing, under Hjedinn Valdimarsson, walked out of the Labor Party and into the Communist Party, which was renamed the United People's-Socialist Party (*Sameiningarflokkur Althydu-Sosialistaflokkur*). Although Valdimarsson took with him a substantial personal following, the dominance of the Communist group quickly became apparent.

Icelandic politics and Iceland's international relations were deeply affected by World War II. British troops occupied Iceland on May 10, 1940, in order to forestall German seizure, and subsequently, after tripartite negotiations, it was agreed that United States troops should replace the British in 1941. The number of foreign soldiers stationed in Iceland, young men with money to spend, became almost as great as the entire adult population of the country. The spirit of nationalism was fanned by the presence of a large alien group. Serious social problems arose. However, unemployment was ended. With military construction and the soaring demand for Icelandic fish in Great Britain, Icelanders experienced prosperity they had never known before, and with

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prosperity came inflation. Another important event occurred in 1944, when Iceland overwhelmingly elected to sever all connections with Denmark and declare itself a republic.

The Communist Party, broadened and strengthened by the addition of the left wing of the Labor Party, faced the polls in 1942, a year in which two parliamentary elections were held. (The second was necessitated by certain constitutional changes.) In the July election of that year, the Communists raised their representation in the Althing to six members, a figure which was increased three months later to ten out of a total Althing membership of 52. These gains reflected not only the results of the defection of the left wing of the Labor Party, but also the switching of party affiliation following the population movement from the farms to the towns. After the 1942 election a non-partisan cabinet held office until 1944 when a new coalition cabinet was formed in which the Communist Party was invited to participate together with the Independence and the Labor Parties. There were two Communist members in the cabinet, one of whom was Brynjolfur Bjarnason, the school teacher, who became Minister of Education.

This event enhanced the prestige of the Communist Party, giving it national status on the same plane with the other parties. Yet if the prestige of the Soviet Union had not been enhanced by its alliance with the Western democracies in the struggle against Nazism, the Communists might not have been invited to participate in the Government.

The break-up of the "strange alliance" between the Soviet Union and the democratic Powers of the West aggravated the controversy in Iceland between the nationalists and the internationalists. Although the Communists used, rather than initiated, this controversy, they fought effectively for the nationalist cause. During the next decade the controversy came to a head on three main issues: the negotiation of the Keflavik Agreement, adherence to NATO and the establishment of the NATO air base. The Communists lost on all three, but their activities have had a divisive effect within Iceland and between Iceland and the Western Powers. The Communist members of the cabinet resigned when the other two parties decided in 1946 to support the United States' request for a civilian air base at Keflavik, and the Communist Party was not invited to participate in the new cabinet. However, the Party found a ready-made propaganda issue in the return of foreigners to Icelandic soil; American technicians and workmen were labelled "invaders." Thus the way was paved for the dispute over Iceland's entry into NATO in 1949. While the Althing was voting on the question the Communists led a riot in front of the Althing House. Stones thrown by the rioters broke the windows of the Althing House, and the shattered glass fell into the blue and white paneled room at the feet of the members as the roll call was taken. The Althing, however, voted in favor of Iceland's entry into NATO, and in 1951, following the negotiation of the Iceland-United States Defense Agreement, the Keflavik airport was transformed into a military base. A few thousand American soldiers have been stationed there since that time, and their presence has continued to be a factor in domestic politics.

In the election of 1949, the Communist Party lost one Althing seat, and in 1953 two more, while their vote fell from 14,077 to 12,422. The reduction in

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strength was undoubtedly affected by the emergence of a new party, the National Defense Party, a left-wing, nationalist group which elected two representatives to the Althing in the 1953 election. In the election of June 1956, the Communists presented candidates in coöperation with the left wing of the Labor Party under the designation of Labor Alliance (*Althydubandalag*), and this group won eight Althing seats and was invited to participate in a new coalition cabinet. Their representatives now hold two portfolios: those of Social Affairs and of Fisheries and Trade.

II

Communist penetration in Iceland has followed the standard pattern, with labor, intellectuals and youth as the principal targets. The first adherents to Communism in the 1920s were youth, and the Party's effort to expand its following among the youth has been aided by the strength of Communism in the teaching profession, a strength indicated by the fairly substantial proportion of schoolteachers listed as Communist candidates for public office. The selection of a Communist as Minister of Education provided the opportunity for the advancement and appointment of Communists to key positions in the schools and colleges, and civil service regulations have hampered the dismissal of teachers on political grounds. The Party has formed youth groups in the junior colleges and in the university. It has also formed a youth organization for those beyond college age, and has repeatedly offered the young men places as Party candidates in local and national elections.

The Communists have devoted particular attention to the intellectuals and artists, and with notable success. One of the best known of the Icelandic intellectuals to turn in the direction of Communism is Halldor Kiljan Laxness, winner of the Nobel prize for literature, who has served as Althing candidate for the Communist Party and as president of the Icelandic-Russian cultural society in Reykjavik. Intellectual and artistic achievements are highly regarded in Iceland, and Halldor Kiljan Laxness, who occupies a position perhaps similar to that of Ernest Hemingway a decade or two ago, has been a useful instrument of Soviet penetration. The Soviet Legation in Reykjavik has supported the Communist Party's efforts in this direction by inviting leading Icelanders to visit Russia and by arranging the visits of outstanding Soviet artists to Iceland. In an isolated but culturally conscious country such as Iceland, the visit of a musician like Khachaturian, who conducted the Icelandic National Orchestra in a program of Russian music, was bound to have a striking impact even though a generous amount of Communist propaganda accompanied his visit. The Soviet Legation has opened information libraries in various parts of the country; Icelandic-Russian cultural societies have been formed in many towns and villages; and instruction in the Russian language has been offered. As public entertainment is limited in Iceland and as people are quite dependent upon their own intellectual capacities, this approach has been effective, although other countries have also embarked on ambitious cultural programs.

The struggle between the Labor Party and the Communists for control of organized labor began in the 1920s, but the Labor Party dominated the executive committee of the Federation of Icelandic Labor Unions (which both

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demonstrates and determines control of labor) until 1942 when the Communists came into power. In 1948 the Labor Party regained control of the executive committee with the help of the two other non-Communist parties, a manœuvre which caused a temporary setback for the Communists but caused dissatisfaction within the Labor Party over the necessary compromises with conservative elements. In 1954, the Communist Party, supported by some left-wing representatives of the Labor Party, gained a majority which was retained at the 1956 convention with the support of some Progressive Party representatives.

All this the Communists have achieved with a card-carrying membership which probably does not exceed 1,500. Communist successes in Iceland have depended on a well-directed exploitation of certain characteristics of the political, economic and social development of the nation and its international relations. Iceland is historically democratic and fundamentally anti-totalitarian, and the ability of the Communists in presenting their doctrines in the guises of nationalism, socialism and trade unionism has made possible the growth of popular support for the Communist Party. The questions to be considered are: what are the features of Icelandic life that have lent themselves to Communist exploitation and how have the Communists exploited them?

The dominant characteristics of political life in Iceland are an intense spirit of nationalism, a sense of frustration in international affairs, a highly personal element, and a fluidity in party structure and party affiliation. The spirit of nationalism emerged from the long struggle for freedom from Denmark and was fostered by a common ancestry, a distinctive language and culture, territorial unity, and a remarkably cohesive society. Icelandic sovereignty is a new and precious thing in the eyes of Icelanders, who have become involved in international affairs with reluctance. The national aspirations of a country of fewer than 160,000 people are of necessity modest. Preservation of the territorial integrity of the nation, the primary objective of every nation's foreign policy, has been in the past and would be again in the future an impossibility for Iceland against any determined major or middle-class Power. At the same time, any suggestion of protective hegemony is acutely distasteful, and collective security is at best the lesser of evils. Withdrawal rather than involvement under these circumstances is preferable to Icelanders, but the strategic location of the country makes isolation and neutrality impossible.

Against this background the Communist Party has presented itself as a national party whose principal objective is ostensibly the preservation of Icelandic sovereignty. Thus opposition to "foreign intervention," whether military, political or economic, has been a leading feature of the Party program. The Communist Party has proclaimed itself the true protector of Icelandic sovereignty and as the principal opponent of what it has termed American imperialism at the Keflavik air base. The Party, of course, denies international affiliation and the Party press usually ignores international developments in which the position of the Soviet Union would obviously be unpopular in Iceland.

Not only her international position but also domestic problems are compli-

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cated by the sparsity of Iceland's population. Friendships and enmities arising from non-political causes affect political relationships to a degree unknown in larger countries. The importance of personal relationships has contributed to the fluidity of party structure, the emergence and disappearance of political parties, splits and mergers, and the switches of political allegiance of individuals. Although the electorate contains fewer than 100,000 voters, since 1937 there have been at least four parties with representation in the Althing, and some of the splinter parties have also won parliamentary seats. In this unstable situation the determined and unwavering Communist nucleus has been able to make quick tactical shifts to take advantage of situations that were essentially personal. In particular, the successive defections from the Labor Party to the Communist Party have been made easier by the general weakness of party structure.

The dearth of natural resources and the dependence upon one export (fish) have created a considerable degree of economic instability in Iceland. Sharp economic fluctuations, strongly affected by international forces beyond Iceland's control, have brought about great prosperity, accompanied by inflation, and followed by acute depression with resultant unemployment. Often the Government has not been strong enough to take forceful measures to ameliorate the situation and has submitted to pressure from the farmers, the labor unions and business interests to the detriment of the national economy. The Communist Party has benefited by economic distress and unemployment, and by the fact that the unemployed and the poor could remember better times. The Labor Party, because of its more responsible approach to the economic problems of the country, has generally taken a less aggressive stand than the Communists, whose demands for higher wages, broader social security protection and full employment have been an important feature in the Party program, second only to that of national sovereignty. During most of its history the Communist Party has been outside the Government, and having no responsibility it could espouse the most extreme demands, thus increasing its popularity with certain segments of the population and providing the means of registering protest against the Government's policies. The more moderate position of the Labor Party has resulted in the loss of some of its members and some Labor Party leaders have been tempted to compromise on labor matters with parties to the right for personal political advantage. At times of labor unrest when the Labor Party has been in the cabinet, it has found its loyalties divided, a situation that has been exacerbated by the division between the rank and file of union members and some of the political leaders who have advanced into other social and political groups.

The structure and development of Icelandic society exhibit many features tending to restrain the growth of Communism. There is no gulf between state and society, there are few class distinctions and no significant minorities, religion is not an issue, social and geographical mobility are high, social communications are effective, and the opportunities for education and advancement are fairly equal. Although the social structure may have been weakened by the changes of the twentieth century, such as the population movement from the farms to the towns, the tremendous economic advances and a closer intellectual contact with the outside world, nevertheless society has not been

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split nor even severely shaken by these forces. The concept of the class struggle probably has even less meaning in Iceland than in the United States.

On the other hand, some of these features are not unfailing deterrents to the rise of Communism. Although a rigid class structure is often found to be conducive to the advance of Communism, the considerable degree of social mobility in Iceland has weakened the non-Communist labor movement. The ready opportunity for the most able and intelligent members of the laboring classes to move upward in society has steadily drained off much of the leadership, especially as the unions in Iceland are too small to provide more than a very few jobs for the career unionist. In some cases, the ex-laboring man who has advanced out of the labor movement has kept his affiliation with the Labor Party, but his ties to the labor movement have been weakened.

To consider another aspect, most Icelanders are related by blood or marriage to most other Icelanders, and many of those in the same age group went to school together (there were, until recently, only two junior colleges and only one university), or worked together on the fishing boats during summer vacations. As a result, it is somewhat difficult for one Icelander to think that another Icelander's intentions are really evil, although he may consider the other foolish, misguided or ill-informed. The rather high degree of trust which Icelanders have for each other has aided the attempts of the Communist leaders to disguise their Party as a purely Icelandic group. Communist penetration throughout Icelandic society would have been impossible if the Party were generally considered to be the agent of a foreign Power. When the Communists can win the interest of someone outside their group and persuade him to become a Party worker or candidate, they know that he will not be ostracized as a traitor. On the contrary, he can expect some support from family and friends, regardless of their political convictions.

Iceland seems fated to remain an extreme example of the plight of small nations in a bipolar, economically unstable world. Strategically important, yet incapable of its own defense, susceptible to international market fluctuations and economic penetration, and even somewhat vulnerable ideologically, Iceland can expect to remain a target of international Communism. However, the advance of Communism is being retarded if not reversed by the fundamentally Westward orientation of the Icelandic people, by the stability of the social structure and by Western coöperation with Iceland's efforts to ameliorate its economic problems. Furthermore, the possible over-extension of the Communists in seeking support from all quarters may lead to a Party split. The balance of forces affecting the situation will shift from time to time, but it is likely that the Communist Party will continue to exert a significant influence in Icelandic politics.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political, Military and Legal

THE NEW CLASS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM. By MILOVAN DJILAS. New York: Praeger, 1957, 214 p. $3.95.

The manuscript of this book was sent abroad for publication and the author is now in prison as a consequence. It is important both for the quality of its thought and for the fact that it is a root-and-branch criticism of Communism, including Titoism, from within the Party itself. Since he was formerly one of the ranking Party leaders in Jugoslavia, his picture of the Communist monopoly of power is particularly telling, and the indictment is made with a typically Montenegrin lack of restraint.

A GUIDE TO COMMUNIST JARGON. By R. N. CAREW HUNT. New York: Macmillan, 1957, 169 p. $3.50.

The Communists have taken great pains to cultivate their jargon, and Mr. Hunt performs a useful function in guiding the reader through the special and double meanings they have attached to words, from Aggression to Voluntarism.

AGENDA FOR ACTION. By JAMES P. WARBURG. New York: Monde Publishers, 1957, 211 p. $4.00.

In his latest tract for the times Mr. Warburg urges a general policy of disengagement and diplomatic accommodation with respect to the Communist Powers—in Europe and in the Far and Middle East.

LA GUERRA FREDDA, 1945–1955. By LUIGI SALVATORELLI. Venice: Neri Pozza, 1956, 337 p. L. 2400.

A hundred articles, most of them appearing in the Turin newspaper *La Nuova Stampa* and dealing with various aspects of international affairs, over the decade 1945–1955.

VON POTSDAM NACH MOSKAU. By MARGARETE BUBER-NEUMANN. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1957, 477 p. DM. 16.80.

The author of "Als Gefangene bei Stalin und Hitler" here recounts her earlier life in the late 1920s and early 1930s—how she came to join the German Communist Party, her life in the movement and her eventual move to Moscow, where she was caught up in the great purges.

THE UNCONSCIOUS MOTIVES OF WAR. By ALIX STRACHEY. New York: International Universities Press, 1957, 283 p. $5.00.

As indicated by the subtitle, "A Psycho-Analytical Contribution," this is an effort to get at the causes and aims of war through the insights provided by Freudian depth psychology. Frequently suggestive, it does not really succeed in bridging the gap between individual and social analysis.

PATHS TO PEACE. EDITED BY VICTOR H. WALLACE. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1957, 397 p. $3.75.

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The score of authors who contribute to this symposium deal both with the various "causes" of war and the various ways by which war might be prevented—economic and population policy, education, religion and world government.

THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE. By Franz Neumann. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1957, 303 p. $6.00.

These posthumously published papers of the late political scholar include his extremely penetrating reflections on the theory of the federal state, the nature of dictatorship, and anxiety and politics.

POLICY FOR THE WEST. By Ion Ratiu. London: Harvill, 1957, 202 p. 16/.

After surveying the present state of the free world and of the continuing Communist threat to it, the author concludes not that the West has lost the initiative, but that it has never had it. His proposals for a positive policy are in the direction of defending and promoting democracy throughout the world—a theme he develops with considerable insight.

INTERNATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM. By George Liska. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957, 223 p. $5.00.

An essay in development of an equilibrium theory of international relations more equipped than traditional balance of power theories to deal with, and inform, the reality.

THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR OF 1914. VOLUME III: THE EPILOGUE OF THE CRISIS OF JULY 1914, THE DECLARATIONS OF WAR AND OF NEUTRALITY. By Luigi Albertini. New York: Oxford University Press, 1957, 772 p. $11.20.

This welcome translation of the third, and last, volume of the late Italian historian's very important study is a minute examination of the catastrophic progress of events from July 29, 1914, to the outbreak of general hostilities.

GERMAN-FRENCH UNITY. By Hermann Lutz. Chicago: Regnery, 1957, 257 p. $5.00.

This book, despite its misleading title, is largely concerned with the old problem of Germany's treatment at Versailles, the question of war guilt and the tribulations of the Weimar Republic.

L'ITALIA A BERLINO (1937–1939). By Massimo Magistrati. Milan: Mondadori, 1956, 465 p. L. 3000.

A useful contribution to the diplomatic history of the two years preceding the outbreak of the Second World War, based on notes and observations by the then Italian chargé d'affaires in Berlin.

THE JAPANESE THRUST INTO SIBERIA, 1918. By James William Morley. New York: Columbia University Press, 1957, 395 p. $6.00.

A scholarly examination, based on extensive use of Japanese and Russian sources, of the question, "What led Japan to intervene in Siberia in the summer of 1918?" A volume in "Studies of the Russian Institute" at Columbia University.

UNITED STATES AND FRENCH SECURITY, 1917–1921. By Louis A. R. Yates. New York: Twayne, 1957, 252 p. $4.00.

A detailed study of the background and purpose of the Treaties of Guarantee concluded between Britain and France and the United States and France in the course of the Versailles Conference.

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THE SWORD AND THE OLIVE. By Sir George Rendel. London: Murray, 1957, 348 p. 28/. (Hollywood-by-the-Sea, Fla.: Transatlantic Arts, $6.75.)

These diplomatic memoirs, of continuing if not absorbing interest, deal chiefly with the Balkans and Near East, where Sir George had numerous posts from before the First World War up through the Second.

THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY. By Gerhard von Glahn. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957, 350 p. $6.50.

A discussion of the law and practice of belligerent occupation, with considerable emphasis on omissions and contradictions in the existing rules.

POLITISCHE GEOGRAPHIE. By Otto Maull. Berlin: Safari-Verlag, 1956, 624 p. DM. 19.80.

In this massive treatise the author, after setting forth some general geopolitical considerations, wends his way, country by country, around the globe.

THE ART OF OVERSEASMANSHIP. Edited by Harlan Cleveland and Gerard J. Mangone. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1957, 150 p. $3.00.

A product of the University of Syracuse's research project on Americans at Work Abroad, this volume contains 11 papers discussing who is doing what abroad, what seem to be the elements of success, and what problems are posed for American education by the prospect of continuing outgoing waves of Americans of all sorts.

GUIDED WEAPONS. By Eric Burgess. New York: Macmillan, 1957, 255 p. $5.00.

A survey of the development of guided weapons since the end of World War II.

DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1954. Selected and Edited by Denise Folliot. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1957, 368 p. $8.80.

The latest volume in this valuable series, complementary to but independent of the annual Survey of International Affairs.

A GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE. By the Rt. Hon. Sir Ernest Satow. New York: Longmans, 1957, 510 p. $15.00.

A welcome new edition of a standard reference work, the previous edition of which was published in 1932.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

THE UNITED NATIONS AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CO-OPERATION. By Robert E. Asher and Others. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1957, 561 p. $2.50.

A comprehensive appraisal of the economic and social work of the United Nations. The authors have qualified optimism for the future, though recognizing that the record of the recent past "leaves much to be desired."

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND POLICY IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES. By P. T. Bauer. Durham (N.C.): Duke University Press, 1957, 145 p. $3.00.

Covering a lot of ground in three lectures, Mr. Bauer of Cambridge draws on his extensive study of underdeveloped countries to set down his views on the types and limits of economic analysis, leading features of underdeveloped economies, and alternative development policies. Diverging from much of the writing in this field, he regards "an increase in the range of effective alternatives open to people, as the principal objective and criterion of economic development."

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MUST MEN STARVE? By Jacob Oser. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1957, 331 p. $4.50.

In reviewing the new controversy over population pressure and world food supplies, the author also discusses land tenure, industrialization, and major problems of economic development generally, and provides a case study of Puerto Rico.

ATOMIC ENERGY APPLICATIONS WITH REFERENCE TO UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES. By B. C. Netschert and S. H. Schurr. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (for Resources for the Future), 1957, 129 p. $2.00.

A brief discussion of technological and economic aspects of using atomic energy in underdeveloped countries, with a descriptive chapter on international agencies.

INCOME AND WEALTH. SERIES V. Edited by Simon Kuznets. Fair Lawn (N.J.): Essential Books, 1956, 242 p. $6.75.

A collection of important papers on the growth of the economies of Britain, France, Germany, Denmark, Hungary and Japan, over long periods in the past.

ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH. By Harvey Leibenstein. New York: Wiley, 1957, 295 p. $6.75.

A serious effort to develop a theory of economic growth in the underdeveloped countries with heavy demographic pressure, based on the concept of economic backwardness as a "quasi-stable equilibrium system."

STERLING AND REGIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEMS. By J. O. N. Perkins. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1957, 171 p. $5.50.

An examination and assessment of the sterling area and European Payments Union as regional payments systems and as contributors to the rebuilding of international trade.

THE WORLD IS CATCHING UP. By Harry Riemer. New York: Fairchild, 1956, 2 v. $10.00.

A textile trade journalist reports personal impressions and professional observations around the world.

CASE STUDIES IN FOREIGN OPERATIONS. New York: International Management Association, 1957, 237 p. $4.50.

Officials of five American companies discuss various aspects of their work abroad.

THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF TRADE UNION FREEDOM. By C. Wilfred Jenks. New York: Praeger (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1957, 592 p. $15.00.

A comprehensive description of recent developments in international actions for the protection of freedom of association for trade union purposes. The author is Assistant Director General of the International Labor Office.

The Second World War

GERMAN RULE IN RUSSIA: 1941–1945. By Alexander Dallin. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957, 695 p. $10.00.

In this well-written, scholarly and impressive study Professor Dallin reconstructs the vast and complex story of the German occupation of Soviet territory. After discussing the background and motivation of the Nazi leadership he treats of German policy and practices with respect to the nationality question, agriculture, industry, labor, religion, propaganda and political warfare.

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THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS: OPERATIONS OVERSEAS. By Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of Military History, 1957, 671 p. $6.50.

NORTHWEST AFRICA: SEIZING THE INITIATIVE IN THE WEST. By George F. Howe. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of Military History, 1957, 748 p. $7.75.

These are two new additions to the official history of the United States Army in World War II. The volume by Bykofsky and Larson, the last of three on the Transportation Corps, deals with operations in the various overseas commands—virtually everywhere on the globe. The volume by Howe, the first to appear in the sub-series on the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, deals with the planning and execution of Operation Torch, the fighting in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia up to the victory in North Africa.

DRIVE. By Colonel Charles R. Codman. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1957, 335 p. $5.00.

War memoirs of General Patton's aide-de-camp, based on letters to his wife; many revealing glimpses of Patton in action.

NORTHERN IRELAND IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR. By John W. Blake. Belfast: H.M.S.O., 1956, 569 p. 30/. (New York: British Information Services, $5.60.)

An authoritative history of Northern Ireland's part in the Second World War. The story lacks unity, however, since the effort was in so many respects merged with that of the United Kingdom as a whole.

THE BATTLE OF CASSINO. By Fred Majdalany. Boston: Houghton, 1957, 309 p. $4.00.

An exceptionally interesting and well-written account of the prolonged, frustrating and tragic battle for Cassino in 1944.

THAT DAY AT GIBRALTAR. By Noel Monks. London: Muller, 1957, 192 p. 15/.

The story of the circumstances under which Admiral Sir Dudley North was, in October 1940, relieved of his command as Commander-in-Chief, North Atlantic, for letting six French warships pass Gibraltar. The issue is not yet closed.

THE SECRET WAR, 1939–45. By Gerald Pawle. New York: Sloane, 1957, 297 p. $5.00.

An interesting account of the quite remarkable achievements and innovations of the Department of Miscellaneous Weapon Development in the British Admiralty.

AIR SPY. By Constance Babington-Smith. New York: Harper, 1957, 266 p. $4.00.

A personal account of the very important rôle of Photographic Intelligence in the Second World War.

DIE WEHRMACHT IM KAMPF. Heidelberg: Vowinckel, 1955–57, 8 v.

This expanding series of monographs includes the following recent additions: "Vom Kuban-Brückenkopf bis Sewastopol: Flakartillerie im Verband der 17. Armee," by Wolfgang Pickert (Vol. 7); "Gebirgsjäger in der Nogaischen Steppe: Vom Dnjepr zum Asowschen Meer, August–Oktober 1941," by Hans Steets (Vol. 8); "Eismeerfront 1941: Aufmarsch und Kämpfe des Gebirgskorps Norwegen in den Tundren vor Murmansk," by Wilhelm Hess (Vol. 9); "Nach Stalingrad—48

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Kilometer!" by Horst Scheibert (Vol. 10); "Panzer-Operationen," by Hermann Hoth (Vol. 11); "Deutsche Seestrategie in Zwei Weltkriegen," by Kurt Assmann (Vol. 12); "Albert-Kanal und Eben-Emael," by Walther Melzer (Vol. 13); "Der Deutsche Griechenland-Feldzug: Operationen der 12. Armee 1941," by Alex Buchner (Vol. 14).

The United States

THE DEMOCRATIC ROOSEVELT. By Rexford G. Tugwell. Garden City: Doubleday, 1957, 712 p. $8.50.

This substantial biography certainly ranks among the most important contributions to the already large body of literature on Franklin D. Roosevelt. Especially good in its coverage of the first years of the Roosevelt era, when Tugwell was closely associated with the President, it is also of much interest for its analysis of F.D.R.'s personality, which the author sees as dominated by the driving sense of his destiny to lead.

A PROPHET IN HIS OWN COUNTRY. By Kenneth S. Davis. Garden City: Doubleday, 1957, 510 p. $5.00.

A quite solid, though hardly definitive biography of Adlai E. Stevenson. Only about one-quarter of the book is devoted to the two Presidential campaigns, but it contains some interesting insights into these grueling aspects of Mr. Stevenson's career.

THE NEW AMERICA. By Adlai E. Stevenson. New York: Harper, 1957, 285 p. $4.50.

A compilation of Mr. Stevenson's speeches and program papers during the 1956 Presidential campaign.

WILLIAM E. BORAH AND THE OUTLAWRY OF WAR. By John Chalmers Vinson. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1957, 212 p. $4.50.

A sympathetic examination of Senator Borah's aims and actions in regard to the problem of America's proper responsibility in promoting world peace. The author makes it evident that the stereotype of Borah as the "perfect isolationist" is by no means an adequate description.

WILSON'S FOREIGN POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE. Edited by Edward H. Buehrig. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957, 176 p. $4.50.

Five essays on aspects of Wilson's foreign policy, by the editor, Charles Seymour, Harold M. Vinacke, Samuel Flagg Bemis and Sir Llewellyn Woodward.

BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY: MYTH OR REALITY? By Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. Evanston (Ill.): Row, Peterson, 1957, 279 p. $4.50.

A major theme of this study of recent American foreign policy is that "the disadvantages of a bipartisan approach to foreign affairs may at times outweigh any advantages the approach may possess." The author is a member of the Department of Political Science at Vassar College.

AMERICAN MILITARY POLICY. By Edgar S. Furniss, Jr. New York: Rinehart, 1957, 494 p. $6.50.

A collection of articles and essays by a number of authors, intended as an exploration of the "military component in American statecraft," its uses and potentialities.

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WRISTON SPEAKING: A SELECTION OF ADDRESSES. By Henry M. Wriston. Providence: Brown University Press, 1957, 263 p. $3.50.

In these wise addresses the former President of Brown University ranges from local campus activities to a world at war, but always with something fresh to say—not the freshness of the unexpected but of an important truth perceived clearly.

THE NEGRO IN AMERICAN CULTURE. By Margaret Just Butcher. New York: Knopf, 1956, 294 p. $4.50.

A study, based on notes and materials left by the late Alain Locke, of the Negro's rôle in, and contribution to, American culture and the arts.

Western Europe

EUROPE AND THE MONEY MUDDLE. By Robert Triffin. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957, 351 p. $5.00.

This important and interesting analysis deals with three large, inter-connected topics: the financial and monetary problems of European recovery; the growth of regional coöperation through the European Payments Union; and the prospects of convertibility. As an American official, Professor Triffin was close to these issues and was one of the architects of the E.P.U. Looking to the future, he believes that convertibility of European currencies must rest on close regional coöperation and suggests suitable arrangements.

HISTOIRE DE LA DÉMOCRATIE CHRÉTIENNE. I: FRANCE—BELGIQUE—ITALIE. By Maurice Vaussard. 332 p. II: LE CATHOLICISME POLITIQUE EN ALLEMAGNE. By Joseph Rovan. 288 p. Paris: Seuil, 1956, Fr. 750 each.

These two companion volumes provide a useful comparative study of the evolution and present state of the Christian-Democratic movements in France, Italy, Belgium and Germany.

COAL AND STEEL IN WESTERN EUROPE. By Norman J. G. Pounds and William N. Parker. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957, 381 p. $6.00.

A geographer and an economic historian combine to examine the growth of Western Europe's heavy industry. Using statistics judiciously they also draw heavily on a wide range of materials concerning, among other things, technology, education, industrial organization, and the characteristics of the local raw material. The result is a most useful book with much original analysis.

DIE BESCHÄFTIGUNGSFREIHEIT DER MONTANFACHARBEITER. By Rudolf Petz and Helmut Zöllner. Berlin: Vahlen, 1956, 197 p. DM. 16.75.

The brief text of this specialized work analyzes the agreement on the relatively free international movement of skilled workers in coal and steel recently concluded by the Schuman Plan countries. The rest is documents.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. Edited by C. Grove Haines. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957, 310 p. $5.00.

Essays, originally prepared as contributions to an international conference on "The Status of European Integration" held in Bologna in May–June 1956.

DE VALERA AND THE MARCH OF A NATION. By Mary C. Bromage. New York: Noonday Press, 1957, 328 p. $4.95.

A serious biography, but rather uncritical and at times wobbly on historical background.

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GRANDEUR ET SOLITUDE DE LA FRANCE. By Marcel-Edmond Naegelen. Paris: Flammarion, 1956, 235 p. Fr. 450.

Observations on the disquieting and unsettled state of the contemporary world and on France's proper rôle in it.

THE TAXIS OF THE MARNE. By Jean Dutourd. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957, 244 p. $3.50.

A translation of the author's angry indictment of French politics and leadership in the years since the First World War. (French original noted here April 1957.)

JOFFRE. By Pierre Varillon. Paris: Fayard, 1956, 602 p. Fr. 1200.

A biography which is at the same time a vigorous defense of Joffre's actions in the First World War.

L'ANNÉE POLITIQUE 1956. By André Siegfried and Others. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1957, 631 p. Fr. 2700.

This volume of the year book includes a chronology of French domestic and foreign politics together with selected documents.

DIE AUFLÖSUNG DER WEIMARER REPUBLIK. By Karl Dietrich Bracher. Stuttgart: Ring, 1957, 797 p. DM. 34.50.

A detailed and scholarly examination of the factors—social, political and personal—that led to the undermining of the Weimar Republic and its destruction in 1930–1933. An important contribution.

THE GERMAN IDEA OF FREEDOM. By Leonard Krieger. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957, 540 p. $7.50.

While this book is chiefly concerned with the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, its relevance to more current concerns—briefly suggested in the epilogue—lies in the author's very penetrating analysis of the peculiar and in many ways unique historical development of the German concepts of liberty and freedom.

LEBENSERINNERUNGEN. By Wilhelm Groener. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1957, 584 p. DM. 32.

These memoirs of General Groener, prepared in the last years before his death in 1939, carry the story of his life only to the middle of 1919. Although some of the material has already been used by historians, the volume is a significant source for the history of the German Army, the First World War and the collapse of the Second Empire.

GERMANY'S NEW CONSERVATISM. By Klemens von Klemperer. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, 250 p. $5.00.

This study in the history of ideas traces the rise of neo-conservatism in Germany after Nietzsche, through the revolution and early years of the Republic and in the victory of the Nazi movement, of which the neo-conservatives were in some measure both precursors and victims.

VOM BONNER GRUNDGESETZ ZUR GESAMTDEUTSCHEN VERFASSUNG. Edited by Theodor Maunz. Munich: Isar Verlag, 1956, 446 p. DM. 34.50.

Essays, relating to German legal and constitutional issues, collected as a *Festschrift* for Hans Nawiasky.

THE UNQUIET GERMANS. By Charles W. Thayer. New York: Harper, 1957, 275 p. $4.00.

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An amusing, lively, but not very serious characterization of postwar Germany.

DIE OSTGEBIETE DES DEUTSCHEN REICHES. Edited by Gotthold Rhode. Würzburg: Holzner, 1956, 336 p.

Essays on the history and economic situation of Eastern Germany.

REFUGEES IN GERMANY TODAY. By Leo W. Schwarz. New York: Twayne, 1957, 172 p. $5.00.

A monograph on the legal situation of refugees in Germany since 1945 and the influence on it of international law.

VERTRÄGE DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND. Cologne: Heymann, 1956–57, 3 v. DM. 132.30.

The fifth, sixth and seventh volumes of Series A of this collection cover multilateral treaties of which the German Federal Republic has been a signatory between 1949 and 1955.

THE AUSTRIAN ODYSSEY. By Gordon Shepherd. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957, 302 p. $6.50.

An able British journalist reviews Austria's vicissitudes from the decline and dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire to the State Treaty of 1955. Of particular interest is his account of resistance activities under the Nazis and the emergence of a definite Austrian patriotism.

MODERN ITALY. By Margaret Carlyle. New York: Rinehart, 1957, 159 p. $1.50.

A convenient, brief general survey.

PORTUGAL AND THE PORTUGUESE WORLD. By Richard Pattee. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1957, 350 p. $7.50.

After a brief historical introduction the author draws a portrait of contemporary Portugal, including chapters on Goa and Portugal's place in the world. On the whole Mr. Pattee feels that Portugal has done very well under the sagacious Salazar régime.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

FACTORY AND MANAGER IN THE USSR. By Joseph S. Berliner. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957, 386 p. $7.50.

In this volume of the studies of the Russian Research Center at Harvard, Mr. Berliner undertakes to study managerial behavior in the Soviet Union—the methods devised, often dubious, to keep an enterprise running and afloat in the peculiar setting of the U.S.S.R. A very useful contribution based both on written materials and interviews with former Soviet managers.

LENINISM. By Alfred G. Meyer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957, 324 p. $5.50.

A survey of Lenin's ideas with a particular effort to indicate those "which have played a rôle in determining and in justifying the conduct of the Communist Party's work, the crucial political decisions, and also the long-range plans and aspirations of the Russian communist movement and the Soviet state." A volume in the series of the Russian Research Center at Harvard.

RUSSIA REVISITED. By Louis Fischer. Garden City: Doubleday, 1957, 288 p. $4.00.

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An experienced observer of the Russian scene here reports his impressions of a visit to Moscow in 1956, and discusses the troubled and tragic events in Eastern Europe in the autumn of that year.

RUSSIA AGAINST THE KREMLIN. By Alexandre Metaxas. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1957, 189 p. $3.00.

An impressionistic report on a visit to Russia, by a French journalist; not very substantial.

KHRUSHCHEV OF THE UKRAINE. By Victor Alexandrov. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957, 216 p. $4.75.

A gossipy, often speculative, biography which does not meet the need for a careful study of the Soviet leader. (A translation of "L'Ukrainien Khrouchtchev." Paris: Plon, 1957, 279 p. Fr. 750.)

THE UNITED STATES AND EAST CENTRAL EUROPE, 1914–1918. By Victor S. Mamatey. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, 431 p. $7.50.

An exceptionally able study both of the American attitude toward, and rôle in, the break-up of the Hapsburg Empire and of the part played by the peoples themselves in creating new states. Based on wide use of source materials in East European languages as well as of American documents.

BULGARIA. Edited by L. A. D. Dellin. New York: Praeger (for the Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee), 1957, 457 p. $8.50.
POLAND. Edited by Oscar Halecki. New York: Praeger (for the Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee), 1957, 601 p. $10.00.

A major undertaking by the Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee has been the preparation, under the general editorship of Robert F. Byrnes, of a series of handbooks dealing with "East-Central Europe under the Communists." The volume on Albania was noted here April 1957. The present volumes on Bulgaria and Poland provide a useful general survey of the history, politics, culture and economy of these nations. Biographies, chronologies and bibliographies are included.

PAASIKIVEN MUISTELMIA SORTOVUOSILTA I–II. By J. K. Paasikivi. Helsinki: Söderström, 1957, 2 v. M. 2000.

The first two volumes of the late Finnish President's memoirs span the so-called Years of Oppression (1890–1914). Paasikivi played a significant rôle in Finnish politics during this period.

IMRE NAGY ON COMMUNISM: IN DEFENSE OF THE NEW COURSE. By Imre Nagy. New York: Praeger, 1957, 306 p. $5.50.

This manuscript, smuggled out of Hungary in the spring of 1957, is a vigorous defense by Nagy, written in 1955 and early 1956, of his policies as Prime Minister. Of special interest in the light of Nagy's actions during the subsequent Hungarian revolution are his stinging attacks on Rákosi, the police state, and forced industrialization and collectivization.

THE HERETIC. By Fitzroy Maclean. New York: Harper, 1957, 436 p. $5.95.

The heretic, of course, is Tito, whom the author, as head of the British mission to the Partisans, knew during the war. Readers of Brigadier Maclean's earlier book, "Escape to Adventure," will find here the same qualities of mind and style. As a biography the book gains from the author's numerous personal contacts with Tito, during and after the war. He is certainly fair to his subject, perhaps unduly so.

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There is little reason, however, for doubting the conclusion that Tito's "fame will be celebrated by future generations of South Slavs, the fame of his virtues and of his vices alike."

TITO, MOSCOW'S TROJAN HORSE. By Slobodan M. Draskovich. Chicago: Regnery, 1957, 357 p. $5.00.

A vigorous criticism of Western policy toward Tito in the last decade, based in part upon the thesis, which is not satisfactorily sustained, that Tito's break with Stalin was of no real significance.

TITOISM: PATTERN FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM. By Charles P. McVicker. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957, 332 p. $6.00.

A monographic analysis of the changes in the political, economic and social system of Jugoslavia in the years since 1948, changes largely initiated by the break with Stalin, but having, in the author's view, a very considerable impact on the country and its inhabitants.

GREECE: AMERICAN AID IN ACTION, 1947–1956. By William Hardy McNeill. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1957, 240 p. $3.00.

Returning to Greece ten years after he made a study of the country for the Twentieth Century Fund, Mr. McNeill surveys the effects of American aid, in villages and on the economy as a whole. He reports progress, discerns some weak spots, and sees the years ahead as crucial. More studies of this sort would be valuable, but it takes a skillful author and observer, an economy that can be reasonably encompassed by one man, and a situation where the impact of aid can be distinguished with some plausibility from other factors.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE ORGANIZATION OF BRITISH CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, 1914–1956. By F. M. G. Willson. London: Allen and Unwin, 1957, 457 p. 32/. (New York: Macmillan, $6.00.)

A detailed account, based on a survey by a study group of the Royal Institute of Public Administration, of the changes which have taken place in the organization of central government in Britain between the outbreak of the First World War and the end of 1956.

THE UNSERVILE STATE. Edited by George Watson. New York: Macmillan, 1957, 324 p. $4.75.

A symposium of essays on the state of liberty in the welfare state. Implicit in the discussions—sometimes explicit—is the political future of British Liberalism.

BRITISH HUSTINGS, 1924–1950. By A. H. Booth. London: Muller, 1956, 292 p. 21/.

An experienced political journalist's view of a quarter-century of British elections and electioneering. Emphasis is on personalities rather than statistics or programs.

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1898. By M. R. D. Foot. New York: Rinehart, 1956, 190 p. $1.50.

A brief but not very satisfactory review.

THE FATEFUL YEARS. By Hugh Dalton. London: Muller, 1957, 493 p. 30/.

In this second volume of his exceptionally interesting memoirs (Vol. I was noted here in April 1954) Mr. Dalton covers the period 1931 to 1945. It is valuable equally

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for the light it throws on politics within the Labor Party and on his activities as Minister of Economic Warfare in the Churchill Government.

FULLNESS OF DAYS. By Lord Halifax. New York: Dodd, 1957, 336 p. $6.00.
Lord Halifax's autobiography is mellow, dignified and humane, but for the political or diplomatic historian does not provide anything new.

MISSION COMPLETED. By Air Chief Marshal Sir Basil Embry. London: Methuen, 1957, 350 p. 25/.
Memoirs of an R.A.F. officer who played a significant rôle in the Second World War and subsequently served as Commander-in-Chief, Allied Air Forces, Central Europe until his retirement in 1955.

THESE ARE THE BRITISH. By Drew Middleton. New York: Knopf, 1957, 290 p. $4.50.
In this excellent portrait of contemporary Britain, the London correspondent of *The New York Times* has confidence in the abiding toughness and resistance of the British character to meet present and future challenges, though he is disturbed by the apathy and lack of political vision of both the middle class and the workers.

LIFE IN BRITAIN. By J. D. Scott. New York: Morrow, 1956, 273 p. $5.00.
An instructive, entertaining and sure-footed "guide to British institutions, traditions and contemporary life." The author, of course, is a Scot.

THEY FOUND REFUGE. By Norman Bentwich. London: Cresset, 1956, 227 p. 18/.
A detailed account of the work done by British Jews since 1933 on behalf of the Jewish victims of Nazism.

CANADA IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1949 TO 1950. By W. E. C. Harrison. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs), 1957, 374 p. $4.50.
This sixth volume in the biennial survey deals with Canada's rôle in the two years that witnessed the formation of NATO and the move to rearmament under the pressure of the Korean War.

PEOPLE FOR AUSTRALIA. By A. Lodewyckx. Melbourne: Cheshire, 1956, 230 p. 30/.
A survey of the world's population and food problem with particular reference to Australia's ability to support a much larger population and to produce still more food for export.

THE AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH. By Brian Fitzpatrick. Melbourne: Cheshire, 1956, 337 p. 30/.
A most informative survey of Australian life, society and politics, including a helpful chapter on the mysteries of Australian pronunciation.

WELFARE IN NEW ZEALAND. Edited by K. J. Scott. New York: Oxford University Press (for the New Zealand Institute of Public Administration), 1956, 130 p. $2.50.
Papers relating to the development of a welfare state in New Zealand.

CYPRUS: A PORTRAIT AND AN APPRECIATION. By Sir Harry Luke. New York: Roy, 1957, 190 p. $5.00.
An affectionate and informal history of the island by an author who knows Cyprus

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intimately, having served not only there but in many other parts of the Levant. One chapter deals, rather severely, with the Enosis movement.

The Middle East

TURKISM AND THE SOVIETS. By Colonel Charles Warren Hostler. New York: Praeger, 1957, 244 p. $7.00.

Colonel Hostler's monograph is divided into two parts: a brief handbook describing the various Turkish peoples in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Soviet Union; and a discussion of the ideals and development of Pan-Turkism inside and outside the Soviet Union. An important contribution to a subject on which the literature in Western languages is scant.

ISLAM IN MODERN HISTORY. By Wilfred Cantwell Smith. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, 317 p. $6.00.

The Director of the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University writes a thorough and penetrating study of the impact of the modern world upon religious thought and practice in the Moslem world. He deals separately with the specific situation in Turkey, Pakistan, India and in the Arab world.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR REGIONAL PEACE. Washington: Public Affairs Institute, 1957, 332 p.

Recommendations for a broad, new American policy to attack Middle Eastern problems through a large-scale development program "without strings."

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A journalistic survey of Middle Eastern problems concentrating on the Palestine question and including the story of the Near Eastern crisis of 1956.

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Three informal lectures delivered at Brandeis University by Israel's Ambassador to Great Britain: population problems, Israel and the Middle East, and the Bedouin.

ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST. By Harry B. Ellis. New York: Ronald Press, 1957, 260 p. $4.00.

An informative account by a correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor* with several years' experience in the Middle East, chiefly devoted to the story of the conflict between Zionism and Arab nationalism.

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the formation of unstable governments in which no party or coalition can operate effectively.

MODERN INDIA. By Sir Percival Griffiths. New York: Praeger, 1957, 255 p. $5.75.

A general survey, of which about two-thirds is devoted to the years since the achievement of independence.

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A good deal of the history and local color of Goa is presented in this report by an author who has also written on the French wartime resistance movement. With regard to the Portuguese-Indian dispute, "What particularly struck the author of these lines was to discover that the Goanese evinced no desire to exchange the sovereignty of Lisbon for that of New Delhi."

INDIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS. New York: Manhattan Publishing Co. (for the Carnegie Endowment), 1957, 229 p. $3.00.

This volume is one of a series of studies on international organization under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In general the stress is upon the utility of the U.N.'s peaceful functions as against collective enforcement measures.

CHANGING SOCIETY IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN. By A. K. Nazmul Karim. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, 173 p. $1.50.

A study of the impact of British rule on social change and social stratification, with special reference to East Pakistan.

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A study of governmental efforts to encourage peasant settlement in the Dry Zone, which covers about two-thirds of the land area of Ceylon.

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An analysis of Burma's policy and voting record in the U.N.

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A succinct review of the constitutional, political, social and economic situation of the new Malayan Federation.

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In the author's view, "the central current of Thai history in recent centuries cannot be properly understood or analyzed apart from the changing position of the overseas Chinese. Yet Western and Thai historians alike have paid them scant attention." This scholarly history is an effort to fill this gap.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

ASIEN: ERDTEIL DER ENTSCHEIDUNG. By Walter Leifer. Würzburg: Marienburg-Verlag, 1957, 223 p. DM. 14.80.

A brief general survey of contemporary Asia, from the Middle East to Japan.

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A useful general survey, based on considerable knowledge and documentation, of the rise and advance of Communist movements in the countries of Eastern and Southern Asia.

SOVIET RUSSIA IN CHINA. By Chiang Chung-cheng (Chiang Kai-shek). New York: Farrar, Straus, 1957, 392 p. $5.00.

This "Summing-up at Seventy" is obviously a document of much importance both for the historical evidence it provides—though this must be checked against other sources—and for Chiang Kai-shek's outlook and recommendations. After a résumé of the rise of Communism in China, President Chiang turns to policy issues for the future. In general he feels that "the only effective strategy against the Russian Communists' protracted warfare is one of total war"—though by this he does not mean a blundering into a war of annihilation with thermonuclear weapons. Rather he would seem to propose a local war of national revolution in East Asia.

TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND OTHER POWERS, 1929–1954, TOGETHER WITH CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS AFFECTING THE INTERESTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA. Compiled and Edited by Yin Ching Chen. Washington: Sino-American Publishing Service, 1957, 491 p. $12.00.

A useful compilation.

THE CHINESE ECONOMY. By Solomon Adler. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957, 276 p. $5.00.

A very favorable appraisal of the economic achievements of Communist China, in line with the author's rather appalling adaptation of Pope:

"For forms of government let fools contest,
Whate'er is best industrialised is best."

LAND OF BLUE SKY. By Ivor Montagu. London: Dobson, 1956, 191 p. 25/.

A report on a trip—a relative rarity in recent years—to the Mongolian People's Republic, in the autumn of 1954.

JAPAN BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. By Hugh Borton and Others. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1957, 327 p. $4.75.

The six papers comprising this highly useful volume were prepared by leading scholars—Messrs. Borton, Jerome B. Cohen, William J. Jorden, Donald Keene, Paul F. Langer and C. Martin Wilbur—in conjunction with a study group of the Council on Foreign Relations. They deal with Japanese domestic politics, Communism, international aspects of Japan's economic situation, literary and intellectual currents, relations with Communist China, and Japan's postwar diplomacy.

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A monograph, based on Japanese sources and war crimes trials, on the civil-military rivalry in the 1930s and early 1940s and on the coördinating machinery which was set up to handle this rivalry.

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A detailed and authoritative account of the contribution of seapower in the Korean War.

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QUEST FOR A CONTINENT. By Walter Sullivan. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957, 372 p. $5.50.

An exceptionally interesting history of Antarctic exploration, by a *New York Times* correspondent who has himself been on three American expeditions to the continent.

Africa

REVOLT ON THE NILE. By Anwar El Sadat. New York: Day, 1957, 159 p. $3.00.

This book, by an Egyptian army officer who participated in the movement that overthrew King Farouk and who is now managing editor of an official newspaper, is significant for the insights it provides both into the background to the revolution and the temper of mind of the Nasser régime.

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A general handbook on Egypt compiled by a competent research staff and containing vital statistics, material on history, geography, political institutions, social behavior, economic problems and other aspects of Egyptian life.

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The interesting story of the sudden flowering of an organized labor movement in an extremely primitive economy.

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An able and illuminating study, by the Director of Economic Affairs of the Ministry of Overseas France, on the condition, problems and prospects of economic relations between France and French territories in Africa.

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A revised and largely rewritten edition of an outstanding study, first published in 1938, of Africa south of the Sahara.

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Three essays by a professor of economics at the University of Cape Town, dealing with the historical development of the South African economy, apartheid and recent constitutional struggles.

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By Ruth Savord

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

Telephone Installer visits a home-town family to install color telephones. He and his truck are familiar sights around town. Courtesy rides with him wherever he goes.

Research, manufacturing and a certain amount of overall direction are handled centrally because experience has proved it is the better way.

But the job of serving people locally is handled by the operating companies throughout the country, organized to fit the needs of the particular sections they serve. Your Bell Telephone Company is one of these.

It is distinctly a home-town business because of location and the personal nature of telephone service.

Ninety-five out of every one hundred calls are local. They're made-to-order right on the spot. On all matters of service you have the very great advantage of dealing direct with the company and its people.

Your telephone company is managed locally and it pays taxes locally. You probably know men and women in your town who work for it and have seen and heard of their active part in the welfare of the community. Local people have an investment in the business through their ownership of A.T. & T. stock.

Wherever there are new telephone buildings going up, or jobs of maintenance, there are jobs for local builders, architects, painters, carpenters, plumbers, electricians and many others.

So the Bell Telephone Company isn't something far away but close to you wherever you live and a friendly, helpful part of the community. That is the way you'd like it to be and we try very hard to run it that way.

BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM

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—H. Speier, Head of the Social Science Division

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

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

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

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

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

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